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I. INTR ODU CTI ON
A struggle is underway to preserve the domestic pedigree of American
constitutional law. A number of justices – constituting a majority of the current
Court – have demonstrated their willingness to treat foreign and international
legal materials as both relevant and persuasive. They have done so, moreover, in
such hotly contested areas of constitutional law as capital punishment,1 gay
rights,2 and federalism.3 Justice Breyer is perhaps the Court's most frequent and
outspoken proponent of comparative constitutional analysis 4 ; likewise, Justices
O'Connor5 and Ginsburg6 have called publicly upon both lawyers and judges to
1

See Atki ns v. Vi rgi nia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J., joi ned by O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Gi nsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (noti ng that " wi thi n the worl d communi ty, th e i mposi ti on of th e
death penalty for cri mes commi tted by me ntally retarded offenders i s overwh el mi ngl y
di sapproved"); Th ompson v. Oklah oma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988) (pl urality opi ni on of
Stevens, J., joi ned by Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (i nvoki ng i nternati onal consensus
agai nst executi on of juve ni les, and rei terati ng "th e relevance of the vi ews of th e i nternati onal
communi ty i n determi ni ng wh eth er a puni sh ment i s cruel and unusual"); Foster v. Fl ori da, 537
U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng from de ni al of certi orari) ("'[A]ttenti on to the judgme nt
of oth er nati ons' ... can h elp gui de thi s Court wh en it deci des wh eth er a parti cular puni sh ment
vi olates the Ei gh th Amendme nt.") (quoti ng THE F EDERALIST N O. 63 (James Madi son)); Kni ght v.
Fl ori da, 528 U.S. 990, 995-97 (1999) (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng from de ni al of certi orari) (noti ng th e
" growi ng number of courts outsi de the United States" that have h el d that l ength y delay i n
admi ni steri ng th e death penalty can render th e ulti mate executi on "i nh uman, degradi ng, or
unusuall y cruel ," and observi ng furth er that "the Court has found parti cularl y i nstructive
opi ni ons of former Commonwealth nati ons i nsofar as th ose opi ni ons reflect a l egal tradi ti on that
al so underl ies our own Ei gh th Amendme nt").
2
See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (Kennedy, J., joi ned by Stevens, Souter,
Gi nsbur g & Breyer, JJ.) (ci ti ng, i nter alia, an advi sory commi ttee report to th e Briti sh Parliament,
and Dudgeon v. Uni ted Ki ngdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981), a deci si on of th e European Court of
Human Ri gh ts).
3
See Pri ntz v. Uni ted States, 521 U.S. 898, 977-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., joi ned by Stevens, J.,
di ssenti ng) (suggesti ng that, " relevant poli ti cal and structural differences" notwith standi ng,
Eur opean experi ence with federali sm " may noneth el ess cast an empi ri cal li gh t on th e
conseque nces of di fferent sol uti ons to a common l egal probl em").
4
See, e.g., Ni xon v. Sh ri nk Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402-03 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurri ng);
Foster v. Fl ori da, 537 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng); Kni ght v. Fl ori da, 528 U.S. at 995-97
(Breyer, J., di ssenti ng); Pri ntz, 521 U.S. at 977-78 (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng); Stephen Breyer, The
Supreme Court and the New International Law, Keynote Address to the 97th Annual Meeti ng of th e
Ameri can Soci ety
of
Internati onal
Law,
Washi ngton,
D.C.,
Apr.
4,
2003,
http://www.supreme courtus.gov /publ i ci nfo/speech es/sp_04-04-03.html ("What coul d be more
exci ti ng for an academi c practi ti oner or judge than the gl obal legal enterpri se that i s now upon
us?" ); see also Eli zabeth Greath ouse, Justices See Joint Issues With the EU, W ASH. POST, Jul y 9, 1998,
at A24 (quoti ng Justi ce Breyer on th e desi rability of " cross-fertili sati on of U.S.-E.U. l egal i deas" );
Li nda Greenh ouse, Appealing to the Law's Brooding Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, Jul y 6, 1997, § 4, at 4 (noti ng
th e "i ntri gued" reacti on of l egal academi cs to Justi ce Breyer's use of comparati ve consti tuti onal
law i n hi s Printz di ssent).
5
Justi ce O'Connor re centl y attracted attenti on for a speech given i n Atlanta i n late 2003 i n whi ch
sh e commented: "I suspect that over ti me we will rely i ncreasi ngl y, or take noti ce at l east
i ncreasi ngl y, on i nternati onal and forei gn courts i n exami ni ng domesti c i ssues." Bill Ranki n, U.S.
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make greater use of foreign legal materials. Chief Justice Rehnquist has also
dabbled in comparative constitutional law 7 and even encouraged other judges to
do the same.8 At other times, however, he has landed in the company of Justices
Scalia and Thomas,9 who have reacted to the use of foreign jurisprudence with
scorn.10 "We must never forget that it is the Constitution for the United States
justice is honored: O'Connor says court has its ear to the world, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 29, 2003, at
A3. Much of th e attenti on was negati ve. See, e.g., Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the
Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (Mar. 25, 2004) [h erei nafter Hearing on H.R. Res.
568] (openi ng Statement of Steve Chabot, Chairman of th e Subcommi ttee on th e Constituti on)
(quoti ng Justi ce O'Connor wi th di sapproval); Ji m Wooten, Mass. ruling a powder keg, ATLANTA J.CONST., Nov. 23, 2003, at P6; Danger from foreign legal precedent, W ASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at
A20 (same); Mark Steyn, Gettin' with the beat, N AT' L R EV., Nov. 24, 2003, at 56 (same). Justi ce
O'Connor's posi ti ve i ncli nati ons toward comparative l egal analysi s are not new and h ave not
al ways attracted such criti ci sm. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why
American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 F ED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20-21 (" Our
fl exi bility, our ability to borrow i deas from other l egal systems, i s what will enable us to remai n
progressi ve, with systems that are able to cope with a rapi dly sh ri nki ng worl d."); Greath ouse,
supra note 4, at A24 (quoti ng Justi ce O'Connor on the i ncreased willi ngness of th e Supreme Court
to consul t European Court of Justi ce ruli ngs, and on th e need for U.S. judges and lawyers to l earn
about European l aw).
6
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Gi nsburg & Deborah Jones Merri tt, Affirmative Action: An International
Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. R EV. 253, 282 (1999) (" In my vi ew, comparati ve anal ysi s
emphati cally i s relevant to th e task of i nterpreti ng consti tuti ons and enforci ng h uman ri gh ts." );
Ruth Bader Gi nsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 22 Y ALE L. & POL' Y R EV. ___ (forth comi ng 2004) (reproduci ng Justi ce
Gi nsbur g's speech of August 2, 2003 to th e Ameri can Constituti on Soci ety); see also Grutter v.
Bolli nger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Gi nsbur g, J., joi ned by Breyer, J., concurri ng) (citi ng th e
Internati onal Conventi on on th e Eli mi nati on of Al l Forms of Racial Di scri mi nati on).
7
See Washi ngton v. Gl ucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (Reh nqui st, C.J.) (noti ng th e degree
of controversy enge ndered i n oth er countri es by th e i ssue of ph ysi cian-assi sted sui ci de); id. at 734
(argui ng i n l i gh t of th e Dutch experience wi th decri mi nali zed euthanasia that ph ysi cian-assi sted
sui ci de carri es wi th it a " ri sk of abuse" to whi ch legi slatures may respond); Planned Parenth ood
of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Reh nqui st, C.J., concurri ng i n th e judgme nt i n
part and di ssenti ng i n part) (ci ti ng Ger man and Canadian deci si ons on aborti on).
8
See William Reh nqui st, Constitutional Courts – Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND I TS B ASIC
LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND F UTURE - TUR ERMAN-AMERICAN S YMPOSIUM 411-12 (Paul Ki rchh of &
Donal d P. Kommers eds., 1993) (" [N]ow that constituti onal law i s soli dl y grounded i n so many
countri es, it i s ti me that th e United States courts begi n l ooki ng to th e deci si ons of oth er
constituti onal courts to ai d i n th ei r own deli berati ve process."); Chi ef Justi ce William H.
Reh nqui st, Foreword to DEFINING THE F IELD OF C OMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at viii-i x
(Vi cki C. Jackson & Mark Tush net eds. 2002) [h erei nafter Reh nqui st, Foreword] (" I am si mpl y
repeati ng what I've sai d previ ousl y: i t's ti me the U.S. courts be gan l ooki ng to the deci si ons of
other constituti onal courts to ai d i n th ei r own del i berative process.").
9
See Atki ns v. Vi rgi nia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (Reh nqui st, C.J., joi ned by Scalia & Th omas, JJ.,
di ssenti ng) (" I fail to see ... h ow the vi ews of oth er countri es regardi ng th e puni sh ment of th ei r
ci ti zens provi de any support for th e Court's ul ti mate determi nati on." ).
10
The depth of th ei r scorn h as been most apparent i n death penal ty cases. In one i nstance, Justi ce
Scalia awarded th e majority "the Pri ze for th e Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabri cate 'nati onal
conse nsus'" for dari ng to i nvoke, i nter alia, " the vi ews of ... members of th e so-call ed 'worl d
communi ty.'" Atki ns, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., di ssenti ng). Meanwhile, i n thei r clash es over th e
constituti onality of l engthy executi on delays, Justi ce Th omas has more than once taunted Justi ce
Breyer for resorti ng to forei gn juri sprudence. See Kni ght v. Fl ori da, 528 U.S. at 990 (Th omas, J.,
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that we are expounding," warns Justice Scalia; "the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution."11

On questions of

federalism, comparative analysis is simply "inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution."12 In the Eighth Amendment context, "notions of
justice" belonging to the "world community" are "irrelevant" because they "are
(thankfully) not always those of our people."13 As for the constitutionality of
laws against homosexual conduct, mere discussion of "foreign views" is not only
"meaningless dicta," but also "dangerous," 14 lest the Court "impose foreign
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."15 Justice Scalia's battle cry has not gone
unheard. In Congress, resolutions condemning judicial use of foreign law have
been introduced16; some have even called for the impeachment of judges who

concurri ng i n deni al of certi orari) (" [W]ere th ere any such support i n our own juri sprude nce, it
woul d be unnecessary for proponents of th e clai m to rely on th e European Court of Human
Ri ghts, th e Supreme Court of Zi mbabwe, th e Supreme Court of India, or the Pri vy Counci l." );
Foster v. Fl ori da, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Th omas, J., concurri ng i n deni al of certi orari ) (" Justi ce Breyer
has onl y added anoth er forei gn court to hi s li st while still faili ng to ground support for thi s
th eory i n any deci si on by an Ameri can court." ). One comme ntator has likened the exchanges
wi thi n th e Court over th e use of forei gn l egal material s to "a Punch and Judy sh ow," i n whi ch
" [j]ust about every ti me the court ci tes forei gn material s, Scalia and/or Cl arence Th omas di ssent."
Ti m Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court care what other countries think?, S LATE, at
http://sl ate.msn.com/i d/2098559 (Apr. 9, 2004). Notwith standi ng th e di sdai n h e has often
expressed for the use of forei gn l egal auth ori ty, h owever, Justi ce Scalia has hi mself i nvoked th e
practi ces of "forei gn de mocraci es" i n di ssent. McIntyre v. Ohi o El ecti ons Commi ssi on, 514 U.S.
334, 381-82 (1995) (Scalia, J., joi ned by Reh nqui st, C.J., di ssenti ng) (citi ng th e experi ence of
Engl and, Canada, and Australia as evi dence that "th e prohi biti on of anonymous campai gni ng i s
effecti ve i n protecti ng and e nh anci ng de mocrati c el ecti ons" and th erefore consti tuti onal ).
11
Th ompson v. Oklah oma, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., di ssenti ng).
12
Pri ntz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.).
13
Atki ns v. Vi rgi nia, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., di ssenti ng); see also supra note 10 (revi ewi ng th e
reacti ons of Justi ces Scalia and Th omas to th e use of forei gn juri sprudence i n Ei ghth Amendme nt
cases).
14
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., di ssenti ng).
15
Id. (quoti ng Foster v. Fl ori da, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Th omas, J., concurri ng i n de ni al of certi orari )).
16
Withi n th e last year, no fewer than th ree such resol uti ons have been i ntroduced i n th e House of
Representatives. See Constituti onal Preservati on Resol uti on, H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). House Resol uti on 468, for
example, si ngl es out Justi ces Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, and Gi nsbur g by name for cri ti ci sm. See
H.R. Res. 468 at 3-4 (citi ng Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (Kennedy, J.); Atki ns v. Vi rgi nia,
536 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J.); Kni ght v. Fl ori da, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng from
deni al of certi orari); and a speech given by Justi ce Gi nsbur g, ci ted above i n note 6). It furth er
" remi nds th e Justi ces ... of the judi cial oath they took as a precondi ti on to assumi ng th ei r
responsi biliti es, "and that "the executive and l egi slati ve branch es ... are th e onl y branch es wh ose
offi cers are elected by th e peopl e." Id. at 4. Th e most recent of th ese resol uti ons, dubbed th e
"Reaffi rmi ng Ameri can Independence Resol uti on" by its auth or and co-sponsored by fi fty-ni ne
other Republi can me mbers of the House, al so si ngl es out recent Supreme Court deci si ons by
name and warns that "i nappropriate judi cial reliance on forei gn judgments, laws, or
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impose foreign law upon Americans.17 The barbarians, it would seem, are at the
gate.
"We must never forget it is the Constitution for the United States that we
are expounding": in certain senses, the warning is meaningless.

Surely the

members of the Court are at little risk of mistaking any other document for the
Constitution. If the point is instead to emphasize that Americans must remain
masters of their own destiny, no one on the Court has suggested otherwise. To
acknowledge the propriety of comparative analysis hardly entails a surrender of
sovereignty. As Justice Breyer has modestly observed:
[T]his Court has long considered as relevant and informative the
way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly
comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly
comparable circumstances. ... Willingness to consider foreign
judicial v iews in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that
from its birth has given a "decent respect to the opinion of
mankind." 18
A fairer statement of Justice Scalia's position might be that the Constitution
enshrines a set of uniquely American values and ideas, and only those values and
ideas. But the connections between "our" law and "the ir" law cannot be avoided.
The law of the Constitution is not free of outside influences; nor has it ever been.
And if any of the ideas or values enshrined in the Constitution were ever unique,

pronouncments [si c] th reatens the soverei gnty of th e United States, th e separati on of powers and
th e Presi dent's and th e Senate's treaty-maki ng auth ority." H.R. Res. 568 at 2-3; see Congressman
Tom Feeney, Should Americans Be Governed By the Laws of Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, or the European
Union?, at http://www.h ouse.gov /feeney/reaffri mati on.htm [si c] (last accessed Apr. 13, 2004);
Wu, supra note 10. Th e resol uti on argues, i nter alia, that "Ameri cans sh oul d not have to l ook for
gui dance on h ow to l ive th ei r lives from th e often contradi ctory deci si ons of any of h undreds of
other forei gn organi zati ons." Id. at 2. It quotes Justi ce Scalia's opi ni on i n Printz with approval,
whil e citi ng Lawrence v. Texas as an example of illi cit judi cial reliance upon " the pronounce me nts
of forei gn i nstituti ons." Id. (quoti ng Pri ntz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11, and ci ti ng Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at
2474). The Subcommi ttee on th e Constituti on of th e House Judi ciary Commi ttee has h el d
h eari ngs on th e resol uti on. See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5.
17
See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 42-43 (statement of Representati ve Jerrol d Nadl er,
Ranki ng Member of th e Subcommi ttee on th e Constituti on) (quoti ng televi sed remarks of
Representative Tom Feeney, and accusi ng the resol uti on's sponsor s of engagi ng i n "i nti mi dati on"
of th e judi ciary by th reateni ng i mpeach ment); Conservative Alerts, Tell Supreme Court to follow
Constitution, NOT Europe: Support the 'Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution,' at
http://capwi z.com/si cmi nc/i ssues/al ert/
?al erti d=5435001&type=CO (last vi si ted Apr. 13, 2004), cited in Wu, supra note 10.
18
Kni ght v. Fl ori da, 528 U.S. at 997 (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng from deni al of certi orari) (quoti ng THE
DECLARATION OF I NDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)).
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this nation has endeavored only to spread them, not to monopolize them.
Federal constitutional law influences, and is influenced by, other bodies of law.
It both presupposes19 and invokes20 English common law; it enjoys complex
relationships of reciprocal influence with fifty bodies of state law 21; abroad, it
influences judges in the reasoned elaboration of legal principles that have in
some cases been borrowed directly from the U.S. Constitution.22 Cross-border
trade in constitutional thinking is a reality, 23 and the U.S. is a major participant –
no less so because some of its judges may prefer to export than to import.24
The interconnectedness of federal constitutional law to other bodies of law
illustrates a broader phenomenon of constitutional adjudication. To expound a
19

See, e.g., B ERNARD B AILYN , THE I DEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN R EVOLUTION 188 (1967);
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 18-20 (1977); G. Edward White, Recovering
Coterminous Power Theory: The Lost Dimension of Marshall Court Sovereignty Cases, in ORIGINS OF THE
F EDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 68 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992)
(quoti ng th e vi ew expressed by Chi ef Justi ce Oliver Ell sworth i n hi s capacity as ci rcui t judge i n
Uni ted States v. Williams, reported in CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Apr. 30, 1799, that "th e
common law of England had become part of th e 'laws of the Uni ted States' withi n the meani ng of
Arti cl e III").
20
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII (" In Suits at common l aw, ... the ri ght of trial by jury sh all be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be oth erwi se re-exami ned i n any Court of the United
States, than accordi ng to th e rul es of th e common l aw." ); id. amend. V (i nvoki ng, but not defi ni ng,
"li berty," " property," and " due process of l aw" ).
21
See, e.g., Samuel C. Kaplan, "Grab Bag of Principles" or Principled Grab Bag?: The
Constitutionalization of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. R EV. 463 passim (1998) (emphasi zi ng th e i nfl uence
of state common l aw upon federal constituti onal law); Judi th S. Kaye, The Common Law and State
Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 R UTGERS L.J. 727, 738-52
(1992) (di scussi ng wh eth er state courts sh oul d empl oy common law or constituti onal approach es
i n response to common l egal questi ons, and wh ether such approaches sh oul d be federal or state
i n character); Hans A. Li nde, State Constitutions Are Not C ommon Law: Comments on Gardner's
Failed Discourse, 24 R UTGERS L.J. 927 passim (1993) (bemoani ng th e extent to whi ch state courts
have adopted federal consti tuti onal doctri ne as state constituti onal law).
22
See, e.g., P.K. Tri pathi, Perspectives on the American Constitutional Influence on the Constitution of
India, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN V IEWS OF THE AMERICAN I NFLUENCE 72-89 (Lawrence
Ward Beer ed., 1979) (descri bi ng Indi an borr owi ng of A meri can fundame ntal ri ghts doctri ne as
" di rect and massi ve"); Susan Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants:
The Japanese Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415 passim (1999) (descri bi ng th e
post-war i mposi ti on of Ameri can constituti onal i deal s and l anguage upon Japan).
23
See, e.g., Th e Honourabl e Clai re L'Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and
the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 16-27 (1998) (descri bi ng th e
" gl obali zati on" of h uman ri ghts law, dri ven i n part by i ncreased "dial ogue" among judges and
courts); Anne-Mari e Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 H ARV. I NT'L L.J. 191, 192-204
(2003) [h erei nafter Slaugh ter, Global Community] (descri bi ng a " gl obal communi ty of courts" that
engages i n " constituti onal cross-fertili zati on"); Anne-Mari e Slaugh ter, Judicial Globalization, 40 V A.
J. I NT'L. L. 1103, 1109-23 (2000) (descri bi ng " substantial and growi ng judi cial cross-fertilizati on" i n
th e areas of h uman ri gh ts law and constituti onal law).
24
See, e.g., Mark Tush net, Returning With Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 325 (1999); Slaughter, Global Community,
supra note 23, at 199 (deemi ng it hi stori cally " unusual" that Ameri can courts are " begi nni ng to
borrow as wel l as to l end").
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constitution – any constitution - is to draw upon and contribute to a body of
principle, practice, and precedent that transcends jurisdictional boundaries.
Commonalities emerge across jurisdictions because constitutional law develops
within a web of reciprocal influences, in response to shared theoretical and
practical challenges. These commonalities are at points so thick and prominent
that the result may fairly be described as generic constitutional law – a skeletal
body of constitutional theory, practice, and doctrine that belongs uniquely to no
particular jurisdiction. The mere fact that courts borrow law from one another is
unremarkable. But generic constitutional law exists for more systematic reasons
having to do with interlocking relationships of history and sovereignty,
adjudicative methodology, the broad normative appeal of various rights, and the
tensions underlying judicial review itself. Some have suggested, to the contrary,
that constitutional law is, for cultural and social reasons, less likely to be shared
than other types of law.25 Such factors undeniably justify or even necessitate
departures from practice elsewhere; nor can the force of sheer nativism be
disregarded.26

The fact that profound dissimilarities and prejudices exist,

however, only makes the phenomenon of generic constitutional law all the more
remarkable.
A search of law journals on Westlaw and LexisNexis reveals very few
appearances of the phrase "generic constitutional law," all of them the work of
Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, who has on occasion used the
term as a mild epithet to criticize the manner in which state judges adopt federal
constitutional formulae in lieu of ascertaining whether an approach specific to
state law might be in order.27 Even by itself, the word "generic" already carries

25

See Frederi ck Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING W ORLD 256 (Joseph S. Nye ed., 2000) (fi ndi ng " reason to suspect that th e
ph enomenon of preferri ng i ndi genous l aw maki ng for its own sake i s especially true i n th e
maki ng of consti tuti ons"); ALAN W ATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 8 (2d ed. 1993) ("Soci eti es largel y i nvent th ei r consti tuti ons, thei r politi cal and admi ni strative
systems, even i n these days th eir economi es; but thei r private law i s nearl y al ways taken from
others.") (quoti ng S.F.C. MILSOM , H ISTORICAL F OUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW, at i x (1969)).
26
Compare, e.g., Schauer, supra note 25, at 260 (" Cl early, i n some pol iti cal quarters, avoi di ng
Ameri can i nfl uence just because it i s Ameri can often appears to be a dri vi ng force.") with supra
notes 9-14 and accompanyi ng text (hi ghli gh ti ng th e vi ews of Justi ces Scalia and Th omas).
27
See Hans A. Li nde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. R EV. 215, 219-21 (1992),
reprinted in Li nde, supra note 21 (" [M]ost state courts do not free th emselves from Supreme Court
formul as but treat th em as generi c constituti onal law."); Hans A. Li nde, E Pluribus – Constitutional
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unfavorable connotations: it can imply something undifferentiated, substandard,
undistinguished. None of these critical or negative connotations are intended
here. As used here, generic constitutional law is a descriptive concept, not a
normative or evaluative one. Least of all does it comprise a grand theory of law.
The claim that constitutional law across the globe is undergoing a process of
teleological convergence is well beyond the scope of the concept. It is not argued
that there exists a "universal natural law" of constitutional democracy - that
certain constitutional principles are universally true or good, and that it is the
task of judges worldwide to ascertain them.28 Nor is it argued that constitutional
principles - or constitutions themselves - inevitably serve certain goals that are
conducive to human flourishing,29 though the existence of generic constitutional
law may be taken as inconclusive evidence in support of such arguments.
The goal of this essay is, instead, to explore why, as Justice Breyer puts it,
"[j]udges in different countries increasingly apply somewhat similar legal
Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. R EV. 165, 175 (1984) ("What sh oul d a state court do wh en faced
wi th a consti tuti onal clai m that i s ph rased i n federal termi nol ogy and cites onl y federal cases,
th ough th ere coul d be an equi val ent clai m under the state constituti on? ... Must consti tuti onal
clai ms be i denti fied by brand, or i s there such a thi ng as generi c constituti onal law?"); see also
James L. Oakes, Hans Linde's Constitutionalism, 74 OR. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1995) (quoti ng
I NTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE H ANS LINDE TO AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 99 (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995)); Mi chael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial
Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review
of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. R EV. 231, 236 n.15 (1998) (quoti ng Li nde, Are State Constitutions
Common Law?, supra, at 219); Joh n E. Si monett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota
Constitution, 20 W M. MITCHELL L. R EV. 227, 231 n.16 (1994) (citi ng Li nde, Are State Constitutions
Common Law?, supra, at 219).
28
Ri chard Posner, No Thanks, We Already H ave Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jul y-August 2004,
at xx (opi ni ng that the use of forei gn law as auth ority fli rts with th e " di scredited" i dea of
" uni versal natural law" ); see, e.g., Ri chard Epstei n, The "Necessary" History of Property and Liberty, 6
CHAPMAN L. R EV. 1, 2, 7-8, 27-28 (2003) (argui ng that natural lawyers i dentifi ed " certai n powerful
pri nci pl es" i nvol vi ng the protecti on of li berty and property "to whi ch any consci enti ous
appli cati on of consti tuti onal di scourse or doctri ne must tur n i f i t i s to meet th e mi ni mum
standards of i ntellectual coh erence and practi cal common sense" ). See generally Suji t Ch oudh ry,
Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74
I ND. L. J. 819, 890 (1999) (descri bi ng th e " uni versali st" sch ool of constituti onal i nterpretati on and
its normative premi se that "the presence of a l egal pri nci pl e i n many l egal systems i s evi dence of
its truth or correctness" ).
29
See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, S KEPTICISM AND F REEDOM 19 (2003) (" [T]h ose pri nci pl es and practi ces
that endure ge nerally do so because th ey serve well th e communi ti es of whi ch they are a part." );
R USSELL H ARDIN , LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140 (1999) (argui ng that
constituti ons cannot survi ve unl ess th ey coordi nate behavi or i n a way that creates opportuni ti es
for mutual gai n); Epstei n, supra note 28, at 7-8, 27-28 (argui ng that utility-maxi mi zi ng l egal
arrangeme nts that harness "th e best i n h uman nature" have been "i ntuited and acted upon by
justi ces of all politi cal persuasi ons" ). See generally Mark Tush net, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 Y ALE L.J. 1225, 1238-69 (1999) (offeri ng exampl es and criti ques of
"functi onali sm" i n comparati ve constituti onal analysi s).
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phrases to somewhat similar circumstances." 30 Three explanations are suggested
here. First, constitutional courts experience a common theoretical need to justify
the sometimes countermajoritarian institution of judicial review. This concern,
and the stock responses that courts have developed, amount to a body of generic
constitutional theory. Second, courts employ common problem-solving skills in
constitutional cases. The use of these skills constitutes what might be called
generic constitutional

analysis.

Third, courts face a tangle of overlapping

influences, largely not of their own making, that encourage the adoption of
similar legal rules. These similarities make up a body of generic constitutional
doctrine. Each will be considered in turn. It is the contention of this essay that
the combination of theory, methodology and doctrine amounts to nothing less
than generic constitutional law. In closing, this essay discusses why the idea of
generic constitutional law should matter to academics, and whether judges can
or should resist its development.
II. GENERI C C O NSTITUTI O NA L T HEOR Y
A. The Ubiquity of the Countermajoritarian Dilemma
What are the concerns of constitutional theory? Harry Wellington has
suggested that the contemporary debate in this country centers upon a handful
of interrelated questions:
[W]hat are the sources of law available to participants in
constitutional adjudication? What is a good argument? ... What
counts as the justification for a Supreme Court decision interpreting
the Constitution? [B]y what r ight does the Court use a particular
interpretive method? [H]ow are the other branches of government
and indiv iduals regulated by the Court to keep the justices in their
place? 31
There is nothing exclusively American about these questions. One can expect the
relative emphasis that they receive to vary from place to place, along with the
answers that happen to be in vogue, but such shifts in emphasis and intellectual

30
31

Breyer, supra note 4.
H ARRY H. W ELLINGTON , INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 47 (1990).
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fashion occur domestically as we ll.

Some theoretical inclinations, such as

interpretivism 32 and originalism, 33 may for now be characteristically American.
But the most fundamental of these concerns – the one from which the others
derive their urgency – has a generic flavor, and that concern is the
countermajoritarian dilemma. As John Hart Ely puts it, "the central function, ...
is at the same time the central problem, of judicial review: a body that is not
elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the
people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like." 34
Elsewhere as here, interference by unelected judges with the acts of elected
officials is vulnerable to both popular opposition and theoretical criticism. This
tension does not always express itself in the same conceptual vocabulary. These
differences in vocabulary reflect in part the fact that judges face different points
of departure when exploring the limits of their power: some inherit a position of
32

See Davi d M. Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 AM . J. COMP. L. 131, 136-37 (1996) (observi ng that,
whil e most consti tuti onal courts fi rst resolve questi ons of textual i nterpretati on th en turn to
apply pri nci ples of rati onality and proporti onality, th e U.S. Supreme Court " typi cally
understands i ts rol e as an i nterpreti ve one from be gi nni ng to e nd").
33
See L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 32-33 (" Ori gi nali sm, an extremel y controversial questi on
i n th e United States, i s usuall y si mpl y not th e focus, or even a topi c, of debate el sewh ere." ).
34
JOHN H ART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1980); see, e.g., ALEXANDER B ICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS B RANCH : THE S UPREME COURT AT THE B AR OF POLITICS 16-28, 128 (2d ed. 1986) (1962)
(" [S]ome do and some do not care to recogni ze a need for keepi ng the Court's consti tuti onal
i nterventi ons wi thi n bounds that are i mposed, th ough not cl early defi ned, by th e th eory and
practi ce of politi cal democracy."); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-6, at
302-11 (3d ed. 2000) (observi ng that, for decades, " many of th e most promi nent, and most skill ful,
constituti onal theori sts [have] treated the questi on of th e legiti macy of judi cial revi ew as itself th e
central problem of consti tuti onal law," and citi ng many exampl es); Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 282-83 (1957)
(" [T]o affi rm that the Court supports mi nori ty preferences agai nst majoriti es i s to deny that
popular soverei gnty and pol iti cal equali ty, at least i n th e traditi onal sense, exi st i n the United
States[.]"). The tensi on between judi cial revi ew and democracy di sappears, of course, if one
i ncorporates judi cial revi ew i nto the very defi niti on of de mocracy, as has often bee n suggested,
under the rubri c of " constituti onal democracy" or oth erwi se. See, e.g., JOHN R AWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 231-40 (1996 ed.) (argui ng that "a democrati c constituti on i s a pri nci pl ed expressi on i n
hi gh er law of the politi cal i deal of a peopl e to govern i tself i n a certai n way," and that a supreme
court h elps to realize thi s i deal by empl oyi ng " publi c reason," whi ch citi zens and l egi slators need
not al ways do); ELY, supra, at 73-183 (arti culati ng a " representati on-rei nforci ng th eory of judi cial
revi ew" under wh i ch courts poli ce and uph ol d th e democrati c process). Si milarl y, th e tensi on
abates to th e extent that th e vi ews of th e judi ciary foll ow th ose of th e el ectorate, whether as a
conseque nce of di rect or i ndi rect popular control of judi cial sel ecti on or oth erwi se, or to th e
extent that courts are si mpl y i neffectual i n th e face of politi cal opposi ti on. See, e.g., Dahl, supra, at
284-86 (argui ng that, owi ng to th e regul arity wi th whi ch Supreme Court justi ces are appoi nted
and th e attenti on that i s gi ven to thei r views, "th e poli cy vi ews domi nant on th e Court are never
for l ong out of li ne wi th th e poli cy vi ews domi nant among th e lawmaki ng majoriti es of th e
Uni ted States"); GERALD N. R OSENBERG, THE H OLLOW H OPE: CAN COURTS B RING ABOUT S OCIAL
CHANGE? passim (1991) (argui ng that courts cannot usually effect social reform wi th out th e
support of th e el ected branch es).
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strength relative to the elected branches, others a position of weakness. All of
these points, however, fall along a single continuum. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
has remarked of the proliferation of judicial review over the past half century:
"The provisions of the constitutions vary, the structure of the court systems may
differ, but the underlying ideas are the same."35 Foremost among these ideas is
the deceptively simple notion that "political power should be constrained by
law." 36 All courts with the power of judicial review struggle to define the
implications of this idea, and their struggles inevitably resemble one another.
Consider the United Kingdom, a country in which the countermajoritarian
dilemma might be supposed not to exist. It is conventional wisdom that, in lieu
of a written constitution, the U.K. possesses an unwritten constitutional order
premised upon the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, or legislative
supremacy.37 The few known cases in which English judges have claimed the

35

Reh nqui st, supra note 8, at vii.
Id.
37
See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, I NTRODUCTION TO THE S TUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23-32, 39-70
(10th ed. 1959) (defi ni ng th e Engl i sh " consti tuti on," and i dentifyi ng parliamentary soverei gnty as
one of its compone nts); JEFFREY G OLDSWORTHY, THE S OVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT 1 (1999); S IR
W ILLIAM W ADE & CHRISTOPHER F ORSYTH , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 25-31 (8th ed. 2000). Th e U.K.'s
membersh i p i n th e European Uni on and i ts adopti on of the Human Ri ghts Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.),
have strength ened the judi ciary's hand but are, at l east i n th eory, consi stent with some noti on of
parliamentary soverei gnty, al beit perhaps an attenuated one. In enacti ng th e European
Communi ti es Act 1972, ch. 68 (Eng.), Parliament i nstructed domesti c courts to gi ve E.U. law
precedence over domesti c law, and the courts have responded by suspe ndi ng and even stri ki ng
down parliamentary legi slati on. As a conseque nce, the courts have suspended and struck down
Briti sh l egi slati on for i ncompati bility with EU law. See, e.g., R. v. Sect'y of State for Transport ex
parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 661-65, 676 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Goff) (granti ng
i njuncti ve reli ef agai nst enforcement of a fi shi ng vessel regi strati on l aw); R. v. Sect'y of State for
Empl oyment ex parte Equal Opportuni ties Comm'n, [1995] 1 A.C. 1, 26-28, 31-32 (H.L.) (speech of
Lord Keith) (h ol di ng that a Briti sh statute guaranteei ng severance pay and compensati on for
unfai r di smi ssal di scri mi nated i ndi rectly agai nst femal e empl oyees, i n vi olati on of E.U. law);
Lord Irvi ne of Lai rg, The Development of Human Rights in Britain under an Incorporated Convention
on Human Rights, 1998 PUB. L. 221, 229. Judi cial review of parliamentary l egi slati on for
conformi ty with EU law i s sai d to be consi stent wi th parliamentary soverei gnty for th e reason
that Parliament itself ch ose to give EU law supremacy over domesti c law and i s free to revi sit that
deci si on. See P.P. Crai g, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame, 11 Y.B. EUR.
L. 221, 247-49 (1991) (di scussi ng the opi ni on of Lord Bri dge i n Factortame II). Neverth el ess, th e
fact that Briti sh courts may now " di sappl y" acts of Parliament amounts to a " revol uti onary
change" that casts doubt upon th e "hall owed rul e that Parliament cannot bi nd i ts successors."
W ADE & F ORSYTH , supra, at 28. Moreover, furth er chall enges to th e traditi onal understandi ng of
parliamentary soverei gnty await. As Crai g observes, i f Parliament were expli citl y to state its
i ntent to depart from E.U. law i n a parti cular context, "the courts mi gh t foll ow the nati onal
statute, but th ey mi ght al so state that thi s form of 'partial compliance' with [E.U.] law i s not
possi bl e; that whil e th e United Ki ngdom remai ns i n th e [E.U.] i t cannot pi ck and ch oose wh i ch
nor ms of [E.U.] law to compl y with ." Id. at 253. At th e extreme, parliamentary soverei gnty may
itself fall vi cti m to th e passage of ti me "i f it ever comes to be ge nerall y accepted by Bri ti sh l egal
36
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ability to strike down legislation are several centuries old.38 In particular, Chief
Justice Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case39 has sometimes been read as asserting a
power on the part of judges to "controul Acts of Parliament" contrary to natural
law. 40 Whatever Coke may have originally intended, however, the interpretation
that has since prevailed is that Bonham's Case merely establishes a rule of
statutory construction.41 Indeed, Coke himself offered this interpretation in later
years.42 It is natural to think, moreover, that the Glorious Revolution of 1688
resolved any lingering doubts in favor of Parliament.43 In short, Bonham's Case is
no Marbury v. Madison.44

offi cial s that Parliament has l ost its auth ority to with draw Bri tai n from the European
Communi ty." GOLD SWORTHY, supra, at 244.
Th e Human Ri ghts Act 1998, i n turn, i s th e means by whi ch th e U.K. has ch osen to
i ncorporate th e European Conventi on on Human Ri ghts i nto domesti c law. Th e Act does not
empower judges to stri ke down parliamentary l egi slati on. Instead, i t di rects judges ei th er to
i nterpret challenged l egi slati on i n a manner consi stent with the Conventi on or, if that i s not
possi bl e, to i ssue a nonbi ndi ng " declarati on of i ncompati bility" upon wh i ch it i s i n Parliament's
sol e di screti on wh eth er to act. If Parliament does not respond to a domesti c rul i ng wi th
appropriate amendi ng l egi slati on, h owever, the result i s likel y to be an adverse ruli ng by th e
Eur opean Court of Human Ri ghts that bi nds th e U.K., as a si gnatory to th e Conventi on. See, e.g.,
Lord Irvi ne, supra, at 225-29; Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, Human Rights and the British
Constitution, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 105 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oli ver eds., 4th ed.
2000); Geoffrey Marshall, The United Kingdom Human Rights Act, 1998, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 108-114 (criti ci zi ng th e Act on the grounds
that it fail s, both i n th eory and i n practi ce, to i ncorporate the Conventi on i nto Briti sh law).
38
See Lord Irvi ne of Lai rg, Judges and Decision-Makers: The The ory and Practice of Wednesbury
Review, 1996 PUB. L. 59, 61 (di scussi ng Bonh am's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.
1610), and Day v. Savadge, Hob. 85, 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B. 1614)).
39
8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
40
See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 37, at 6 & n.34 (deemi ng thi s view a "hi stori cal myth []" );
Davi d Jenki ns, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law Constitution,
36 V AND. J. TRANSNAT' L L. 863, 884-89, 958 (2003) (noti ng that " subseque nt i nterpretati ons, or
mi si nterpretati ons," of Bonham's Case h ave "asserted th e pri macy of hi gh er l egal pri nci ples over
contrary acts of Parliament," but al so argui ng that Coke's view i mpli citly " support[s] a li mited
constituti on based upon democrati c l egi ti macy"). Coke soon th ereafter repeated hi s suggesti on
that judges mi ght stri ke down statutes on the basi s of th e common l aw. See id. at 888 n.189
(di scussi ng Rowl es v. Mason, 2 Brownl . & Gol ds. 192, 198, 123 Eng. Rep. 892, 895 (C.P. 1612)).
41
See, e.g., Lord Irvi ne, supra note 38, at 61; Jenki ns, supra note 40, at 887-88; Paul Crai g, Public
Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory, 2000 PUB. L. 211, 213 (" [M]any contend that Coke was
argui ng for no more th an a strong r ul e of constructi on, rath er than a power to i nvali date as
such .").
42
See Lord Irvi ne of Lai rg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and
America, 76 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1, 3-4 (2001).
43
See id.; Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 90.
44
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803) (establi shi ng th e power of the federal judi ciary to i nvali date
l egi slati on on consti tuti onal grounds). Th e Engli sh judi ciary has, h owever, demonstrated that
th e power of i nterpretati on may be used so aggressi vely as to nul lify statutory language. Th e
well known Anisminic case concer ned th e ability of the judi ciary to revi ew th e deci si ons of a
commi ssi on charged with deci di ng cl ai ms for compe nsati on respecti ng property sei zed by th e
Egyptian governme nt i n th e prel ude to th e Suez Cri si s. In bl unt and unambi guous terms, th e
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In fact, there exists a thriv ing debate in the U.K. over the normative
foundations and proper extent of judicial review.45

A detour into English

administrative law is ne cessary to illustrate the origins of the debate – though, as
will become apparent, no firm distinction can be drawn in the U.K. between
administrative and constitutional law. In the U.K. as in the U.S., it is routine for
judges to review the substance of administrative action. In the U.S., such review
ordinarily occurs at the federal level under the comprehensive scheme
established by the Administrative Procedure Act and thus requires no special
normative justification. English judges, however, lack such a general statutory
warrant, and the standards they apply are of their own creation. In the absence
of an express statutory mandate, the question therefore arises: what is the
justification for administrative review?
The conventional justification is the so-calle d ultra vires doctrine. The
argument is a simple one. It is the role of the courts to police the adherence of
executive action to its legislative bounds. To this uncontroversial premise, the
English courts add a variety of assumptions as to legislative intent.

One

particular assumption – the proverbial nose of the camel under the tent - enables
them to review the substance of executive action: when the legislature confers
discretion upon the executive, it is presumed to intend that the discretion be
exercised reasonably.46 Champions of the ultra vires doctrine deem it decisive
relevant statute precl uded all judi ci al revi ew of th e commi ssi on's deci si ons: " Th e determi nati on
by th e commi ssi on of any appli cati on made to th em under thi s Act shall not be call ed i nto
questi on i n any court of law." Inevitably, a di sappoi nted clai mant sough t judi cial review of th e
commi ssi on's deci si on. Th e House of Lords, i n i ts capacity as the nati on's hi gh est court, di d not
purport to stri ke down th e language i n questi on, but i nstead mani pulated th e di sti ncti on
between juri sdi cti onal error and l egal error to read the ouster clause i nto obli vi on. See Ani smi ni c
Ltd. v. Forei gn Compe nsati on Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 169-75 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Rei d); id.
at 206-10 (speech of Lord Wil berforce); see also J.A.G. GRIFFITH , THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY
106-08 (5th ed. 1997) (observi ng that Anisminic " sh ows h ow, on occasi on, the courts will resi st th e
strongest efforts of the government to excl ude them from revi ewi ng executi ve di screti on"); Th e
Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf of Barnes, Droit Public – English Style, 1995 PUB. L. 57, 69 (noti ng with
sati sfacti on that Parliament has not si nce dared to enact si milar language).
45
See Paul Crai g, Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 63 passim
(1998) (provi di ng an overview of the debate); Crai g, supra note 41, at 231 & n.4 (canvassi ng
promi ne nt literature on both si des).
46
Th e relevant standard of revi ew i s phrased i n hi ghly deferential terms and i s known as
Wednesbury revi ew, named for th e deci si on i n Associ ated Pi cture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corporati on, [1948] 1 K.B. 223. See DAVID R OBERTSON , JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE H OUSE OF
LORDS 238-62 (1998) (di scussi ng Wednesbury revi ew and i ts variants); infra notes 217-221 and
accompanyi ng text (descri bi ng Wednesbury revi ew, and contrasti ng i t wi th th e more stri ngent
proporti onality revi ew of th e ki nd common el sewh ere i n Europe).
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that the doctrine is consistent with parliamentary sovereignty: because
parliamentary sovereignty is a fact of the unwritten constitution – indeed, the
touchstone of legitimacy – conformity to parliamentary sovereignty is the sine
qua non of any theory of judicial review. On this v iew, even if it is a legal fiction
on the part of judges to impute an entire body of procedural and substantive
requirements to legislative intent, the fiction is a useful and indispensable one.47
It dictates, however, that courts are powerless to strike down legislation openly.
Others criticize the ultra vires doctrine as a malign fiction from which the
courts must liberate themselves if they are to fulfill the ir true role in the
constitutional order.48 These critics – a number of prominent judges among them
- emphasize that the courts are in truth engaged in the enforcement of
substantive legal norms, notwithstanding the intent of Parliament, and have been
at this task for centuries. The legitimacy of this enterprise, they argue, rests upon
the normative force of the legal principles themselves. It is a logical extension of
the argument to insist that some principles are so compelling that neither the
executive nor the legislature may override them. Indeed, on this view, the notion
of parliamentary sovereignty is itself contingent upon adequate normative
justification.49 In the words of High Court judge Sir John Laws, the absence of a

47

See, e.g., Ch ri stopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the
Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122, 136 (1996) ("No one i s so
i nnoce nt as to suppose th at judi cial creativity does not for m th e grounds of judi ci al revi ew; but
by adh eri ng to th e doctri ne of ul tra vires the judi ciary sh ows that i t adheres to i ts proper
constituti onal positi on[.]" ); Mark Elli ott, The Ultra Vires Doctrine In a Constitutional Setting: Still the
Central Principle of Administrative Law, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 129, 134-58 (1999) (acknowl edgi ng
" sh ortcomi ngs" of "traditi onal" ul tra vi res doctri ne, but urgi ng a " modi fied versi on" based upon
th e "rul e of law" i n li eu of "taki ng th e constituti onally unacceptabl e step of chall engi ng th e
soverei gnty of Parliament").
48
See, e.g., Crai g, supra note 41, at 231-37; Th e Hon. Si r Joh n Laws, Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB.
L. 72, 78-79 & 79 n.23; Lord Wool f, supra note 44, at 65-69 (li keni ng th e ultra vi res doctri ne to a
"fai ry tal e," and argui ng that courts need not uph ol d l egi slati on that undermi nes or destroys th e
" rule of law").
49
See, e.g., Crai g, supra note 45, at 86-90 (argui ng that judi cial revi ew " can onl y be l egiti mated ...
by aski ng wh eth er there i s a reasoned justi fi cati on whi ch i s acceptable i n normati ve terms" );
Crai g, supra note 41, at 230-31 (argui ng for th e view that " Parliament has soverei gn power,
provi ded that th ere i s th e requi si te normati ve justi fi cati on for that power"); Laws, supra note 48,
at 86-87 (" [T]he doctri ne of Parliamentary soverei gnty cannot be vouch ed by Parliamentary
l egi slati on; a hi gh er-order law confers i t, and must of ne cessi ty li mit i t."); Th e Hon. Si r Stephen
Sedl ey, Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda, 1995 PUB. L. 386, 389-91 (descri bi ng a " new
and still emergi ng consti tuti onal paradi gm" of " bi-polar soverei gnty" and "fundame ntal h uman
ri gh ts" predi cated upon " shared percepti ons" of soci ety's needs); Lord Wool f, supra note 44, at 6769 (argui ng that parliamentary soverei gnty must yiel d to th e "rul e of law," upon wh i ch
" parliamentary democracy" i s premi sed).
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"sovereign text" means that "the legal distribution of public power consists
ultimately in a dynamic settlement, acceptable to the people, between the
different arms of government."50
There is a "clear parallel," as Lord Irvine has observed, "between the
debate in America about the powers of the courts in relation to the Constitution,
and the discourse in Br itain concerning the desirability of parliamentary
sovereignty."51 The difference is one of vocabulary and degree, not kind. At the
heart of both debates lie the same questions: "How much power should the
courts have over the other branches of government? And in what circumstances,
if any, is it appropriate for the judicial branch to overrule elected legislators and
administrators in order to safeguard individual or group interests?"52 Indeed, the
example of the U.K. suggests a broader point: if a country with no written
constitution and a tradition of legislative supremacy nevertheless generates
debate over the extent to which judges can and should invalidate legislation,
such conflict may be expected in other countries as well.53
B. Two Approaches to the Definition and Justification of Judicial Power
The debate in the U.K. highlights not only the core challenge of generic
constitutional theory – namely, the articulation and justification of the limits of
judicial power - but also the two basic approaches that may be adopted in
response. The first may be called the hierarchy of laws approach; the second, the
core interests approach. Under the hierarchy of laws approach, legal rules fall
within

categories – constitutional, legislative, or judicial – according to their

formal status or origin. These categories constitute a simple hierarchy that, if
observed, keeps both judicial and legislative power within the limits of
legitimacy: constitutional law trumps legislation, which in turn trumps judge-

50

Laws, supra note 48, at 81.
Lord Irvi ne, supra note 42, at 6.
52
Id.
53
Cf. Vi cki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the
Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 599 (1999)
(compari ng Canada and th e U.S.) (noti ng that "i ssues of th e l egiti macy and th e scope of judi cial
activi sm and of deference to l egi slative judgme nts can emerge early even i n new consti tuti onal
systems." ).
51

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art23

16

Law:

GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

16

made or common law. In the event of conflict between two legal rules, one need
only determine the nature of the relevant rules – constitutional, legislative, or
judicial – in order to know which rule, and which branch of government,
prevails. 54 This hierarchical sorting approach is implicit among the champions of

54

Th e executi ve branch and admi ni strati ve agenci es are obvi ousl y an i mportant source of law as
well, but th ei r posi ti on i n the hi erarch y i s hardl y enviabl e: i n theory and i n practi ce,
admi ni strati ve lawmaki ng i s subject to both constituti onal and l egi slati ve restrai nts, as defi ned
and enforced by th e judi ciary. Admi ni strative law possesses, at best, th e force of l egi slati on and,
at worst, no l egal force at all, dependi ng upon th e extent to whi ch the judi ciary deci des that th e
l egi slature has del egated lawmaki ng auth ority. Moreover, i n the i nevi tabl e absence of preci se
statutory standards to gui de judi cial review of agency acti on, admi ni strati ve law tends i n practi ce
to amount to a body of judge-made law, as ill ustrated by the Bri ti sh exampl e. See supra text
accompanyi ng note 46 (di scussi ng h ow Briti sh courts have fashi oned pri nci pl es of admi ni strative
law usi ng the fi cti on of l egi slati ve i ntent). For th ese reasons, th e positi on of admi ni strati ve law
wi thi n the hierarchy i s very much wi thi n th e control of th e judi ci ary.
Courts control th e scope of agency deci si onmaki ng i n two steps, both of whi ch entail th e
exerci se of consi derabl e judi cial di screti on. Fi rst, th ey determi ne th e extent of th e agency's
di screti on by i nterpreti ng th e rel evant statute. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Counci l , Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (requi ri ng revi ewi ng courts to defer to
" reasonabl e" agency i nterpretati ons of governi ng statutes i f Congress h as not " di rectly spoken to
th e preci se questi on at i ssue," but beggi ng th e questi on of wh at consti tutes a " reasonabl e"
i nterpretati on). Second, th ey determi ne whether the agency has remai ned wi thi n the (judi cially
defi ned) li mits of i ts di screti on. See, e.g., Admi ni strative Procedure Act § 706(2), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(2004) (di recti ng courts to set asi de "agency acti on, fi ndi ngs, and concl usi ons" that are "arbitrary,
capri ci ous, an abuse of di screti on, or oth erwi se not i n accordance wi th law" ). In France, for
example, admi ni strati ve judges are very rel uctant to fi nd that th e executi ve enjoys absol ute
di screti on. See L. N EVILLE B ROWN & JOHN S. B ELL, F RENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 254, 257 (5th ed.
1998). To a greater extent than mi gh t be expected i n th e U.S. or U.K., French admi ni strative
courts are apt to concl ude that the admi ni strati on possesses no di screti on whatsoever, and to
substitute thei r own judgme nt for that of th e admi ni strati on. See, e.g., Soci été Civil e Sai nte-Mari e
de l 'Assompti on, Consei l d'État, Oct. 20, 1972, Lebon 657, concl . Mori sot, discussed in Sophi e
Boyron, Proportionality in English Administrative Law: A Faulty Translation?, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL
S TUD. 237, 248 (1992) (assessi ng, de novo, wh ether and to what extent constructi on of a major
motorway coul d i nfri nge upon th e grounds of a mental h ospital, and ul ti mately auth ori zi ng th e
expropriati on of a buil di ng, but not th e constructi on of a road juncti on); Dame Ebri et Uni on
Syndi cal e de Défense des propri étaires du Massi f de la Clape, Conseil d'État, May 2, 1975, concl .
Guillaume, in 1975 L'ACTUALITÉ JURIDIQUE-DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 311, discussed in Boyron, supra,
at 242 (deci di ng, de nov o, wh eth er ei ght h ectares of land constituted a "pi cturesque si te" that
coul d not be modi fi ed with out special auth ori zati on); Gomel , Consei l d'État, Apr. 4, 1914, Lebon
488, discussed in B ROWN & B ELL, supra, at 258 (deci di ng, de novo, wh eth er th ere exi sted a vi ew of
"architectural val ue" that justi fied bui l di ng restri cti ons). In i ntermediate situati ons, when th e
admi ni strati on enjoys l i mi ted di screti on, th e courts wi ll vi sit the meri ts of agency deci si onmaki ng
under an " erreur manifeste" standard, B ROWN & B ELL, supra, at 256-58, that i s remi ni scent, at l east
i n language, of th e "arbitrary or capri ci ous" standard i mposed i n thi s country by th e
Admi ni strati ve Procedure Act. Even wh en a matter has been commi tted wh olly to the di screti on
of th e executi ve, h owever, th e admi ni strati ve courts wi ll ensure that th e admi ni strati on has
" commi tted no error of l aw or fact," id. at 254 (emphasi s added), and has acted for a proper
purpose, id. (citi ng th e doctri nal rul e agai nst détournement de pouvoir). Th e fact that th e judi ciary
exerci ses control over admi ni strative deci si onmaki ng i n two stages can make judi cial supervi si on
especiall y diffi cult to restri ct. Courts can mani pulate the di sti ncti on between the two stages to
th ei r own advantage: if th e l egi slature does not permit th e courts to revi ew how an agency has
exerci sed its di screti on, th e courts may neverthel ess stri ke at what th e agency has done si mply by
narrowi ng th e limits of th e agency's di screti on. See, e.g., Broml ey London Borough Counci l v.
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parliamentary sovereignty, for whom the legislative pedigree of a rule is enough
to establish its dominance over any common law rule, however ancient the latter
may be. In the same vein, it is conventional in this country to say that legislation
must yield to the Constitution; indeed, to assert otherwise is to incur a heavy
burden of explanation.
Under the core interests approach, by contrast, courts resolve interbranch
conflict by looking not to the origin of legal rules, but to their substantive
content. Interests that are seen as intrinsically deserving of judicial protection
will be given such protection. The authorship or pedigree of the legal rules
purporting to uphold or restrict those interests may be relevant but need not be
decisive. In the U.K., for example, this approach is exemplified by those who
argue that the courts possess the power to review legislation for consistency with
fundamental legal principles, notwithstanding the absence of a written
constitution. The core interests to be protected may be those of the governed, or
those of the branches themselves, though judges have an incentive to blur the
distinction when their own interests are at stake. Courts have equated their own
interests with those of the people by arguing, for instance, that a strong judiciary
is required to vindicate the rights of individuals, 55 or the rule of law,56 or
democracy itself.57

These arguments are unsurprising insofar as they make

Greater London Counci l , [1983] 1 A.C. 768, 814-20, 823-30, 843-46 (H.L.) (U.K.) (speech es of Lords
Wil berforce, Di pl ock and Scarman) (h ol di ng that th e meani ng of the word " economi c" i n th e
governi ng statute precl uded London publ i c transit auth oriti es from reduci ng fares and
generati ng a revenue sh ortfall, to be recovered via surcharges upon l ocal governme nts); supra
note 44 (di scussi ng A ni smi ni c Ltd. v. Forei gn Compe nsati on Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (H.L)
(U.K.)); see also PAUL P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 818 (4th ed. 1999) (contrasti ng th e Briti sh
judi ci ary's " juri sdi cti onal control" over agency acti on with its power to review such acti on for
" error wi thi n juri sdi cti on").
55
See, e.g., The Hon. Si r Joh n Laws, Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional
Rights?, 1993 PUB. L. 59, 69-79 (argui ng that th e judi ciary must scr uti ni ze governme ntal acti on
more cl osel y wh en " fundamental ri ghts" are i mpli cated); Note, Executive Revision of Judicial
Decisions, 109 H ARV. L. R EV. 2020, 2026-27 (1996) (argui ng that th e Supreme Court sh oul d and
does i nvoke the separati on of powers to defend its ability to vi ndi cate th e ri ghts of i ndi vi dual
liti gants).
56
See, e.g., Lord Wool f, supra note 44, at 68-69 (comme ndi ng Anisminic's refusal to respect
juri sdi cti on-stri ppi ng l egi slati on as an exampl e of th e judi ciary taki ng a rare stand i n defense of
th e rul e of law).
57
See, e.g., Laws, supra note 48, at 81, 84-91; Reynol ds v. Si ms, 377 U.S. 533, 566, 568-69 (1964)
(h ol di ng that th e Equal Protecti on Clause requi res apporti onment of state legi slatures on a
populati on basi s) ("We are cauti oned about the dangers of enteri ng i nto politi cal thi ckets and
math emati cal quagmi res. Our answer i s thi s: a denial of consti tuti onall y protected ri ghts
demands judi cial protecti on; our oath and our offi ce requi re no l ess of us.").
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judicial assertions of power appear normatively desirable rather than selfserving. Nevertheless, the core interests approach exposes constitutional courts
to attack both for the blatantly countermajoritarian way in which it settles the
countermajoritarian dilemma, and for the subjectivity inherent in any judicial
effort to select and prioritize interests for protection.

Judges may seek to

downplay the subjective element of this approach by insisting, for example, that
they are constrained in their determinations by history and tradition58 or text,59 or
that they will choose only the most incontrovertibly cherished interests for
protection.60 At root, however, the core interests approach invites judges to
define the extent of their own power on the basis of their own value judgments.
C. The Indeterminacy of the Hierarchy of Laws
This is not to suggest that the hierarchy of laws approach relieves judges
of the obligation – or the opportunity - to define the limits of their power. Legal
rules and principles may not be fixedly constitutional, legislative, or judge-made
58

See, e.g., Rochi n v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (observi ng that th e Due Process Cl ause
protects th ose ri gh ts " so rooted i n th e traditi ons and consci ence of our peopl e as to be ranked as
fundame ntal") (quoti ng Snyder v. Massach usetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (remarki ng that li mits on substantive due process
come from " respect for th e teachi ngs of hi story [and] sol i d recogni ti on for the basi c val ues that
underl ie our soci ety") (quoti ng Gri swol d v. Conne cti cut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurri ng)); Washi ngton v. Gl ucksber g, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) ("We begi n, as we do i n all dueprocess cases, by exami ni ng our Nati on's hi story, l egal traditi ons, and practi ces.").
59
See, e.g., Rochi n, 342 U.S. at 176-77 (Black, J., concurri ng) (preferri ng th e judi cial enforcement of
" express constituti onal guarantees" to th e "accordi on-li ke" quali ty of substanti ve due process
analysi s); Gri swol d, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., di ssenti ng) (objecti ng to the tacti c of "dil uti ng or
expandi ng a consti tuti onall y guaranteed ri gh t" by " substitut[i ng] for th e crucial word or words of
a constituti onal guarantee anoth er word or words, more or l ess fl exi ble and more or l ess
restri cted i n meani ng" ); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF I NTERPRETATION : F EDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 23-29, 37-41 (1997) (argui ng for textuali sm i n constituti onal i nterpretati on). Notabl y,
even th e fact that th e text i mposes too little constrai nt can be construed as a constrai nt. See Ni xon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (h ol di ng that the word " try" i n the Impeach ment Clause
lacks " suffi ci ent preci si on to afford any judi ciall y manageabl e standard of revi ew," and that th e
clai m that the Senate had fail ed to "try" an i mpeach ment because i t had not provi ded a full
evi dentiary h eari ng was th erefore nonjusti ciabl e).
60
See, e.g., Lord Woolf, supra note 44, at 68-69 (argui ng that Parliament cannot repudi ate th e "rul e
of law," such as by " removi ng or substantially i mpai ri ng th e enti re revi ewi ng rol e of th e Hi gh
Court"); Th e Rt. Hon. Si r Robi n Cooke, Fundamentals, 1988 N.Z. L.J. 158, 164 (argui ng that judges
sh oul d strike down laws that undermi ne eith er "the operati on of a democrati c l egi slature" or "th e
operati on of i ndependent courts"); Gl ucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (observi ng that th e Due Process
Clause onl y protects "th ose fundamental ri gh ts and li berti es whi ch are, objecti vely, ... 'i mpli cit i n
th e concept of ordered l i berty,' such that 'neith er li berty nor justi ce woul d exi st if they were
sacrifi ced'") (quoti ng Pal ko v. Connecti cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
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in character. Because they decide where in the hierarchy particular legal rules
and principles belong, judges can effectively manipulate the hierarchy to suit
their own ends. The distinction between judge-made law and legislation, for
example, might seem to leave relatively little room for doubt.

Unlike

constitutional law and common law, which are both announced by judges,
legislation and judge-made law might at least be distinguished on the basis of
authorship. This difference in authorship is the very basis for giving legislation
priority over common law. In practice, however, authorship is a vexed question.
In the U.K., the courts have employed the device of legislative intent to read into
legislation a body of judge-made law that is then used to strike down
administrative action.

In effect, the judiciary has claimed power over the

executive in the name of the legislature. Similar ly, though judicial review of
administrative action in the U.S. enjoys a legislative touchstone of legitimacy in
the form of the Administrative Procedure Act,61 the looseness of its operative
terms has required judges to articulate the actual body of law under which they
strike down executive action. More broadly, American legislatures have blurred
the distinction between statutory and judge-made law by systematically
codifying the rules of the common law.62 As Gilmore observes, it was once a
hallmark of American legal formalism to posit a sharp hierarchical distinction
between the judicial and legislative functions: "Only the legislature could change
the rules; when the legislature had spoken, the courts were bound to carry out
the legislative command."63 Over the last century, however, "[w]e have come to
see that such a distinction is not, and never was, tenable."64
The relationship between legislation and constitutional law is also
ambiguous.
synonymous.

In some cases, the categories overlap; in others, they may be
It is routine to observe that Britain's unwr itten "constitution"

includes statutes old and new,65 from the Habeas Corpus Acts of 164066 and

61

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2004).
See GILMORE, supra note 19, at 15.
63
Id. at 14.
64
Id. at 15.
65
See, e.g., R ETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI & W ILLIAM F. F OX, JR., THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ERA 1-18 (1993) (li sti ng "a number of i mportant documents" that, togeth er with certai n
" constituti onal conventi ons" and common law pri nci pl es, " mi ght well be referred to as the Briti sh
62
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167967 and the Act of Settlement 170168 to the European Communities Act 1972
and the Human Rights Act 1998. 69

By comparison, Canada has a written

constitution, but that constitution is itself an act of legislation that confers
constitutional status upon a host of other legislation: the Constitution Act 1982
defines the "Constitution of Canada" as including an entire schedule of statutes
both British and Canadian in origin.70 Even in the U.S., statutes may sometimes
be said to affect the content of constitutional law.

The Supreme Court has

insisted, for example, that Congress may not use its enforcement powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment71 to effect "substantive change" in
constitutional law, yet by the Court's own admission, the line between
congressional enforcement and substantive constitutional law "is not easy to
discern." 72 Conversely, the Court has itself fashioned constitutional standards
that rest upon the content of ordinary legislation.73 More generally, it can be
argued that certain landmark statutes – what Eskridge and Ferejohn call "superstatutes" - occupy "the legal terrain once called 'fundamental law'"; the
prominence of such statutes, and their influence upon the evolution of
constitutional law itself, may be said to imbue them with "quasi-constitutional"

constituti on"); DICEY, supra note 37, at 6-7 (noti ng that th ere exi sts no "test by whi ch to
di scri mi nate laws whi ch are constituti onal or fundame ntal from ordi nary enactments").
66
16 Car. 1, c. 10.
67
31 Car. 2, c. 2.
68
12 & 13 Will. III, c.2.
69
See supra note 37 (di scussi ng th e European Communi ti es Act 1972, th e Human Ri ghts Act 1998,
and thei r conseque nces for judi ci al revi ew i n th e U.K.).
70
See CAN . CONST. (Constituti on Act, 1982) pt. VII, § 52(2) & sch ed.; PETER W. H OGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, §§ 1.2-1.6, at 2-11 (student ed. 2002).
71
" Th e Congress sh all have power to enforce, by appropriate l egi slati on, th e provi si ons of thi s
arti cl e." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
72
Ci ty of Boerne v. Fl ores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
73
Consi der City of Ri ch mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), i n whi ch the Court h el d that
state and l ocal governme nts may not engage i n affirmative acti on absent a "pri ma faci e case of a
constituti onal or statutory vi olati on" that i s to be remedi ed. Id. at 500. In di ssent, Justi ce
Marshall criti ci zed th e majority's adopti on of a constituti onal standard predi cated upon th e
content of ci vil ri ghts l egi slati on:
If Congress tomorrow dramati call y expanded Titl e VII of the Civil Ri ghts Act of
1964 -- or alternati vel y, i f it repeal ed that l egi slati on altogeth er -- th e meani ng of
equal protecti on woul d change preci pitatel y al ong wi th it. Whatever th e Framers
of th e Fourteenth Amendme nt had i n mi nd i n 1868, it certai nly was not that th e
content of th ei r Amendment woul d turn on th e amendments to or th e evol vi ng
i nterpretati ons of a federal statute passed nearly a century l ater.
Id. at 556 (Marshall , J., di ssenti ng).
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status.74 In both their substance and their objects of concern, laws such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Administrative Procedure Act might be considered
the functional equivalent of constitutional law over which judges and legislators
alike exert some degree of control. To the extent that lawmaking power in areas
of constitutional concern can be shared in this manner, countermajoritarian
concerns are allayed.75
The distinction between constitutional law and judge-made law is,
however, the most obvious and promising candidate for self-interested judicial
manipulation. Even in theory, it is unclear how constitutional law and mere
judge-made law may be distinguished. No written constitution is complete unto
itself.

Like any legal document, a constitution inevitably presupposes some

background body of understandings that gives meaning to its terms, and to
which it may even refer explicitly.

The choice and use of these background

understandings is left to judges.

Such is clearly the case with the U.S.

Constitution, for example, which invokes "the rules of the common law"76 and
manages in the space of a single sentence to deploy such concepts as "liberty,"
"property," and "due process." 77 Similarly, the Canadian Constitution includes
both common law principles and constitutional "conventions" based upon
custom and tradition78; though mere "conventions" are said to be judicially
unenforceable,79 the Canadian Supreme Court does enforce "unwritten
constitutional pr inciples," 80 and the line between enforceable and unenforceable
constitutional law is itself for judges to draw. Constitutional law is the product
of judicial choice – constrained choice, perhaps, but choice nonetheless. To wie ld
the power of constitutional interpretation is to determine the content of
constitutional law.
74

William N. Eskri dge Jr. & Joh n Ferejoh n, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216-17 (2001).
See id. at 1275-76 (" Prescri ptivel y, super-statutes medi ate th e tensi on between de mocracy or
popular accountability and th e evol uti on of h i gh er law at th e hands of unel ected judges." ).
76
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
77
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
78
See Reference re Ame ndment of th e Constituti on of Canada (Patriati on Reference), [1981] 1
S.C.R. 753, 876; id. at 853 (Laski n, C.J., Estey & McIntyre, JJ., di ssenti ng).
79
See id. at 774-75; H OGG, supra note 70, § 1.10, at 18-27.
80
See Reference re Secessi on of Que bec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶¶ 32, 52-54, 88-93, at 239-40, 248-50,
265-68 (h ol di ng on the basi s of " unwri tten constituti onal pri nci pl es" of federali sm and democracy
that th e federal government and oth er provi nces are obli gated to negotiate if a " cl ear majority" of
Quebec's popul ati on votes unambi guousl y to secede)
75
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The arbitrariness of the distinction between (binding) constitutional law
and (nonbinding) judge-made law enables courts to calibrate the boundary
between judicial and legislative power in a highly deliberate manner. Indeed, it
would be surprising if, in choosing whether to decide cases on constitutional or
common law grounds, judges did not consider the consequences for legislative
power. Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has descr ibed both the
openness of the choice that state judges face, and the potential consequences for
other institutions:
Clearly, there are matters that must stand as constitutional, beyond
ready revision. Constitutional issues cannot be avoided, or
constitutional principles diluted, or the law manipulated, or
responsibility shirked or deflected to other institutions by resort to
the common law for core policies of that nature. But which are the
core policies of that nature? Where there is no clear discontinuity
between common law and constitutional law, the difficult question
is one of definition.
When is a matter properly one of common law and when does it
cross the threshold of constitutional law? A court's stated desire to
preserve flexibility and options by common law solutions is as
much a consequence as a cause for choosing one ground over the
other. The shifts and vacillation among courts, even within courts,
between constitutional and nonconstitutional premises suggests
that a rationale has yet to emerge.81
Three lessons can be drawn from this passage. First, courts inevitably confront
cases in which they must choose between a common law holding that is subject
to legislative revision, and a constitutional holding that is not.

Second, courts

have not, in fact, made this choice in any consistent manner. Third – and most
importantly - in the absence of any "clear discontinuity" between common law
and constitutional law, there is little to prevent courts from "deflecting" - or
reserving - the final decision to elected officials as they wish.
The hierarchy of laws that might be supposed to delimit judicial power is
so elastic, in fact, that courts need not even choose between the categories of
constitutional and common law. They may instead combine the two to produce
nonbinding

81

constitutional

law,

or

what

Henry

Paul Monaghan

calls

Kaye, supra note 21, at 751-52.
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"constitutional common law." 82 As he observes, not only may courts fail to make
clear the extent to which a decision is "constitutional" (binding on the legislature)
or "common law" (nonbinding); they may deliberately fail to do so. Why so?
Though Monaghan himself says surprisingly little on the subject,83 such
deliberate obscurity seems above all to enable the judiciary to manage the limits
of legislative power with greater precision than might otherwise be possible - all
the while speaking the language of legislative deference and judicial restraint. In
rhetorical terms, the judiciary can claim, plausibly, that it has left the legislature
room to maneuver. In substance, however, the judiciary has merely invited the
legislature to labor within judicially specified limits, while reserving the right to
reject the fruits of those labors. Consider Miranda v. Arizona,84 described by
Monaghan as fashioning a "constitutionally inspired," yet "subconstitutional,"
rule of criminal procedure.85 The Supreme Court recently rejected an alternative
scheme devised by Congress on the grounds that it was not "at least as effective"
as the Miranda rule at preventing coerced confessions. 86 On the one hand,
proclaimed the Court, "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress
may not supersede legislatively." 87 On the other hand, it refused to hold that
Miranda warnings are actually required by the Constitution88 - a fact bitterly
emphasized by Justice Scalia in dissent.89

With its elusive non-distinctions

between constitutional and common law – and, indeed, between "constitutional"
and "constitutional" law – constitutional common law is in practice a finely tuned
instrument of judicial control over legislative power, an act of deference and an
act of veto in one, much like Marbury itself.
In sum, the notion that there exist hierarchically ordered categories of
laws and lawmakers does little to guide or constrain judges in deciding the limits
82

Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term – Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
H ARV. L. R EV. 1 (1975).
83
See id. at 31 (i mplyi ng that th e maki ng of such di sti ncti ons may not be a good use of ti me on th e
part of a " busy" court).
84
384 U.S. 436, 467-77 (1966) (requi ri ng pol i ce offi cers to advi se cri mi nal suspects of th ei r
constituti onal ri ghts upon arrest).
85
Monagh an, supra note 82, at 19-20.
86
See Di ckerson v. Uni ted States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (quoti ng Mi randa, 384 U.S. at 467).
87
Id. at 444.
88
See id. at 442 (expressl y decli ni ng to h ol d that " nothi ng el se will suffi ce to sati sfy consti tuti onal
requi rements" ).
89
See id. at 446, 450-57 (Scalia, J., di ssenti ng).
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of their own power. The boundaries between the categories are unsettled even in
theory, and this uncertainty enables judges to circumvent and even invert the
hierarchy. Judicial enforcement of the hierarchy might be analogized to a game
of rock-paper-scissors between elected lawmakers and judges, but with a twist:
the judiciary also acts as referee and can declare rock to be paper, paper to be
rock, or even that it has played some combination of rock and paper.

The

potential for abusive unfairness in this game lies, of course, in the fact that the
judiciary acts as judge in its own cause, but some form of self-policing is
inescapable: any institution assigned the task of allocating public power will
possess both the means and the incentive to favor itself. Ultimately, it may be
unrealistic to think that there exists any foolproof formula by which the
watchmen of governmental power can be expected to watch themselves. Indeed,
a rigid formula may be not only implausib le, but also undesirable. Evolving
challenges of governance may demand flexibility in the allocation of public
power, as reflected in this country, for example, by the rise of the administrative
state and the decline of nondelegation doctrine.90 Formalistic adherence to a
hierarchical categorization of lawmakers and laws can prove a hindrance even to
those atop the hierarchy: to accomplish such crucial goals as accession to the
European Union, the entrenchment of human rights, and the release of former
colonies, the British Parliament must make commitments that limit its own
power, yet parliamentary sovereignty, strictly understood, renders all such
commitments revocable at any time.91

90

See, e.g., S TEPHEN G. B REYER, RICHARD B. S TEWART, CASS R. S UNSTEIN & MATTHEW L. SPITZER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND R EGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 17-35 (5th ed. 2002)
(reviewi ng th e ri se of admi ni strati ve regulati on); id. at 43-87 (di scussi ng nondel egati on doctri ne,
and opi ni ng that it "has had onl y one good year" – namel y, th e year i n whi ch A.L.A. Sch echter
Poul try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), was deci ded); THEODORE J. LOWI , THE END OF
LIBERALISM 92-126, 300-13 (2d ed. 1979) (criti ci zi ng th e ri se of th e admi ni strative state as nothi ng
l ess than th e demi se of li berali sm and th e rul e of law, and urgi ng a return to nondel egati on
doctri ne).
91
The doctri ne of parliamentary soverei gnty requi res courts not onl y to uph ol d whatever
Parliament commands, but al so to obey the wi sh es of th e current Parliament, regardl ess of what
any past Parliament has done. Because a past Parliament cannot bi nd a future Parliament, th e
courts have normally adhered to the pri nci pl e of lex posterior derogatat priori: an i nconsi stency
between past and present l egi slati on i s constr ued as an i mplied repeal of th e past legi slati on.
Legi slative entrench ment i s supposed to be i mpossi bl e. See DICEY, supra note 37, at 62-64; see also
Joh n O. McGi nni s & Mi chael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and
Normative Theory, 89 V A. L. R EV. 385, 400-01 (2003) (comme nti ng on l egi slative entrench ment i n
th e U.S.); Eri c A. Posner & Adrian Vermeuel e, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Y ALE
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D. The Supposed Requirements of Judicial Legitimacy
In light of these difficulties, it is understandable if courts happen to
employ the hierarchy of laws less as an analytical device than as a legitimating
fiction. What is meant by judicial legitimacy? It is discussed obsessively, as if it
were a precious commodity to be hoarded,92 yet for the most part goes undefined
- perhaps for fear that merely to explain judicial legitimacy in plain terms is to
undermine it. In practical terms, it can be described as the ability of courts to
secure compliance with their decisions, absent the powers of the purse or the
sword.93 An obvious way in which courts secure such compliance is on the
strength of their respective reputations: however uncertain their basis in positive
law, the pronouncements of a judiciary known for fairness and rectitude stand
some chance of a sympathetic public reception.

In India, for example, the

judiciary enjoys a unique reputation for integrity in a political environment rife
L.J. 1665, 1677-78 (2002) (doi ng th e same, and ci ti ng th e uni on of Engl and and Scotland as a
speci fi c exampl e). As di scussed above, th e European Communi ti es Act 1972 and Human Ri ghts
Act 1998 both strai n th e meani ng of parliamentary soverei gnty, i n theory as well as i n practi ce, by
i nstructi ng th e courts to gi ve nondomesti c law some measure of superi ority over past, present,
and future domesti c law. See supra note 37. U nl ess th e courts understand parliamentary
soverei gnty as all owi ng Parliament to i mpose upon i tself formal and procedural requi rements such as a cl ear statement rul e – Parliament runs a conti nual ri sk of i nadvertentl y repudiati ng
Eur opean l aw. See GOLDSW ORTHY, supra note 37, at 15, 244-45.
In theory, parliamentary soverei gnty al so renders Parliament unabl e to ri d i tself of
l egi slative power over former Bri ti sh col oni es that wi sh to gai n th ei r i ndependence by peaceful
and l egal means. It call s i nto questi on, for exampl e, th e vali dity of § 2 of the Canada Act 1982, by
whi ch Parliament purported to renounce any furth er legi slati ve power over Canada. See H OGG,
supra note 70, § 3.5(d), at 57-58 (di scussi ng § 2 of th e Canada Act 1982 and its questi onabl e
l egality as a matter of Briti sh constituti onal law); see also GOLDSWORTHY, supra, at 244 (di scussi ng
th e same probl em as rai sed by the Australia Act 1986).
92
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., di ssenti ng) (descri bi ng " the publi c's
confi dence i n the Court" as "a publi c treasure," " built sl owly over many years"); Planned
Parenth ood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992) (joi nt opi ni on of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter,
JJ.) (deemi ng i t "i mperative to adhere to the essence" of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for fear
of oth erwi se i nfli cti ng " profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legiti macy"); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., di ssenti ng) (argui ng that the Court sh oul d abstai n
from "i njecti ng i tself i nto th e clash of politi cal forces" lest it endanger " sustai ned publ i c
confi dence i n i ts moral sancti on").
93
See, e.g., MARTIN S HAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 13-14 (1981)
(" Courts, we are repeatedly and ri gh tly tol d, have neith er th e purse nor th e sword. ... Most court
systems seem to operate on th e assumpti ons that both parti es conse nt suffi ci ently to compl y
vol untarily as least as l ong as some vague th reat of furth er judi cial acti on i s mai ntai ned."); THE
F EDERALIST N O. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cli nton Rossiter ed., 1961) (" The judi ciary ... has
no i nfl uence over eith er the sword or the purse[,] and must ul ti mately depend upon th e ai d of th e
executi ve arm even for th e effi cacy of i ts judgme nts." ).
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with corruption.94 This fact alone may both explain and sustain the tendency of
the Indian bench toward micromanagement of public affairs to an extent that
might not be tolerated elsewhere.95 Sheer tradition may also play a part in the
acceptance of judicial decisionmaking. Once judicial review has been in place for
some time - as in the U.S. – its continued acceptance may in part reflect Burkean
conservatism on the part of a citizenry bound to dislike particular decisions yet
unwilling on the whole to jettison a venerable institution. What constitutional
courts generally cannot claim in support of their activities, however, is an
electoral mandate.96 The countermajoritarian dilemma is considered a dilemma
because, whenever constitutional courts dare to do more than validate an
existing consensus, they are subject to a supposedly withering retort: "we did not
elect you, so why should we listen to you?" In less colloquial terms, it is thought

94

See George H. Gadboi s, Jr., The Institutionalization of the Supreme Court of India, in COMPARATIVE
JUDICIAL S YSTEMS: CHALLENGING F RONTIERS IN CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 126 (Joh n R.
Sch mi dhauser ed., 1987). As even th e Presi dent of India has remarked:
It i s not an exaggerati on to say that the degree of respect and publi c confi dence
enjoyed by th e Supreme Court i s not matched by many oth er i nsti tuti ons i n th e
country. Th e judi ciary i n India has become th e last refuge for th e peopl e and th e
future of th e country will depend upon th e fulfil ment of th e hi gh expectati ons
reposed by th e peopl e i n i t.
K.R. Narayanan, Speech on th e occasi on of Gol den Jubi l ee cel ebrati ons of th e Supreme Court of
India (Jan. 28, 2000), h ttp://www.i ndia-semi nar.com/2000/487/487%20narayanan.htm.
Anal ogousl y, it has been suggested that th e Israeli judi ciary enjoys " consi derabl e politi cal
power" because of i ts reputati on for nonparti sanshi p i n a rampantl y parti san soci ety. Marti n
Edel man, The Changing Role of the Israeli Supreme Court, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL S YSTEMS, supra,
at 97-98; cf. R OBERT A. B ORK, COERCING V IRTUE: THE W ORLDWIDE R ULE OF JUDGES 13 (rev. ed. 2003)
(calli ng th e Supreme Court of Israel "th e most acti vi st, anti democrati c court i n th e worl d").
95
For exampl e, students wh o have been tur ned away from exami nati ons for fail ure to attend
sch ool have been known to obtai n ex parte stays from Indian courts by chall engi ng th e propri ety
of th e procedures by whi ch attendance rul es were adopted. See Tri pathi , supra note 22, at 60. In
response to envi ronme ntal concerns, th e Supreme Court of India has appoi nted experts to i nspect
mi nes and quarri es and ordered the cl osi ng of th ose found not to be i n compl iance with relevant
safety standards. See Rural Liti g. & Enti tlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh , [1987] 1 S.C.R.
641, 647-50. Oth er courts have enforced envi ronmental statutes by banni ng speci fi c makes,
model s, and vi ntages of taxi cabs. See, e.g., Smoke Affected Resi dents v. Muni ci pal Co., Writ
Petiti on No. 1762/1999 (Apr. 10, 2002), http://www.elaw.org/resour ces/
text.asp?ID=1361&lang=es (banni ng all " Premi er 137-D Model" taxi s and "all taxi s over the age of
15" except th ose converted to run on natural gas).
96
Th ere are, of course, excepti ons. Judges of th e Japanese Supreme Court, for exampl e, may be
removed by majority vote: Arti cl e 81 of th e Japanese Constituti on subje cts them to retenti on votes
at the fi rst general electi on foll owi ng th eir i ni tial appoi ntment, and at ten-year i nterval s
th ereafter. See K ENPO [Consti tuti on] art. 81 (Japan). For di scussi on of vari ous means by wh i ch
th e ruli ng party i s sai d to i nfl uence th e Japanese judi ciary, see Brown Hamano, cited above i n
note 22, at 442-59.
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that unelected judges risk disobedience because they cannot directly invoke the
legitimating device of majoritarian consent.97
The two qualifications in this statement - "directly" and "majoritarian" –
merit notice. First, even the most independent of judiciaries is subject to political
control, if only because judges must be continually appointed and replaced. The
political character of this control is simply more obvious in some cases than in
others.

For example, the members of the German Constitutional Court, the

Bundesverfassungsgericht, are elected by the federal legislature on the basis of
interparty bargaining and with the input of major interest groups.98 In more
subtle but equally effective fashion, the members of France's Conseil
Constitutionnel, though appointed for fixed terms, are chosen from the political
milieu and are known for exercising judgment with political sensitivity – that is,
in a manner sensitive to the needs and priorities of the elected government.99 In
this country, it has been an empirical fact that unelected judges with life tenure
are chosen and replaced in a frequent and systematic way by elected officials.
Between the inescapable fact of turnover and periodic expansions of the bench,
even the relatively independent federal judiciary is decisively reshaped by
elected officials on an ongoing basis.100

97

See, e.g., Paul W. Kah n, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 H ARV. L. R EV.
1147, 1154 (1993) (argui ng that th e federal judges appoi nted by recent Republ i can admi ni strati ons
"vi ew th e judi ciary as an unde mocrati c i nstituti on wi thi n a politi cal order premi sed on th e i dea
that governme ntal l egi ti macy i s deri ved from th e consent of th e majority").
98
See DONALD P. K OMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE F EDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 21-22 (2d ed. 1997); Davi d S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West
Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. R EV. 1795, 1826-29 (1988).
99
See Joh n Bell , Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. R EV. 1757, 1763,
1781-86 (1988) (noti ng that, alth ough the Conseil Constituti onnel has not become a
" strai gh tforwardly parti san poli ti cal body," a h eavy premi um i s placed i n th e selecti on process
upon both "l egal and poli ti cal skill s").
100
Poli ti cal scienti sts have been better attuned to thi s fact than l egal academi cs. In an i nfl uential
and early arti cl e, Robert Dahl noted the frequency and re gulari ty with whi ch Supreme Court
justi ces have hi stori call y been replaced, and deemed i t " most unreali sti c" that th e Court woul d,
"for more than a few years at most," resi st major poli cy changes sough t by a lawmaki ng majori ty.
See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 34, at 284-95. Th e same observati ons appl y with greater force to th e
l ower federal courts. Barrow, Zuk and Gryski observe, for exampl e, that "the combi nati on of new
posi ti ons and swel li ng numbers of vacanci es, owi ng especi all y to reti rements," has enabl ed
moder n presi dents " to change anywh ere from 35 to 60 perce nt of th e membershi p on th e l ower
federal courts duri ng thei r stay i n offi ce." DEBORAH J. B ARROW, GARY Z UK & GERARD GRYSKI , THE
F EDERAL JUDICIARY AND I NSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 12 (1996). Th us, " with 9 out of every 10
appoi ntees shari ng th e parti san attach ment of th e chi ef executi ve," " gargantuan swi ngs i n th e
poli ti cal composi ti on of th e bench become commonpl ace." Id.; see also Gary Zuk, Gerard S. Gryski
& Deborah J. Barrow, Partisan Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, 1869-1992, 21 AM . POL. Q. 439
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Second, the legitimating power of majoritarian decisionmaking should not
be overestimated; nor should popular acceptance of judicial review be
underestimated. Elections do not reflect universal consent - indeed, perhaps not
even plurality consent.101 Every popular decision leaves in its wake a minority.
Countermajoritarian judicial decisionmaking may beg the question of its
legitimacy in the eyes of the majority, but majoritarian electoral decisionmaking
also begs the question of its legitimacy in the eyes of the minority.102 Neither
form of decisionmaking is effective at resolving political disagreement absent the
acceptance of both the winners and the losers.103 It may be, in fact, that neither
form is widely acceptable without the other.

Judging from the institutional

arrangements that have proven popular and durable, it seems likely that
democratic polities accept, if not prefer, some mixture of popular and
countermajoritarian decisionmaking, the critical question being one of relative
degree. The fact that minority protections are written into a constitution may be
evidence of such acceptance.

The fact that such protections are found in a

written constitution may even create a certain amount of the necessary

passim (1993). With out emphasi zi ng th e mechani sms of judi cial appoi ntment and replacement,
Geral d Rosenber g h as urged th e related vi ew that th e Court cannot resi st lawmaki ng majori ti es
or effect social change i n th e face of politi cal resi stance on more than a sporadi c basi s. See
R OSENBERG, supra note 34, passim (argui ng that courts cannot usually effect social reform with out
th e support of th e el ected branch es); Geral d N. Rosenber g, Judicial Independence and the Reality of
Political Power, 54 R EV. POL. 369 passim (1992) (assessi ng th e judi cial response to " Court-attacki ng
bill s" over th e last two centuri es, and concl udi ng that the Court h as rarely resi sted th e
preferences of elected lawmakers acti ng i n concert). Collecti vel y, th ese fi ndi ngs constitute a
di rect assault upon th e noti on that th e Framers created a judi cial branch capable of with standi ng
lawmaki ng majori ti es for any meani ngful peri od of ti me.
101
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., di ssenti ng) (observi ng that " we may never
know wi th compl ete certai nty the i denti ty of the wi nner" of the 2000 presi dential el ecti on). For
th e sake of si mpli city, it may be assumed that th ose wh o do not vote conse nt to whatever
happens, th ough th e alacrity wi th whi ch nonvoters cri ti ci ze th eir governme nt suggests oth erwi se.
102
Indeed, as politi cal sci enti sts and economi sts have l ong observed, majoritarian
deci si onmaki ng mech ani sms often do not even refl ect th e wi sh es of th e majori ty. See, e.g.,
W ILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 65-136 (1982) (di scussi ng th e i nstability of
col l ecti ve ch oi ce mech ani sms as demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow and oth ers, and ill ustrati ng
that th e outcome of voti ng among th ree or more alternati ves depends upon th e order i n wh i ch
alternati ves are consi dered, th e meth od of voti ng used, th e manner i n whi ch preferences are
measured, and oth er factors); Davi d Brady & Mark A. Morgan, Reforming the structure of the House
appropriations process: the effects of the 1885 and 1919-20 reforms on money decisions, in CONGRESS:
S TRUCTURE AND POLICY 207-33 (Math ew D. McCubbi ns & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (descri bi ng
h ow th e power of th e House Appropriati ons Commi ttee affects the extent to whi ch oth er
congressi onal commi ttees spend on beh alf of special i nterests).
103
Cf. S HAPIRO, supra note 93, at 1-8 (di scussi ng th e "triadi c l ogi c" of confli ct resol uti on and th e
precari ousness of thi rd-party adjudi cati on absent th e actual consent of th e parties to such
adjudi cati on).
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acceptance, perhaps by serving as a reminder of principles adopted upon careful
reflection in calmer times.104 But whether a written constitution exists, and what
it says, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the acceptance of
judicial review in practice. That acceptance may exist even in the absence of a
written constitution that styles itself supreme, as Paul Craig and Sir Laws and
Lord Woolf have in essence argued.105
Given the choice, however, constitutional courts tend not to stake their
efficacy solely on the normative appeal of the decisions they render, or on the
acceptance of judicial review itself. The explication of those interests entitled to
judicial protection - those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"106 or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 107 for example – is
consistently the task of judges, and it is by nature a heavily subjective one.
Nevertheless, judges go to considerable lengths to tether their efforts to their
respective constitutions. If they are fortunate, they may have available to them
some slender snippet of vague but actual text, such as "due process," from which
entire vistas of possibility unfold; if they have the nerve, they may even liken
what they do to scientific inquiry.108 Elsewhere, judges may have to make do
with "unwritten constitutional principles," 109 or the "basic structure" of the

104

As Steph en Hol mes puts it: "A consti tuti on i s Peter sober while the el ectorate i s Peter drunk."
Steph en Hol mes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democr acy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 196 (Jon El ster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
105
See supra note 48 and accompanyi ng text.
106
Palko v. Conne cti cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.), quoted in, e.g., Washi ngton v.
Gl ucksber g, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2492 n.3 (2003) (Scalia,
J., di ssenti ng).
107
Moore v. City of East Cl eveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (pl urality opi ni on of Powell, J.), quoted
in, e.g., Washi ngton v. Gl ucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
108
Consi der Justi ce Frankfurter's efforts i n Rochin v. California:
Restrai nts on our juri sdi cti on are self-i mposed onl y i n th e sense that there i s from
our de ci si ons no i mmedi ate appeal sh ort of i mpeach ment or consti tuti onal
amendme nt. But that does not make due process of l aw a matter of judi cial
capri ce. The facul ti es of the Due Process Clause may be i ndefi nite and vague,
but th e mode of th eir ascertai nment i s not sel f-will ed. In each case " due process
of law" requi res an eval uati on based on a di si nterested i nqui ry pursued i n th e
spi rit of sci ence, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fai rly stated, on th e
detach ed consi derati on of confl i cti ng cl ai ms, on a judgme nt not ad hoc and
epi sodi c but dul y mi ndful of reconcili ng th e needs both of conti nui ty and of
change i n a progressi ve soci ety.
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
109
See, e.g., Reference re Secessi on of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶¶ 32, 52-54, 88-93, at 239-40,
248-50, 265-68 (h ol di ng on th e basi s of " unwri tten consti tuti onal pri nci pl es" of federali sm and
democracy that th e federal governme nt and other provi nces are obli gated to negotiate if a " cl ear
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constitution,110 or the "governmental framework."111 From such unpromising
materials, the audacious may find a way to strike down constitutional
amendments.112 Those truly favored by history may even have the opportunity

majori ty" of Quebec's popul ati on votes unambi guousl y to secede); H.C. 98/69, Bergman v.
Mi ni ster of Fi nance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969) (Isr.), available in translation at
http://62.90.71.124/files_eng/69/980/000/z01/69000980.z01.pdf (last vi sited May 21, 2004), at 6
(recogni zi ng " the equality of citi zens before the law as a fundame ntal pri nci pl e of [Israel's]
constituti onal regi me," and enjoi ni ng enfor ceme nt of campai gn fi nance l egi slati on on that basi s,
notwi th standi ng the absence of a written constituti on or of any statutory language provi di ng for
judi ci al review).
110
See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp. S.C.R. 1, 163-66 (India) (opi ni on of
Si kri, C.J.) (h ol di ng unconstituti onal a constituti onal amendme nt i ntended to curtail judi cial
revi ew of consti tuti onal amendme nts); see also infra note 108 (placi ng th e Kesavananda Bharati
deci si on i n context).
111
Raven v. Deukmeji an, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080, 1086-89 (Cal . 1990) (i nvali dati ng part of a ball ot
proposi ti on on th e grounds that it effected " such a far-reachi ng change i n our governme ntal
framework as to amount to a quali tative constituti onal revi si on, an undertaki ng beyond the reach
of th e i ni tiative process" ).
112
See, e.g., id. at 1086-89; Kesavananda Bharati , (1973) Supp. S.C.R. at 163-66. In its ori gi nal form,
Arti cl e 368 of the Constituti on of India si mpl y descri bed th e means by whi ch Parliament may
amend th e Constituti on, subject i n enumerated cases to h ei ghtened super majori ty requi rements.
Th e Supreme Court of Indi a i nitiall y took th e vi ew that constituti onal amendme nts adopted by
Parliament pursuant to Arti cle 368 were not th emselves subject to judi cial revi ew. See Shankari
Prasad v. Uni on of Indi a, (1952) S.C.R. 89, 105; Tri pathi, supra note 22, at 95. In a seri es of cases
begi nni ng wi th the Golak N ath deci si on of 1967, h owever, the Court repeatedl y rebuffed
constituti onal amendments enacted under Arti cl e 368 as unconsti tuti onal . In Golak Nath v. State
of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762, the Court took th e positi on that any amendme nt that "takes away
or abri dges" " fundamental ri ghts" i s unconsti tuti onal under Arti cl e 13(2), whi ch provi des that
" [t]h e State shall not make any law whi ch takes away or abri dges" "fundame ntal ri ghts." Id. at
787-805 (opi ni on of Subba Rao, C.J.); I NDIA CONST. art. 13(2). Parliament responded by amendi ng
both Arti cl es 13 and 368 to precl ude judi cial review of consti tuti onal amendments. In Kesavanda
Bharati, th e Supreme Court softened its positi on but neverthel ess h el d th e amendme nts
unconstituti onal, on the grounds that Parliament cannot amend th e Constituti on i n a manner that
i mpai rs its " basi c structure." Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) Supp. at 165-66 (opi ni on of Sikri , C.J.).
Once agai n, Parliament responded by amendi ng Arti cl e 368, and once agai n, i n Mi nerva Mill s
Ltd. v. Uni on of India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 206, th e Supreme Court declared th e amendme nts
unconstituti onal. See id. at 246-59.
Th e extent and desperati on of Parliament's efforts to precl ude judi cial review of
constituti onal amendments are tragi comi c. In rel evant part, Arti cl e 368 curre ntl y reads as
foll ows:
(1) Notwith standi ng anythi ng i n thi s Constituti on, Parliament may i n exerci se of
its constituent power ame nd by way of additi on, variati on or repeal any
provi si on of thi s Constituti on i n accordance with th e procedure lai d down i n thi s
arti cl e.

...

(3) Nothi ng i n arti cle 13 shall apply to any amendme nt made under thi s arti cl e.
(4) No amendment of thi s Constituti on ... shall be called i n questi on i n any court
on any gr ound.
(5) For the removal of doubts, i t i s h ereby declared that there shall be no
li mitati on whatever on th e consti tuent power of Parliament to amend by way of
additi on, variati on or repeal th e provi si ons of thi s Constituti on under thi s arti cl e.
I NDIA CONST. art. 368. To understand the politi cal context of the struggl e between
Parliament and the Supreme Court, see Gadboi s, ci ted above i n note 94, at 115-16.
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to reject an entire constitution on constitutional grounds.113 The more extreme the
case, the clearer it becomes that judges do not obey or interpret constitutions so
much as they make constitutions. 114 Yet whatever license judges can (or cannot)
find in the text for their activities, a written constitution that provides, at least
arguably, for judicial review gives them an answer of childlike simplicity to the
critical question of "legitimacy": "we did not elect you, so why should we listen to
you?" By invoking the hierarchical superiority of constitutional law to all other
law, a judge says, in effect: "Don't blame me. The constitution made me do it."
(Or, as a British judge might say to the executive, "Parliament made me do it" –
an especially transparent fiction given that the executive leads the Parliament. 115)
To use a constitution in this way amounts to a form of ventriloquism: an
inanimate text can speak, it turns out, to a bewildering range of questions and
under sociopolitical conditions its authors could not have foreseen, so long as
judges supply the words.

Perhaps a certain amount of such obfuscation is

necessary if courts are to secure compliance with controversial decisions, or even
to reach popular decisions that also satisfy the internal standards of the legal

By way of compari son, wh en faced with an anal ogous questi on, th e Canadian
Supreme Court di savowed any power to revi ew th e substance of l egi slati on that
overri des the Canadian Constituti on. Secti on 33 of th e Canadian Consti tuti on, the socall ed " notwith standi ng cl ause," empowers th e legi slature to overri de certai n
constituti onal ri ghts and speci fies the means by whi ch it may do so. See CAN . CONST.
(Constituti on Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Ri ghts and Freedoms), § 33. In Ford v.
Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 712, the Court h el d that § 33 i mposes " requi rements of form onl y"
and speci fi call y rejected the argument that the overri de power may onl y be exerci sed
foll owi ng a "full y i nformed democrati c process" i n wh i ch both the ri ght at stake and i ts
proposed i nfri ngement are drawn to the attenti on of th e legi slature and the publ i c. Id. at
740-42.
113
See Certi fi cati on of th e Constituti on of the Republ i c of South Afri ca, 1996, 1996 (4) SALR 744
passim (CC) (h ol di ng that th e proposed constituti on of 1996 failed to sati sfy th e requi rements of
th e i nteri m constituti on of 1994, and requi ri ng th e formul ati on of a new constituti onal text); Al bi e
Sach s, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. I NT' L L. & POL. 695 passim (1996)
(di scussi ng th e adopti on and certifi cati on of th e South Afri can Constituti on).
114
See, e.g., J.W. PELTASON , CORWIN & PELTASON ' S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 125 (11th
ed. 1988) (quoti ng Woodrow Wil son's observati on that th e Supreme Court has acted as a
" constituti onal conve nti on i n conti nuous sessi on" ); Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of
Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century, 1989 S. CT. R EV. 311, 330 (noti ng that i n the European
Communi ty, "th e protecti on of i ndivi dual ri gh ts becomes th e task of judge s wh o must devel op a
common l aw of basi c ri ghts by reference to exceedi ngl y vague noti ons of sh ared val ues").
115
See, e.g., W ADE & F ORSYTH , supra note 37, at 28-30; Laws, supra note 48, at 90 & n.51 (quoti ng
Lord Hail sham's notori ous descri pti on of Parliament as an " el ective di ctatorshi p"); Lord Lester,
supra note 37, at 90-92 (same).
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community. Perhaps such obfuscation is inherently undesirable.116 Perhaps it
has no effect at all on how people feel about constitutional courts or judicial
review.117 Whatever the case may be, judges do not seem prepared to do without
it.
Four generic propositions about constitutional adjudication can now be
offered. First, because they cannot compel obedience, constitutional courts and
judges are preoccupied with the problem of their own efficacy. This concern is
frequently expressed in terms of "legitimacy," which refers in practice to the
acceptance of judicial review, by the polity or by elites, in whatever combination
happens to be necessary.

Second, when performing judicial review, judges

invoke their respective constitutions in an effort to win this acceptance. Whether
this tactic is effective - or even necessary - is an empirical question, 118 not one that
can be resolved by constitutional theory, but judges appear to believe, at least,
that it cannot hurt. Third, the act of judicial review is constrained only loosely by
the constitutional text. Indeed, it can occur in disregard or even direct defiance
of the constitutional text, though judges are anxious to dispel the appearance
thereof. Fourth, what courts actually do when they perform judicial review is to
identify and articulate the interests they deem important enough to deserve
protection from interference by the other branches of government: that is, they
practice what has here been labeled the core interests approach. This approach
goes by various names in practice but varies little in substance. It is to the nature
and ubiquity of core interests analysis that we turn next.

116

See, e.g., B ICKEL, supra note 34, at 62 (argui ng that no court sh oul d "tell itself or th e worl d that it
draws deci si ons from a text that i s i ncapabl e of yi el di ng th em" ).
117
As Judge Posner h as argued:
Th ere i s no evi dence that [publ i c confi dence i n th e courts] depe nds on th e
scr upul ousness wi th whi ch courts confi ne th emsel ves to fai r i nterpretati ons of
commands l ai d down i n th e texts – about wh i ch the publ i c knows l ittl e – as
di sti nct from noti ons of justi ce or fai rness that are i ndependent of fi delity to
texts.
R ICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 136 (1990) (citi ng, i nter alia, Ri chard Leh ne
& Joh n Reynol ds, The Impact of Judicial Activism on Public Opinion, 22 AM . J. POL. S CI. 896 (1978)).
118
See supra note 117.
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III. GENERI C C O NSTIT UTIO NA L A NA LYSIS
Consider the following passage:
Challenges to governmental action require the reviewing court to
evaluate the importance of the right or interest upon which the
government has infringed, the importance of the government's
goal, and the extent to which that goal justifies the government's
choice of means. When important rights or interests are at stake,
the government's goal must be of comparable importance, and a
close fit must exist between that goal and the means chosen to
achieve it. Similar requirements apply when the governmental
action in question is aimed at certain vulnerable or disadvantaged
groups.
This passage describes the practice of judicial review in which of the following?
(a)

The United States. 119

(b)

The United Kingdom.120

119

See, e.g., Poe v. Ull man, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., di ssenti ng) (" [C]ertai n i nterests
requi re parti cularl y careful scruti ny of the state needs asserted to justi fy th ei r abri dgment." );
Chi cago Poli ce Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 99 (1972) (observi ng that "all equal protecti on
cases" pose the questi on wh eth er there exi sts "an appropriate governme ntal i nterest suitabl y
furth ered by th e differential treatment" ); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972)
(observi ng that "a wei ghi ng process h as l ong been a part of any determi nati on" of th e
requi rements of procedural due process); see also, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792-94 (2d ed. 1988) (observi ng that Fi rst Amendment cl ai ms
foll ow one of two "tracks" dependi ng upon th e i ntent of the governme ntal restri cti on, but that
" determi nati ons of th e reach of fi rst amendme nt protecti ons on ei ther track presuppose some
form of 'balanci ng' wh eth er or not th ey appear to do so"); Geral d Gunth er, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 73 H ARV. L. R EV. 1, 17-18 (1972) (descri bi ng the Court's moveme nt toward " sli di ng
scale" equal protecti on review).
120
Th ough th e United Ki ngdom l acks a written consti tuti on, its courts perform substantive
revi ew of both executi ve and legi slati ve acti on under a combi nati on of domesti c and European
l egal standards remi ni scent of th e passage above. Fi rst, as a matter of domesti c law, Briti sh
courts engage i n substanti ve revi ew of executi ve acti on, i n reliance upon judi cially fashi oned
pri nci pl es of admi ni strative law. See infra notes 217-218 and accompanyi ng text (descri bi ng
Wednesbury revi ew). As a matter of practi ce, i f not al so formal doctri ne, th e extent to whi ch they
scr uti ni ze such acti on varies with th e i mportance of th e i nterests at stake. "It i s now common to
acknowl edge that the courts apply th e pri nci ples of judi cial revi ew, i ncl udi ng th e Wednesbury
test, wi th varyi ng degrees of i ntensity dependi ng upon the nature of th e subject-matter." CRAIG,
supra note 54, at 583. In parti cular, governme ntal acti on that i nterferes with h uman ri ghts attracts
h ei ghtened judi cial scruti ny. See id. at 546-48, 582-84 (di scussi ng cases).
Second, Briti sh courts now revi ew both executive acti on and parliamentary l egi slati on for
compati bility with both E.U. law and the European Conventi on on H uman Ri ghts. To th e extent
that clai ms are rai sed under E.U. law or th e Conventi on, th e courts must engage i n
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(c)

Canada.121

(d)

Germany.122

34

proporti onality revi ew of th e ki nd empl oyed by th e European Court of Justi ce and th e European
Court of Human Ri ghts, respecti vely. See id. at 559-63, 585-86 (di scussi ng domesti c appli cati on of
th e Conventi on via th e Human Ri ghts Act 1998); id. at 589-98 (di scussi ng th e use of
proporti onality under E.U. law by domesti c courts); see also supra note 37 (di scussi ng th e
conseque nces of i ncompati bility between parliamentary l egi slati on, on th e one hand, and E.U.
law or th e Conventi on, on the oth er). Proporti onality revi ew can be expressed i n di fferent ways
but i nvariably denotes judi cial attenti on to th e i mportance of the competi ng i nterests, th e extent
to whi ch th ose i nterests are at stake, and th e care taken by th e government i n its ch oi ce of means.
See infra notes 121-124 (di scussi ng Canadian and European i mpl ementati ons of proporti onality
revi ew); text accompanyi ng notes 151-154 (synth esi zi ng th e vari ous strai ns of proporti onality
revi ew).
Thi rd, many have suggested that proporti onality revi ew i s bei ng adopted – or h as
al ready been adopted – by th e Engli sh courts as a matter of domesti c law, to be appli ed even i n
th e absence of a clai m under E.U. law or the Conventi on. See id. at 585-89, 600; Jeffrey Jowell &
Anth ony Lester Q.C., Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor Dangerous, in N EW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL
R EVIEW passim (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Ol iver eds., 1988); infra notes 219-222 and accompanyi ng
text (di scussi ng th e extent to whi ch Wednesbury revi ew i s convergi ng – or h as al ready converged
– upon pr oporti onality revi ew of th e European variety).
121
Th e Canadian Consti tuti on expli citly provi des that th e ri ghts and freedoms i t guarantees are
subject to " such reasonabl e li mi ts ... as can be demonstrabl y justi fied i n a free and democrati c
soci ety." CAN. CONST. (Consti tuti on Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Ri ghts and Freedoms), § 1. To
justify the i mpairment of a constituti onally guaranteed ri ght or freedom, the governme nt must
establi sh that its objective i s " pressi ng and substantial," that th e means it has ch osen are
" rati onally connected" to its objective, that the ri gh t or freedom i n questi on has been i mpaired "as
littl e as possi bl e," and that th e negati ve i mpact upon th e ri ght or freedom i s " proporti onal" to th e
governme nt's objective. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-40 (ci ti ng R v. Bi g M. Drug Mart
Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352). In practi ce, th e Court has not actually requi red th e government's
ch oi ce of means to i mpai r ri ghts or freedoms " as littl e as possi bl e"; rather, it has empl oyed "a
more fl exi bl e analysi s of wh ether th e degree of i mpairment of protected ri ghts i s justifiabl e,
consi deri ng th e i mportance of th e ri gh t, th e degree of i ntrusi on, and th e nature of th e asserted
governme nt i nterest." Jackson, supra note 53, at 608 (citi ng R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697).
122
Germany i s credited with th e i nventi on of proporti onality revi ew, or Verhältnismässigkeit,
whi ch has si nce been adopted by oth er courts such as th e European Court of Justi ce. See T.C.
H ARTLEY, THE F OUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 148 (4th ed. 1998); PAUL CRAIG &
GRÁINNE DE B ÚRCA, EU LAW 372 (3d ed. 2003). In substance, "th e German approach i s not so
different from the meth odol ogy often empl oyed by th e Uni ted States Supreme Court i n
fundame ntal ri ghts cases." K OMMERS, supra note 98, at 46. As practi ced i n Germany,
proporti onality revi ew i s a th ree-step process. Fi rst, th e requi rement of Eignung, or suitability,
entail s that "the means used must be appropriate ... to the achi evement of a l egi ti mate end." Id.
Second, Erforderlichkeit i s a measure of necessi ty and refers to the requi rement that the means
adopted by th e goverment " must have th e l east restri cti ve effect ... on a constituti onal val ue." Id.
By way of compari son with Ameri can constituti onal law, Kommers i ndi cates that thi s standard i s
i n practi ce l ess demandi ng than the narrow tail ori ng requi reme nt of stri ct scruti ny, but woul d
not be sati sfi ed by rati onal basi s revi ew. See id. Thi rd, th e pri nci ple of Zumutbarkeit requi res that
" [t]h e burden on th e ri ght must not be excessi ve relati ve to the benefi ts secured by th e state's
obje ctive." Id.
Justi ce Hel mut Stei nberger of th e Bundesverfassungsgeri cht has suggested that, because
th ey share " certai n basi c i nstituti onal and functi onal el ements" – namely, "federal structures, a
system of ch ecks and balances, and i ndepende nt courts armed wi th judi cial revi ew of th e
constituti onality of acts of publ i c power" - th e Ameri can and German constituti onal systems are
both characterized by "functi onally equi val ent standards of eval uati ons, meth odol ogi cal
approaches, and substantive sol uti ons, alth ough th ei r arti culati on and the ways and means to
arrive at them may differ." Hel mut Stei nberger, American Constitutionalism and German
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(e)

France.123

(f)

The European Court of Human Rights.124
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Constitutional Development, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND R IGHTS; THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED
S TATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 216 (Loui s Henki n & Al bert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
123
French judi cial reasoni ng i s not ch aracteri zed by the expli ci t arti culati on or use of doctri nal
tests; rath er, by common l aw standards, French deci si ons have an unfamiliar tendency to proceed
di rectl y from statements of fact to concl usi ons of l aw. Expli cati on of French consti tuti onal
doctri ne i s furth er frustrated both by th e excepti onal brevity of French judgments, and by th e
extraordi nary habits of grammar and organi zati on that they exhi bit. See, e.g., JOHN B ELL, F RENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at v (1992) (noti ng rueful ly th e " diffi cul t," "al most i ncompreh ensi bl e
structure" of French judgme nts); Vi cki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative
Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 583, 596 n.47 (1999); Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A
Comparative Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 H ARV. L.
R EV. 689, 695-96 (1998) (noti ng that French judi ci al deci si ons take th e form of a si ngl e sentence).
Neverthel ess, th e case law of th e Conseil Constituti onnel evi dences appli cati on of th e same tests
of constituti onali ty encountered el sewh ere. The first major pi ece of l egi slati on to be revi ewed by
th e Conseil, i n th e 1981 Security and Liberty case, i ncl uded a provi si on auth ori zi ng poli ce to
conduct i dentity ch ecks, and to detai n persons " for th e peri od necessary to ch eck hi s i denti ty," up
to a maxi mum of si x h ours. See Deci si on No. 80-127, Cons. const., Jan. 19 & 20, 1981, D. 1981, 15,
translated in B ELL, supra, at 308-15. In uph ol di ng the provi si on, the Conseil stressed enti rely
familiar consi derati ons – namel y, th e i mportance of th e government's objecti ves, th e degree to
whi ch the provi si on i mpai red th e ri ght i n questi on, and th e tail ori ng of th e law to i ts objectives.
On th e one hand, it characteri zed th e governme nt's goal s - " the pursui t of cri mi nal s, and th e
preventi on of th reats to publ i c order" - as " necessary for the i mpl ementati on of pri nci pl es and
ri gh ts of constituti onal val ue." Id. ¶ 56, at 314. On th e oth er hand, the Conseil found that th e
degree of "i nconveni ence" to freedom of movement was " not excessive," id., i n li ght of the vari ous
ways i n whi ch th e provi si on had been narrowl y tail ored: i ndi vi dual s had the ri ght to establi sh
th ei r i denti ty " by any means," detenti on was auth ori zed onl y i n cases of " necessity," and
detai nees enjoyed a variety of safeguards i ncl udi ng, but not li mi ted to, th e si x-h our ti me li mi t. Id.
¶¶ 54-56, 64, at 313-14.
Th e Conseil Consti ti onnel does not revi ew the constituti onali ty of executi ve acti on; that
task bel ongs excl usi vel y to the French admi ni strati ve courts, whi ch are wh oll y i ndependent of
th e Conseil Consti tuti onnel . See Justi ce Steph en Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and
Globalization: Changing Relationships Among European Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. R EV.
1045, 1058-60 (2000); Bell , supra note 99, at 1760-63, 1781-83; see also infra note 244 (descri bi ng
conseque nces of France's di vi ded judi cial system). Th e Consei l d'État i s known for appl yi ng
proporti onality revi ew i n substance, i f not i n name. See B ROWN & B ELL, supra note 54, at 233-35,
263 (noti ng that proporti onality has "assumed i ncreasi ng i mportance" i n France, and l ikeni ng
revi ew for erreur manifeste to proporti onality review); Jowell & Lester, supra note 120, at 54-56;
Boyron, supra note 54, at 239-54.
124
Th e European Court of Human Ri gh ts (th e "E.C.H.R." ) i s responsi bl e for i nterpreti ng th e
Eur opean Conve nti on on Human Ri ghts (th e " Conventi on" ) and appl yi ng it to th e member states
of th e Counci l of Europe (whi ch i s not to be conf used wi th th e European Uni on). See Breyer,
supra note 123, at 1057-58. Most of th e ri ghts provi si ons of th e Conventi on expressly permi t such
governme ntal i nterference as i s " necessary i n a democrati c soci ety i n th e i nterests of publ i c safety
for th e protecti on of publ i c order, h ealth or moral s, or for the protecti on of the ri ghts and
freedoms of oth ers." CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF H UMAN R IGHTS AND F UNDAMENTAL
F REEDOMS as amended by Protocol s Nos. 3, 5, 8 & 11, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10(2),
http://www.ech r.coe.i nt/Conventi on/webConve nENG.pdf
[h erei nafter
EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ]; see id. arts. 6(1), 8(2), 9(2), 11(2) (contai ni ng si milar language). Accordi ngl y, th e
general approach of th e E.C.H.R. i s to balance th e ri ghts at stake agai nst the justifi cati ons offered
by th e governme nt, subject to a " margi n of appreciati on" that affords nati onal governments a
measure of deference i n th ei r assessment of means and objecti ves. See, e.g., Otto-Premi nger Inst.
v. Austria, 325 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 17-21 (1995) (" wei ghi ng up th e confli cti ng i nterests" of freedom of
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expressi on and the ri ght of others to " proper respect" for thei r reli gi ous beli efs, and uph ol di ng th e
sei zure of a fil m offensive to Cath oli cs from a non-profit ci nema). As i n other juri sdi cti ons, th e
degree of judi cial scruti ny vari es with the i mportance of th e i nterest at stake. See, e.g., id. at 19
(remarki ng that judi cial revi ew must be " stri ct" wh en freedom of expressi on i s at stake, i n li gh t of
its i mportance); McCann v. Uni ted Ki ngdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-31, 45-46, 56-62
(1995) (h ol di ng that the use of potentiall y l ethal force " must be stri ctl y proporti onate" to th e
governme nt's ai ms, and rul i ng, by a vote of 10-9, that Briti sh auth ori ties used unnecessary force
i n killi ng IRA terrori sts wh o had prepared a car bomb for use at a parade).
125
Th e European Court of Justi ce (the " E.C.J.") appli es proporti onality revi ew wh enever th e
l egality of eith er Communi ty or member state acti on i s chall enged, but th e i ntensi ty of revi ew
varies with th e subject matter. When revi ewi ng " poli cy measures," it will onl y consi der wh eth er
th e ch oi ce of means was " manifestl y i nappropriate" to achieve th e objecti ves; wh en "fundame ntal
freedoms" are i mpli cated, h owever, i t appli es a standard of " necessity" and demands use of th e
"least restri cti ve alternati ve." See, e.g., TAKAS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 90
(1999); CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 371-79; Grái nne de Búrca, The Principle of
Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 105, 148 (1993) (" [T]h e more i mportant
th e parti cular ri ght or the parti cul ar Communi ty i nterest affected, and th e greater th e adverse or
restri ctive i mpact on it, the more cl osel y the Court of Justi ce i s likely to search for th e exi stence of
l ess restri cti ve al ternati ves."). Proporti onality revi ew by the E.C.J. resembl es the German model :
it combi nes tests of suitability and necessi ty wi th an overall assessment of proporti onality. See
TRIDIMAS, supra, at 91-92; CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra, at 372. The E.C.J.'s use of proporti onality
revi ew i n h uman ri ghts cases i s likel y to be rei nforced by Arti cl e 52 of th e new Charter of
Fundamental Ri ghts of th e European Uni on, whi ch expressly ti es the meani ng and scope of ri ghts
i n the Charter to that of correspondi ng ri ghts i n the European Conve nti on on Human Ri gh ts. See
CHARTER OF F UNDAMENTAL R IGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION , Dec. 7, 2000, art. 52, O.J. (C 364) 1
(2000); supra note 124 (descri bi ng proporti onality revi ew under the Conventi on). Th e Charter i s
not yet l egall y bi ndi ng, but i t al ready i nfl uences th e E.C.J.'s i nterpretati on of E.U. treati es and
laws. See CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra, at 43.
126
The Israeli Supreme Court consi ders th e i mportance of th e governme ntal objective, th e
i mportance of th e i nterest at stake, and th e proporti onality of th e governme ntal objecti ve to th e
extent of th e harm i nfli cted. For a vi vi d exampl e of such balanci ng and proporti onality analysi s,
see H.C. 5100/94, Publ i c Commi ttee Agai nst Torture i n Israel v. Israel (1999), available in
translation at h ttp://62.90.71.124/files_eng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf (last vi sited May
21, 2004), i n whi ch the Court consi dered th e l egality of ph ysi cal torture as a means of
i nterrogati on:
On th e one h and, lies th e desi re to uncover th e truth , i n accord wi th th e publ i c
i nterest i n exposi ng cri me and preventi ng it. On th e oth er hand i s th e need to
protect the di gnity and li berty of th e i ndi vi dual bei ng i nterrogated. [T]h ese
val ues are not absol ute. [A] democrati c soci ety ... i s prepared to accept that an
i nterrogati on may i nfri nge th e h uman di gni ty and li berty of a suspect - provi ded
that it i s done for a proper purpose and that th e harm does not exceed that whi ch
i s necessary.
Id. ¶ 22, at 21-22. Th e Court concl uded that th e i nterrogati on meth ods i n questi on were
prohi bited, see id., but that offi cial s wh o neverth eless empl oyed th em and th ereafter faced
prosecuti on mi ght be able to i nvoke a defense of necessi ty, i f th e means used were " i nh erent to
th e very essence of an i nterrogati on" and " both fai r and reasonabl e." Id. ¶ 38, at 36.
127
Like secti on 1 of th e Canadian Consti tuti on, secti on 33 of the South Afri can Consti tuti on
provi des that constituti onal ri ghts are subje ct to such li mitati ons as are " reasonabl e" and
" justi fiabl e i n an open and democrati c soci ety based upon freedom and equali ty." S. AFR. CONST.
§ 33. Anal ysi s under secti on 33 of governmental acti on that i mpai rs a consti tuti onal ri ght
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There is, of course, no single correct answer. What the passage describes
is nothing less than generic constitutional analysis. To be sure, every jurisdiction
has its own magic words: constitutions employ different language, and courts
have different ways in which they prefer to formulate their tests of
constitutionality. A constitution may speak of "equal protection,"130 or "equality"

"i nvol ves the wei ghi ng up of competi ng val ues, and ul ti mately an assessment based on
proporti onality." State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 436 (CC) (Chaskal son, P.).
128
Wh en a " fundamental ri ght" i s i mpai red, Indian courts wi ll consi der "th e nature of th e ri gh t,
th e i nterest of the aggri eved party, and the degree of harm resulti ng from th e State acti on."
MAHENDRA P. S INGH, V.N. S HUKLA' S CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA 33 (10th ed. 2001) (di scussi ng I NDIA
CONST. art. 13). Certai n fundamental ri ghts, such as freedom of expressi on, are expressl y made
subject by th e Constituti on to " reasonable restri cti ons." I NDIA CONST. art. 19. In determi ni ng
wh eth er a restri cti on i s " reasonabl e," the courts appl y general tests of proporti onality and
rati onality: th e restri cti on " sh oul d not be greater than what i s requi red by the ci rcumstances," and
th ere sh oul d exi st a " proxi mate conne cti on between th e restri cti on and the object sough t to be
achi eved." S INGH , supra, at A-53.
129
Like many of th e consti tuti ons di scussed above, th e post-war Constituti on of Japan contai ns
expli cit li mitati on clauses that requi re th e balanci ng of i ndi vi dual ri ghts agai nst the " publ i c
welfare." See K ENPO arts. 12, 13 (Japan), translated in LAWRENCE W. B EER & H IROSHI I TOH , THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN , 1970 THROUGH 1990, at app. 3, at 655 (1996). As el sewh ere,
th e i ntensity of revi ew vari es with th e nature of the i ndi vi dual ri ght or i nterest at stake. Under
th e Japanese " dual standard" approach , restri cti ons on property ri gh ts and economi c l egi slati on
recei ve l ess scruti ny. Mi ndful of Ameri ca's experi ence with the Lochner era, th e drafters of th e
Japanese Constituti on rendered protecti on of economi c and property ri gh ts subje ct to " publ i c
welfare" excepti ons i n a way that "life" and "li berty" protecti ons are not. See Nobush i ge Ukai, The
Significance of the Reception of American Constitutional Institutions and Ideas in Japan, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA, supra note 22, at 120-22 (compari ng arti cl es 29 and 31 of the Japanese
Constituti on). In th e equal protecti on context, th e Supreme Court "has never resorted to stri ct
judi ci al scruti ny and has been rel uctant to devel op standards from wh i ch h ei gh tened judi cial
scr uti ny mi ght be derived." Hi denori Tomatsu, Equal Protection of the Law, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds. 1993). It i s consi stentl y
observed that judi cial revi ew i n Japan i s extremel y deferential i n practi ce. See, e.g., B EER & I TOH,
supra, at 24 (noti ng onl y si x cases, over forty-fi ve years, i n wh i ch the Supreme Court h as
i nvali dated l egi slati on); DAVID M. B EATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 121
(1995) (" Among comparativi sts, constituti onal revi ew i n Japan i s regarded as th e most
conservative and cauti ous i n th e worl d."); Brown Hamano, supra note 22, at 443; Kazuyuki
Takahashi, Why Do We Study Constitutional Laws of Foreign Countries, and How?, in DEFINING THE
F IELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 47 ("We are concer ned ... about a
court so subdued as to deprive judi cial revi ew of all its si gnifi cance."); Norih o Urabe, Rule of Law
and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States and Japan, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra, at 178 (" [T]h e Supreme Court of Japan has al most no i dea that governme nt acti on
sh oul d be bound stri ctl y by th e Constituti on."). Even if the Court fail s to strike down a law,
h owever, it will perform proporti onality revi ew of th e manner i n wh i ch the governme nt applies
th e law. See Brown Hamano, supra, at 445-46 (di scussi ng Toyama v. Japan, 20 Kei sh u 8, 901 (Sup.
Ct., Oct. 26, 1966), translated in LAWRENCE W. B EER & H IROSHI I TOH , THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
LAW OF J APAN , 1970: S ELECTED S UPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, at 85 (1978)).
130
U.S. CONST. amend. 14.
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and "equal protection," 131 or "equal protection and equal benefit."132 Rights may
be subject to "reasonable restrictions,"133 or such limitations that are "necessary in
a democratic society" 134 or required by the "public welfare." 135 Around the world,
constitutional courts apply different levels of scrutiny keyed to the importance of
the interests at stake, but not all use the word "proportionality" to describe this
form of analysis.136 Some constitutional texts are more comprehensive than
others, but a shorter constitutional text does not imply fewer or simpler
constitutional concepts.

A laconic constitution may simply require judges to

furnish a greater proportion of the requisite vocabulary.137
Such variations in text and terminology do not appear to engender deep
dissim ilarities in the analytical structure of rights adjudication. Just as there are
only so many institutional configurations available to a constitutional
democracy,138 there may only be so many ways to perform judicial review of
legislation. General patterns of judicial review are not difficult to discern. What
131

I NDIA CONST. art. 14.
CAN . CONST. (Constituti on Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Ri gh ts and Freedoms), § 15.
133
I NDIA CONST. art. 19(2)-(6) (qualifyi ng ri ghts of expressi on, assembl y, movement, and
professi on).
134
EUROPEAN CONVENTION , supra note 124, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2); see supra note 124.
135
K ENPO arts. 12, 13, 22, 29 (Japan).
136
See Davi d Beatty, Protecting Constitutional Rights in Japan and Canada, 41 AM . J. COMP. L. 535,
544 (1993) (" [T]h e Ameri can mul ti -ti ered framework of judi cial review i s si mply th e balanci ng
and proporti onality pri nci pl es by other names. ... In substance, the cri teria of consti tuti onality
are exactly th e same." ).
137
Th e U.S. Consti tuti on, for i nstance, i s under 8,000 words l ong, i ncl udi ng all amendments. By
compari son, th e Indian Consti tuti on wei gh s i n at over 22,000 words, excl udi ng sch edul es and
appendi ces; as ori gi nall y publ i sh ed wi th all accoutrements, i t ran to 254 pages. See A ndrzej
Rapaczynski , Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism Abroad, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND R IGHTS, supra note 122, at 448-49. Brevity i s arguabl y a vi rtue i n
constituti on-wri ti ng. See LUDWIKOWSKI & F OX, supra note 65, at 201 (contrasti ng th e U.S., Indian
and Sovi et consti tuti ons, and argui ng that sh orter constituti ons tend to be more "effective"). It i s a
conseque nce of brevi ty, h owever, that the U.S. Supreme Court "has taken what i s unque sti onabl y
th e worl d's sh ortest and most laconi c constituti onal statement of h uman ri ghts and engrafted on
it a set of rul es, and a framework of analysi s, that i s as compl ex and doctri nai re as th e
juri sprudence wri tten by any court i n th e worl d." DAVID M. BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 112 (1995). For exampl e, whil e other constituti ons frequentl y contai n
express language li miti ng th e ri ghts found th erei n, see L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 31-32
(di scussi ng th e ubi qui ty i n moder n constituti onal texts of " justifi cati on provi si ons" that expressl y
all ow such li mitati ons upon ri gh ts as can be justifi ed); supra notes 133-135 and accompanyi ng text
(descri bi ng vari ous l i mitati ons clauses), th e Court has been requi red to arti culate and i mpose
such li mits itsel f, "as a matter of 'judi cial legi slati on' and wi th out any express di recti on i n the Bill
of Ri ghts." H OGG, supra note 68, § 35.1, at 765; Peter W. Hogg, Canada's New Charter of Rights, 32
AM . J. COMP. L. 283, 297 (1984).
138
See Robert A. Dahl, Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions from Democratic
Experience, in N OMOS XXXVIII: POLITICAL ORDER 175, 183-86 (Ian Shapi ro & Russell Hardi n eds.,
1996).
132
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Donald Kommers says of the Bundesverfassungsgericht might equally be said of
other courts: "In much of its work, the court seems less concerned with
interpreting the Constitution – that is, defining the meaning of a documentary
text – than in applying an ends-means test for determining whether a particular
right has been overburdened in the light of a given set of facts."139 Canadian
scholar David Beatty makes the point forcefully:
What is str iking about this jurisprudence of constitutional rights
when it is examined comparatively is how, even though the courts
generally do not frequently refer to each other's judgments, the
reasoning they follow and the doctrines they develop to define
their powers are virtually identical. 140
[T]he rules of constitutional law can be reduced to two basic
principles or tests. To establish the constitutional pedigree of a law
it must be shown, first, that the public interest or purpose of the
law is of sufficient importance that it offsets (justifies) whatever
limitation or restriction it imposes on indiv iduals or groups or
other orders of government. Some might call this a utilitarian
standard of constitutionality, or a test of 'proportionality,' or
balance. [T]he courts also insist that the means, or particular
method, that it employs meet a basic standard of 'rationality' - or
necessity - as well. ...
Together, these two basic principles require those who have been
entrusted with the powers of the state to act with a measure of
moderation and proportion.141
The difficulty with Beatty's argument lies in the manner in which it elides
the descriptive and the normative. There is a reason why Beatty identifies the
generic "tests" of constitutionality as "basic principles": his argument is not
merely that constitutional courts employ generic analytical methods, but rather
that these methods are intrinsically desirable. In his view, the ubiquity of
particular tests reflects an "overarching, unified method of constitutional review
that does distinguish, in an objective and principled way, between laws that are
constitutional and those that are not."142 That is, he identifies the actual with the
good, in a manner that implies the actual exists because it is good. Sujit Choudhry
139

K OMMERS, supra note 98, at 46 (likeni ng th e German and Ameri can approach es to
constituti onal adjudi cati on).
140
Beatty, supra note 32, at 133.
141
B EATTY, supra note 129, at 15-16.
142
Id. at 15.
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astutely characterizes Beatty's argument as an example of "universalism,"
defined by the normative premise that the mere existence of a legal principle in
many legal systems is evidence of its "truth or correctness."143

A strictly

descriptive formulation of generic constitutional analysis might therefore do best
to avoid such terms as "proportionality" and "rationality" that double as
normative principles. What is sought is an account of what constitutional courts
do, not an argument that what they do is in some sense good.
Such an account might go like this.

The rights and protections that

constitutions confer are inevitably subject to such restrictions as courts consider
justifiable.

In deciding whether a particular restriction is tolerable, courts

employ the two means of problem-solving that are perhaps most familiar to
lawyers, balancing144 and means-end analysis. 145 Balancing requires the court to
evaluate both the relative importance of the conflicting interests at stake, and the
extent to which these interests are at stake. In the context of rights adjudication,
the interests to be balanced will typically be the government's objectives, on the
one hand, and individual rights or protections, on the other: the more important
the latter, the more important the former must be to justify their infringement.
This balancing is qualified by the extent to which each interest is implicated: a
search of one's person and possessions strikes more deeply at privacy and
property interests when conducted at home, for example, than when conducted
at the airport, while the government's interest in public safety follows the
opposite pattern. As the interests to be weighed are incommensurable, however,
judicial balancing is not merely imprecise; it is incapable of precision. The notion
of balancing presupposes we ighing and measurement, yet the only metric
available to judges is that of analogy.

The other technique in the judicial

repertoire, means-end analysis, is concerned not with the nature of the
governmental objective, but with how that objective is achieved. Courts will
attempt to determine whether the objective could have been satisfactorily

143

Ch oudh ry, supra note 28, at 890.
" [L]awyers wh o are typi cally trai ned to resol ve confli cts will be i ncli ned to thi nk that balanci ng
competi ng i nterests i s th e most rati onal way of resol vi ng probl ems." Tush net, supra note 24, at
336.
145
" [M]eans-end rati onality i s cl oser to th e center of th e l egal enterpri se than l ogi c, [o]r than
reasoni ng by anal ogy." POSNER, supra note 117, at 107-08.
144
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achieved in a manner less injur ious to the individual interest at stake: the more
important the interest, the less that unnecessary impairment of it will be
tolerated.
This two-part account of generic constitutional analysis mirrors Justice
Breyer's own description of what constitutional courts do when faced with
important conflicting interests.

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC146

required the Court to revisit the tangled thicket of campaign finance regulation,
in which rights of speech and association coexist uneasily with restrictions
intended to combat corruption and secure public confidence in democratic
processes. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer
identifie d balancing and means-end analysis as the Court's two tasks in complex
cases:
[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally
protected interests in complex ways[,] the Court has closely
scrutinized the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained
from employing a simple test that effectively presumes
unconstitutionality. Rather, it has balanced interests. And in
practice that has meant asking whether the statute burdens any one
such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary
effects upon the others (perhaps, but not necessarily, because of the
existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive alternative).147
The generic character of this approach was not lost on Justice Breyer, who
proceeded to describe it as "consistent with that of other constitutional courts
facing similarly complex constitutional problems," and to offer decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court by way of
example.148 Elsewhere, Justice Breyer has spoken of the dawning "global legal
enterprise,"149 an ominous phrase to those who fear the judicial imposition of
foreign law.150 The enterprise that he describes, however, may be a naturally

146

528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurri ng).
148
Id. at 403 (citi ng Bowman v. United Ki ngdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998), and Li bman v.
Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (Can.)).
149
Breyer, supra note 4.
150
See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 7 (openi ng statement of Representative Tom
Feeney) (quoti ng Justi ce Breyer's language wi th di sapproval ).
147
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occurring one, insofar as it is defined not by common results, but by the
problem-solving skills shared by lawyers everywhere.
Whether balancing and means-end analysis can or should be described as
proportionality

review

is

a

question

of

terminology.151

The

term

"proportionality" is fraught with difficulty. In part because it is so widely used
by different courts, the term has defied consistent definition.

Allowing for

differences in the ways that courts formulate their approaches, however,
proportionality consistently emerges as an umbrella term that implies both
identification and weighting of the relevant conflicting interests, and evaluation
of the extent to which the conflict may be minimized by careful choice of means.
For purposes of conceptual clarity, it may be better to speak separately of
balancing and means-end analysis. There is no set sequence in which courts will
perform these steps, under the name of proportionality or otherwise; nor are they
always kept distinct. 152 Some courts may impose threshold tests of weighing or
balancing 153; others may be prepared to assume implicitly that a governmental
objective is sufficiently weighty to justify some restriction in principle, but hold
that the means adopted is unnecessarily injurious to the individual interest at
stake.154 Whether or not one agrees with Beatty that these techniques amount to
an "objective and principled" way of de ciding constitutional questions, their
sheer ubiquity suggests that courts resort to them for lack of better alternatives.
The heuristics available to the legal mind in the face of normative conflict are
few.

Though there exist verbal formulae that purport to define the tasks of

balancing and means-end analysis, these definitions – and the variations among
them – may not make much practical difference. Judges are inevitably required
151

See Jackson, supra note 53, at 609 ("While the language of 'proporti onality' i s not generally used
i n th e United States, th e underl yi ng questi ons - i nvol vi ng the degree of fi t between th e clai med
obje ctive and th e means ch osen, and a concer n for wh ether the i ntrusi on on ri gh ts or i nterests i s
excessi ve i n relati on to th e purpose - are al ready an i mportant part of some fi el ds of U.S.
constituti onal law[.]" ).
152
See CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 372 (noti ng that th e E.C.J. will someti mes collapse th e
second and thi rd stages of th e proporti onality i nqui ry); TRIDIMAS, supra note 125, at 92 (same).
153
In Canada, for exampl e, th e government must fi rst proffer a " pressi ng and substantial
obje ctive" capabl e of justifyi ng an i nfri ngement upon a fundamental ri ght or freedom before th e
court will perform any balanci ng or means-end analysi s. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-39.
In practi ce, h owever, few cases are deci ded on th e basi s of thi s thresh ol d requi rement. See H OGG,
supra note 70, §§ 35.8, 35.9(b), at 779-80, 784.
154
See, e.g., Gunth er, supra note 119, at 26-30 (di scussi ng cases i n wh i ch the U.S. Supreme Court
has engaged i n means scr uti ny to avoi d reachi ng the meri ts of diffi cul t consti tuti onal clai ms).
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to exercise that subjective and therefore distrusted quality known as judgment.
It is the irony of constitutional adjudication that judges are so often reluctant to
advertise their reliance upon the very quality for which they are most required.
IV. GENERI C C O NSTITUTI ONA L D O CTRI NE
A. The Varying Uses of Foreign Doctrine
It is very common for constitutional courts to consider what courts
elsewhere have done.

Some, such as the Israeli Supreme Court, borrow

systematically from other countries155; the U.S. Supreme Court, by comparison,
considers the constitutional law of other jurisdictions only sporadically.156
Indeed, the mere mention of foreign case law in a Supreme Court decision
attracts attention in this country precisely because it is so rare.157 To discuss what
other courts have done, however, is not necessarily to imitate them. The uses to
which judges put foreign legal materials are varied.

No one supposes that

foreign case law ever constitutes controlling authority; nevertheless, the mere
fact that a court somewhere has reached a particular conclusion may imbue the
conclusion with some vestige of authority or precedential value. 158 Alternatively,
a foreign decision can be treated as nothing more than a potential source of
persuasive reasoning, akin to an academic treatise, or it can be used for reasons
having nothing at all to do with either its precedential or persuasive value.
Foreign materials can be used in merely evidentiary fashion: Justice Kennedy's
oft-criticized references in Lawrence v. Texas to European case law and Br itish
legislative materials 159 were made not to harmonize American constitutional law

155

See Al exander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second
Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, 285 (1999) (descri bi ng
th e Israeli Supreme Court as "th e most i mportant comparative consti tuti onal law i nstitute of th e
worl d" ).
156
See L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 37-38.
157
See id. at 38; Greenh ouse, supra note 4, § 4, at 4.
158
See Posner, supra note 28, at xx (stressi ng the " essential di sti ncti ons" " between citi ng a deci si on
as controlli ng auth ority and as auth ority that i s not control li ng, and between ci ti ng a deci si on as
eith er ki nd of auth ority and as no auth ori ty at all").
159
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (citi ng an advi sory commi ttee report to the Bri ti sh Parliament
and th e E.C.H.R.'s deci si on i n Dudgeon v. United Kingdom). For criti ci sm of th e Lawrence
majori ty's use of forei gn material s, see, for exampl e, Steyn, ci ted above i n note 5, at 56; Wooten,
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with foreign law, but rather to refute historical assertions upon which Bowers v.
Hardwick had relied. 160 In fact, Justice Kennedy has publicly defended the Court's
resistance to the influence of European case law.161 References to foreign legal
materials may simply be a form of courtesy: as Justice O'Connor has put it, to
take notice of other courts may help to "create that all-important good
impression" among them.162

Such courtesy is not necessarily idle: the

appearance, if nothing more, of engaging in international judicial dialogue may
increase a court's own influence and prestige.163 Not least of all, comparison
often teaches courts not what to emulate, but what to avoid. Other courts have
explicitly considered the U.S. approaches to hate speech, pornography, and
capital punishment, only to reject them164; nor are they anxious to recreate

ci ted above i n note 5, at P6; and th e congressi onal resol uti ons and testi mony di scussed above i n
note 16.
160
478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Mi chael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atki ns and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT' L L. 69, 75-75, 80 (2004) (noti ng that i nternati onal
material s were " used defensivel y" i n Lawrence to " defeat unsupported clai ms" about th e
uni versality of opposi ti on to sodomy); Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 17 (prepared
statement of Vi cki C. Jackson) (noti ng that th e use of forei gn material s i n Lawrence was partly to
"to correct or clarify the hi stori cal record referred to i n Chi ef Justi ce Burger's opi ni on i n Bowers v.
Hardwick" ).
161
See B ORK, supra note 94, at 24-25 (descri bi ng h ow Justi ce Kennedy " bore th e brunt of th e attack
on th e Court's all eged 'i nsul arity'" at th e Ameri can Bar Associati on's 2000 meeti ng i n London, but
" di d not succumb" to thi s "i nsol ent forei gn br owbeati ng").
162
Ranki n, supra note 5, at A3 (quoti ng a speech gi ven by Justi ce O'Connor i n 2003).
163
See Wu, supra note 10 (descri bi ng th e Supreme Court's references to forei gn material s as "a
useful courtesy" by whi ch the Court "i ncreases its i ntell ectual i nfl uence," even if it " proceed[s] to
i gnore th ei r reasoni ng"); L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 37-39 (observi ng, from th e vantage
poi nt of th e Canadian Supreme Court, that th e Reh nqui st Court's "fail ure to take part i n
i nternati onal dial ogue" has i mpai red i ts i nfl uence); Slaugh ter, Global Community, supra note 23, at
198 (suggesti ng that Canadian and South Afri can courts have been rewarded with
di sproporti onate i nfl uence for th ei r ability "to capture and crystallize the work of thei r fell ow
constituti onal judges around th e worl d"); cf. Schauer, supra note 25, at 258-59 (suggesti ng that
nati ons seek to maxi mi ze thei r "i nternati onal l egal i nfl uence" and shape thei r constituti onal law
"to maxi mi ze th e li kelih ood" of such i nfl uence).
164
See Schauer, supra note 25, at 22-23; L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 26-27, 36-37 (" Crosspolli nati on h el ps not onl y wh en we accept th e sol uti ons and reasoni ng of oth ers, but wh en we
depart from th em, si nce even th en, understandi ng and arti cul ati ng th e reasons a different sol uti on
i s appropriate for a parti cul ar country hel ps make a better deci si on."); Rapaczynski, supra note
137, at 405, 407-08 (noti ng that the U.S. Consti tuti on has exerted upon other consti tuti ons both
" posi tive i nfl uence" of th e ki nd that i nspi res i mitati on, and " negative i nfl uence" of th e ki nd that
prompts pursui t of a di fferent approach); Donal d P. Kommers, Comparative Constitutional Law: Its
Increasing Relevance, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8,
at 63 ("In recent decades, ... the U.S. Constituti on has served mai nly as a negative model of
constituti onal governance around th e worl d, not onl y with respect to governme ntal structures
and relati onshi ps, but al so ... wi th respect to certai n guaranteed ri ghts.").
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Precisely because courts consult foreign doctrine to varying degrees and
make inconsistent uses of what they observe, the mere fact that they
acknowledge one another does not by itself predict the emergence of generic
constitutional doctrine.

It is not self-evident that deliberate comparative

constitutional analysis, by itself, will lead courts to converge rather than to
diverge. Much has been made, by supporters and critics alike, of the extent to
which communication and doctrinal borrowing have increased among judges
and courts.167 The full panoply of homogenizing pressures at work, however,
may escape the recognition and control of the judges themselves. Most notably,
the manner in which constitutional courts share common theoretical concerns
and analytical methods, as discussed above, is likely to yield doctrinal
similarities regardless of whether judges consciously interact with one another.
Other reasons to expect generic constitutional doctrine include the extent to
which constitutional language and history are shared by different jurisdictions;
the recurring practical challenges of governance that courts must confront; the
influence of legal scholarship; the homogenizing tendencies of federal and
supranational structures; and the desire of courts with overlapping jurisdictions
to avoid conflict. These factors, and others, will be considered below.
B. Judicial Communication + Ad Hoc Borrowing = Global Law?
It has been suggested that we are witnessing, as Justice Breyer puts it, the
dawning of a "global legal enterprise." 168 Similarly, if less stirringly, Justice
Ginsburg

and Canadian

Justice

Claire

L'Heureux-Dubé

speak

of

an

165

Loch ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See Anth ony Ogus, Property Rights and Freedom of Economic Activity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
R IGHTS, supra note 122, at 129, 142-43 (noti ng " the rel uctance of constituti ons and judges to pursue
freedom of contract i deal s" i n li ght of Lochner); Sujit Ch oudh ry, The Loch ner Era and Comparative
Constitutionalism, 2 I NT' L J. CONST. L. ____ (forth comi ng 2004).
167
See infra Part IV.B.
168
Breyer, supra note 4.
166
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"international dialogue" on human r ights questions.169 It is unclear, however,
what the nature or consequences of this global judicial "enterprise" or "dialogue"
happen to be. Anne-Marie Slaughter writes, for example, of a "global community
of courts," of judges experiencing "a change in their own consciousness" as they
"increasingly com[e] to recognize each other as participants in a common judicial
enterprise."170 But the reality that she describes is, by comparison, less exalted:
[Constitutional judges] are coming together in all sorts of ways.
Literally, they meet much more frequently in a variety of settings,
from seminars to training sessions and judicial organizations.
Figuratively, they read and cite each other's opinions, which are
now available in these various meetings, on the Internet, through
clerks, and through the medium of international tribunals that
draw on domestic case law and then cross-fertilize to other national
courts.171
In other words, judges communicate, both directly and indirectly, more
extensively than before.

On this account, the "global community of courts"

sounds more like a literary salon writ large than a global judicial body that will
fashion and impose an internationally harmonized body of constitutional law.
Critics, nevertheless, have predicted the direst of consequences.

Robert Bork

warns that judges everywhere are in thrall of what he calls the "New Class,"
comprised of socialist and anti-religious "faux intellectuals" who "hope[] to
outflank American legislatures and courts by having liberal views adopted
abroad and then imposed on the United States." 172 John McGinnis, meanwhile,
has testified before Congress that "citing foreign cases ... might seem very chic to
the cogniscenti [sic], but that cosmopolitan style comes with a price": it "has the
potential to alienate our citizens from their own Constitution" – which, in turn,
undermines the stability of the Republic. 173 Not to be outdone, Jeremy Rabkin
has alleged that the European Union "is really set on undermining American

169

See Gi nsbur g & Merritt, supra note 6, passim; L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, passim; Th e
Honourabl e Clai re L'Heureux-Dubé, From Many Different Stones: A House of Justice, 41 ALTA. L.
R EV. 659, 667-68 (2003).
170
Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 23, at 192, 194.
171
Id. at 192-93.
172
B ORK, supra note 94, at 2-16.
173
See Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 29 (statement of Joh n Ol dham McGi nni s) (" Our
ci ti zens' affecti on for th ei r own Constituti on i s one of th e thi ngs that keeps our republ i c stabl e.").
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sovereignty" and seeks to do so by "infiltrat[ing] into our judicial system this idea
that our judges need to listen to what their judges say."174
In this country, at least, such drastic consequences seem unlikely to result
from increased judicial communication alone. More plausibly, those justices who
travel frequently to international conferences will become more likely to indulge
research on the part of their clerks into the case law of courts whose members
they have met, and which they now hold in intellectual esteem. The relevant
thought process, if read aloud, might go something like this:
I have now met a number of the English (or Canadian, or German)
judges and found them clever and capable. I think I shall make a
point of reading their opinions in the future. I may want to borrow
ideas from them, and perhaps even cite them as persuasive
authority, if and when it seems relevant and appropriate to do so which admittedly may never be the case, even putting aside the
criticism I will attract for considering such materials at all.
Professional admiration and courtesy aside, the use of foreign materials may also
be encouraged by the "law of the instrument."175 Having a hammer leads one to
ask not how problems can best be solved, but whether they can be solved with a
hammer; similarly, merely knowing how another court has dealt with a problem
can make that approach attractive. If it turns out, for instance, that the Canadian
Supreme Court has "appl[ied] somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat
similar circumstances," 176 a ready-made and therefore attractive solution
arguably exists. The extent of such ad hoc borrowing, however, will depend
upon what judges know about the work of other courts. By the judges' own
admission, that knowledge is likely to be limited in this country, no matter how
it may be valued in principle. 177 Unlike its Israeli counterpart, the U.S. Supreme
174

Id. at 49.
See ABRAHAM K APLAN, THE CONDUCT OF I NQUIRY: METHODOLOG Y FOR B EHAVIORAL S CIENCE 28
(1964) ("'[T]he law of th e i nstrument,' ... can be formul ated as foll ows: Give a small boy a
hammer, and h e will fi nd that everythi ng he encounters needs poundi ng."); cf. Davi d A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. R EV. 877, 891 (1996) (noti ng that th e
common l aw styl e of consti tuti onal adjudi cati on preval ent i n thi s country val ues ready-made
sol uti ons for th e sh eer reason that th ey are ready-made).
176
Breyer, supra note 4.
177
See id. ("Neith er I nor my l aw cl erks can easil y fi nd rel evant comparati ve material on our
own."); Posner, supra note 158, at xx (" [T]h e judi cial systems of th e rest of the worl d are
i mmensel y varied and most of th eir deci si ons i naccessi bl e, as a practi cal matter, to our
monoli ngual judges and l aw cl erks.").
175
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Court does not hire clerks from other countries to assist with the task of
comparative analysis.178 The sheer difficulty of the task is incentive enough for
the justices to stick with domestic materials.
C. Generic Text, Generic Doctrine
Apart from ad hoc communication and peer pressure among judges, there
do exist more systematic and profound reasons to expect the emergence of
generic constitutional doctrine. Perhaps the most obvious reason is the extent to
which constitutions themselves borrow from one another. The cumulative result
of such borrowing amounts, arguably, to a lingua franca of constitutional
provisions.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example,

borrows from international human rights documents; the constitutions of South
Africa and Israel, in turn, borrow both from those same international documents
and from the Canadian Charter.179 The South African Constitution even obligates
courts to consider "international law" and encourages them to consider "foreign
law" when interpreting rights provisions.180 Having been imposed by the U.S.
after World War II, the Japanese Kenpo is influenced by American constitutional
law, to say the least. 181 India's constitution was not adopted under compulsion
but bears both British and American impr ints; indeed, in many cases, its text was
modified to better reflect the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme

178

See Somek, supra note 155, at 285 (observi ng that th e Israeli Supreme Court's strength i n
comparati ve constituti onal anal ysi s stems i n part from i ts " practi ce of empl oyi ng cl erks from all
over th e worl d, wh o do th e research work on th ei r country of ori gi n").
179
See L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 24; Lorrai ne Wei nri b, The Canadian Charter as a Model for
Israel's Basic Laws, 4 CONST. F. 85, 85-87 (1993) (suggesti ng that th e Canadian Charter offered
Israel an attractive exampl e because it i s a " coh erent nati onal statement" of val ues and pri oriti es
found more generally i n th e " post-Worl d War Two famil y of ri ghts-protecti ng i nstrume nts" ); Joh n
Claydon, International Human Rights Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 4 S UP. CT. L. R. 287, 295-302 (1982) (noti ng the i nfl uence of th e European Conve nti on on
Human Ri ghts, th e U.N. Uni versal Declarati on of Human Ri ghts, and oth er i nternati onal h uman
ri gh ts i nstrume nts upon th e Canadian Charter).
180
S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1).
181
See, e.g., Brown Hamano, supra note 22, at 426-42; Lawrence W. Beer, Constitutionalism and
Rights in Japan and Korea, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND R IGHTS, supra note 122, at 230-43; Takahashi,
supra note 129, at 41-47; Rapaczynski , supra note 137, at 429-433 (observi ng that th e " Preambl e
al one contai ns ech oes of the U.S. Constituti on, the Declarati on of Independe nce, th e Gettysburg
Address, and oth er U.S. documents, and no ech oes of any Japanese sources" ).
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Even the U.S. Constitution did not spring forth from a vacuum;

America did not invent such concepts as habeas corpus183 or trial by jury.184 It
would be surprising if courts entirely failed to interpret similar or even identical
constitutional language in similar ways.

Historical linkages – such as those

between the U.K. and other common law jurisdictions – may heighten the
similarities, especially to the extent that courts are disposed toward originalism,
though this tendency may be unusually or even uniquely American.185
D. Generic Concerns, Generic Doctrine
Courts may also develop generic constitutional doctrine in response to
common theoretical and practical concerns. The countermajoritarian dilemma is
one such concern: as discussed in Part II, courts feel compelled to define and
justify their power in such a way as to secure widespread acceptance. One way
in which they may attempt to do so is by refusing to decide what they consider
"political questions." As Beatty observes, American and Japanese courts have
fashioned "political question" doctrines that immunize from judicial review
"almost all issues of foreign affairs, national security and the operational
structures of government"; they have done so, moreover, despite the fact that
neither constitution calls for judicial abstention on such questions.186

182

See Tri pathi, supra note 22, at 62-79. Notably, even th e Indian Constituti on's fail ures to emul ate
th e U.S. Constituti on reflected profound Ameri can i nfl uence. Its drafters had i nitially planned to
i ncl ude a due process cl ause al ong th e li nes of the Fifth Amendment but abandoned the i dea
after consul tati ons wi th Justi ce Frankfurter and i nstead adopted ph rasi ng drawn from th e
Japanese Constituti on – wh i ch had i tself been written by Ameri cans. In a furth er twi st of i rony,
th e adopti on of th e Japanese versi on di d not prevent the Indian Supreme Court from i ntroduci ng
Ameri can-styl e due process juri sprudence. See Rapaczynski, supra note 137, at 450-51. Ameri can
justi ces and law professors were al so i nfl uential i n persuadi ng th e drafters not to adopt
Ameri can-styl e federali sm. See id. at 449 n.219.
183
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl . 2 with, e.g., Th e Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2
(Eng.).
184
Compare U.S. CONST. art. VII with, e.g., Th e Bill of Ri ghts, 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, § I (Eng.)
(" Jurors ough t to be duel y i mpannell ed and returned, and Jurors wh i ch passe upon Men i n Triall s
for Hi gh Trason ough t to be Freeh ol ders.").
185
See L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 23, at 33-34 (contrasti ng Ameri can with Canadian and
Australian perspectives on th e rel evance of ori gi nal i ntent to consti tuti onal adjudi cati on).
186
See Beatty, supra note 32, at 133-34; Beatty, supra note 136, at 537-38; see also, e.g., Brown
Hamano, supra note 22, at 447-52 (di scussi ng th e Japanese Supreme Court's refusal to deci de
cases under Arti cle 9 of th e Kenpo).
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Constitutional courts must also shape constitutional doctrine to reflect the
extent of market regulation and income redistribution in modern economies.
Unless courts wish to attempt the dismantling of the administrative state or
welfare state – in the face of what is likely to be insurmountable opposition –
they must accommodate property rights to a wide range of governmental
restrictions beyond those necessary for the prevention of force or fraud. Some
constitutions facilitate this task by qualifying economic interests in ways that
they do not qualify other interests.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and

Freedoms, for example, does not even contain the words "property" or
"contract," 187 while the Japanese Kenpo explicitly subjects property rights, but not
other types of rights, to regulation consistent with the "public welfare." 188 By
contrast, there exists no comparable textual basis in the U.S. Constitution for the
disfavoring of property rights relative to other liberty interests. Nevertheless, it
is by now well established that freedom of contract, though constitutionally
protected, will ordinarily be required to yield to legislation that furthers the
general welfare.189 Regardless of constitutional text, the consistent pattern among
courts is to employ varying levels of scrutiny, and to reserve the least stringent
scrutiny for economic regulation.
Another practical concern that courts confront is the fact that governments
must allocate finite resources in pursuit of competing goals. Scarcity of resources
dictates the underenforcement of social and economic rights, relative to
traditional civil and political liberties 190 that can be uphe ld at little or no
economic cost to the state. Thus, though many constitutions contain provisions
that purport to direct or obligate the state to pursue particular social we lfare
goals, these provisions tend by their own terms to be judicially unenforceable.191
187

See CAN . CONST. (Consti tuti on Act, 1982) pt. I.
See K ENPO art. 29 (Japan) (" Property ri gh ts shall be defi ned by law, i n confor mi ty with th e
publi c wel fare."); id. art. 31 (provi di ng that " [n]o person sh all be depri ved of li fe or li berty, nor
shall any oth er cri mi nal penal ty be i mposed, except accordi ng to procedure establi sh ed by law,"
but omi tti ng any menti on of " property"); supra note 129 (di scussi ng th e " dual standard" approach
of Japanese courts).
189
See, e.g., Uni ted States v. Carol ene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); West Coast Hotel v.
Parri sh, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11, 537 (1934).
190
On th e di sti ncti on between " ci vil-politi cal" and " economi c-social" ri ghts, see Loui s Henki n,
Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND R IGHTS, cited above i n note 122, at 8-9, 14-15.
191
See, e.g., I NDIA CONST. art. 37 (provi di ng that th e "Di rective Pri nci pl es of State Poli cy" found i n
Part IV of th e Indian Consti tuti on, unl ike the "Fundme ntal Ri ghts" set forth i n Arti cl e III, " shall
188
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In this country, the outcome has been the same: the Constitution expresses no
social or economic policy objectives in the first place, and the Court has explicitly
rejected the idea that the Due Process Clause affirmatively guarantees "minimal
levels of safety and security."192

By contrast, the Japanese Kenpo explicitly

provides that "[a]ll people shall have the right to maintain the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living," 193 without in any way limiting
judicial enforcement of this right. Not surprisingly, the Japanese Supreme Court
quickly cast doubt upon the enforceability of this provision.194
E. The Influence of Legal Scholarship
A historically significant reason why jurisdictions have shared legal
doctrine with one another, in the absence of any formal compulsion or
overarching authority, has been the influence of doctrinal legal scholarship. For
centuries, the blend of Roman and canon law known as the ius commune –
literally, the "common law" – observed no national boundaries and found
explication not in judicial opinions, but in a body of legal commentary and in the
curricula of European universities.195 In the Anglo-American tradition as well,

not be enforced i n any court" ; I R. CONST. art. 45 (setti ng forth " pri nci ples of social poli cy ...
i ntended for the general gui dance of th e legi slature" that " shall not be cogni sable i n any Court" );
Mary Ann Gl endon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 52 U. CHI. L. R EV. 519, 525-27 (1992)
(noti ng that post-Worl d War II European constituti ons h ave often suppl emented " traditi onal
negati ve li berti es" wi th "affi rmati ve soci al and economi c ri gh ts or obl i gati ons," yet " no
democrati c country has placed soci al and economi c ri gh ts on preci sely the same l egal footi ng as
th e familiar ci vil and pol iti cal li berti es").
192
DeShaney v. Wi nnebago County Dep't of Social Svcs., 489 U.S., 189, 195 (1989).
193
K ENPO art. 25 (Japan).
194
See Gl endon, supra note 191, at 528-30 (di scussi ng Arti cl e 25 of th e Kenpo and the Japanese
Supreme Court's deci si on i n Asahi v. Japan); Beer, supra note 181, at 237 & 256 n.48 (remarki ng
that Arti cl e 25 i s "i n some cases justi ciabl e" but remai ns th e subject of " seri ous debate" i n Japan).
195
See R.H. Hel mh ol z, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European Ius
Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 962, 964 n.12 (1990) (descri bi ng th e ius commune as "th e law studi ed
i n European uni versiti es and regul arly applied i n conti nental courts i n th e absence of l ocal statute
or custom to th e contrary"); M.H. Hoefli ch, Translation & the Reception of Foreign Law in the
Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 754 (2002) (defi ni ng the ius commune as a mi xture
of Roman and Canon l aw that domi nated western Eur ope from th e late el eventh th rough th e
fi fteenth centuri es); H. Patri ck Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MC GILL L.J. 261, 266-68 (1987)
(descri bi ng th e hi stori cal European vi ew of Roman l aw as " uni versal l earni ng" that defi ed
nati onal boundari es, and whi ch reli ed for its content not upon judi cial opi ni ons, but rath er upon
a l egal literature consi sti ng of " questi ons, wi th attempts at reasoned responses" ).
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some prominent works have come to enjoy authority in their own right.196 For a
variety of reasons, doctrinal scholarship seems unlikely to recapture those
halcyon days of influence. 197 Nonetheless, insofar as treatises, Restatements,
Model Codes, and the like have fostered interstate uniformity in areas of private
law, it is reasonable to suspect that legal scholarship may also have encouraged
uniformity in the development of public law.
The American experience, at least, suggests that doctrinal writing is
indeed a force for homogenization in the constitutional arena. To the extent that
state courts consult the academic literature, they are likely to find either that their
own state constitutions are not discussed at all, 198 or that their constitutional law
is fungible with that of other states - if not also with federal constitutional law.
In the nineteenth century, for example, anyone who consulted Cooley's treatise
on state constitutional law 199 – the best-selling law book of its time, and widely

196

See, e.g., A.W.B. Si mpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. R EV. 632, 635-36, 667 (1981) (noti ng th e recogni ti on i n Engl i sh l egal
argume nt of certai n " works of auth ority," and offeri ng as an exampl e Littl eton's Tenures, ci rca
1481, whi ch came to be "treated as th ough it were itself law" and " regarded with a reverence
approachi ng that accorded an actual statute").
197
See, e.g., Ch ri stopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 Y ALE L.J. 1149, 1150-51 (1981))
(descri bi ng th e di sfavor i nto whi ch treati se-writi ng, and even " mastery of any body of law," has
fall en among l egal academi cs); Gl enn, supra note 195, at 287 (" [L]egal wri ters i n th e United States
have ... become largel y preoccupi ed with gi vi ng 'an account of what i s happeni ng amongst
th emselves' and accusati ons of narci ssi sm, personal bias, and self-i nterest are now common coi n
i n United States legal di scourse[.]" ) (quoti ng Stone, supra, at 1151); Si mpson, supra note 196, at
677-79 (speculati ng that Legal Reali sm has negati vely affected the Ameri can treati se-wri ti ng
traditi on by under mi ni ng th e noti on that judi cial opi ni ons express " some rati onal sch eme of
pri nci pl es").
198
Justi ce Li nde makes th e poi nt forcefully:
Constituti onal speciali sts ... need to overcome th e i ngrai ned assumpti ons that
constituti onal law means th e deci si ons of the United States Supreme Court, that
for a nati onal career, i n a " nati onal" law sch ool , professi onal sch olarshi p means
addi ng one more ream to each year's paper mountai n of comme ntary on th ose
deci si ons, and that attenti on to th e constituti onal law of a state, i ncl udi ng th e
state wh ere the law sch ool happens to be l ocated, or to the treatment of one i ssue
i n several states, i s for ambiti ous professors and law revi ew editors a di sti nctl y
mi nor l eague game. Th ese self-perpetuati ng bi ases are hard to overcome.
Li nde, supra note 21, at 936; see also, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. R EV. 761, 770 (1991) (characteri zi ng state consti tuti onal di scourse as
"i mpoveri sh ed" relati ve to federal constituti onal di scourse).
199
1-2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TRE ATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS W HICH R EST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE S TATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Walter Carri ngton ed., 8th ed.
1927) (1868). Cool ey's Constitutional Limitations fi rst appeared i n 1868 and was last publi sh ed, as
a two-vol ume set, i n 1927. Th e last edi ti on to be released i n hi s lifeti me was th e si xth editi on,
publi sh ed i n 1890, upon whi ch th e ci tati ons i n thi s essay rel y. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS W HICH R EST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE S TATES OF
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cited by judges and practitioners alike 200 - would have found, at best, decisions
from individual states used to illustrate generic propositions of state
constitutional law 201 and, at worst, Supreme Court decisions on federal
constitutional law used to explain principles of state constitutional law, with
passing references to state court decisions added in the manner of an
afterthought.202
It has been suggested that the tendency of constitutional scholarship to
favor federal over state law has more to do with the incentives and desires of
legal scholars than with any characteristic of the subject matter itself.203 The
suggestion is not without merit: from a market perspective alone, doctrinal
writing that purports to be comprehensive, and to synthesize the law of many
jurisdictions, is likely to have greater appeal to a broader audience than
scholarship that dwells upon the doctrinal niceties of one jurisdiction among

THE AMERICAN UNION (Al exi s C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed.

Angell ed., 6th ed. 1890) (1868) [h erei nafter COOLEY,
1890)].
200
See Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J.
AM . H IST. 751, 759 (1967); Paul D. Carri ngton, Law as "The Common Thoughts of Men": The LawTeaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 S TAN . L. R EV. 495, 496-97 (1997). In th e words
of one contemporary revi ewer, Cool ey's Constitutional Limitations was " not onl y a standard
auth ori ty, but al most excl usi vely soverei gn i n its sph ere" : "It i s cited i n every argument and
opi ni on on th e subjects of whi ch it treats, and not onl y i s the book auth ori tati ve as a di gest of th e
law, but its auth or's opi ni ons are regarded as al most concl usi ve." Id. at 497 (quoti ng Book Note,
27 ALB. L.J. 300 (1883)); see also, e.g., id. at 528 & n.249 (canvassi ng th e vari ous l eft-wi ng criti ci sms
attracted by ri ght-wi ng judi cial uses of Cool ey's treati se); Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in
Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. R EV. 1001, 1059-60 & 1060 n.421 (1991)
(noti ng state court acceptance of Cool ey's vi ews across a range of ni neteenth-century
constituti onal questi ons, and quoti ng Edward Corwi n's descri pti on of Cool ey's treati se as "th e
most i nfl uential treati se ever publ i sh ed on A meri can consti tuti onal law").
201
See, e.g., COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890), supra note 199, at 192-214
(di scussi ng th e power of state courts to i nvalidate legi slati on); id. at 238-69 (di scussi ng th e
pl enary nature of state control over muni ci pal governments); see also, e.g., THEODORE S EDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE R ULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF S TATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180-87 (Joh n Norton Pomeroy ed., 2d ed. 1874) (1857) (revi ewi ng deci si ons
from four states, and concl udi ng that courts have " no ri ght whatever" to i nvali date l egi slati on on
th e grounds of " natural ri ght, abstract justi ce, or sound morali ty").
202
In chapter four, for exampl e, Cool ey di scusses th e wei gh t to be gi ven a contemporaneous or
l ong-accepted constructi on of a state constituti on by dedi cati ng several pages of descri pti on to a
tri o of Supreme Court deci si ons - Stuart v. Laird, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and Bank of United
States v. Halstead - th en ci ti ng i n th e text of th e di scussi on onl y two state deci si ons, from
Massach usetts and Maryland, as confi rmati on of th e poi nt al ready made usi ng federal
constituti onal law. See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890), supra note 199, at 8285.
203
See supra note 198 (quoti ng Justi ce Li nde's criti ci sm of th e strong federal bias i n contemporary
constituti onal sch olarshi p).
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many. It is doubtful whether Cooley or Sedgwick204 would have enjoyed the
same measure of commercial success or intellectual influence had they confined
themselves to the constitutional law of Michigan or Massachusetts. Whatever
the explanation, the tendency of legal scholarship either to discuss state
constitutional law in a totalizing way or to neglect it entirely has hardly helped
state courts to pursue unique constitutional approaches.
F. The Homogenizing Tendencies of Federal and Supranational Structures
A particular challenge is to unravel the complex and overlapping ways in
which federal and supranational structures foster constitutional homogenization.
The most obvious path that constitutional doctrine travels within such structures
is a vertical one, from top to bottom, as when federal or supranational law is
formally binding upon state or national courts. Unremarkably, British courts
enforce E.U. law as announced by the European Court of Justice and now must
also apply the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.205 In this
country, the extent to which federal constitutional doctrine protects a given right
amounts to a floor beneath which state constitutional law cannot fall - if not also
a ceiling above which it cannot rise.206 Of greater interest is the tendency of
member states to adopt federal or supranational doctrine in the absence of any
formal obligation to do so.

It is in this context, after all, that Justice Linde

employed the term "generic constitutional law" to criticize the indiscriminate
adoption of federal constitutional doctrine by state courts207; as James Gardner
puts it, state courts have "borrowed wholesale from federal constitutional
discourse, as though the language of federal constitutional law were some sort of
lingua franca of constitutional argument generally."208 Paul Kahn has argued
that state and federal courts are in fact partners in a common "interpretative
204

S EDGWICK, supra note 201.
See supra note 37 (di scussi ng th e European Communi ti es Act 1972 and th e Human Ri ghts Act
1998).
206
Federal consti tuti onal ri ghts may li mit th e content of state consti tuti onal ri ghts if the two
happen to confli ct. See, e.g., PruneYard Sh oppi ng Ctr. v. Robi ns, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980)
(h ol di ng that the state constituti onal ri gh t of pi cketers to enter a privately owned sh oppi ng center
di d not i tself amount to a vi olati on of th e Taki ngs Clause).
207
Li nde, supra note 21, at 942.
208
Gardner, supra note 198, at 766.
205
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enterprise" of "American constitutionalism," which "seeks to understand the
appropriate role for the rule of law in a democratic order."209 It is unclear,
however, what makes such a lofty enterprise specifically American: few
constitutional courts would disagree that they seek to articulate "the appropriate
role for the rule of law in a democratic order." Kahn's "interpretive enterprise"
might thus be treated as another interpretation of Justice Breyer's mysterious
"global legal enterprise."
The U.K.'s history with the European Court of Human Rights (the
"E.C.H.R.")

illustrates a

number of

pressures toward conformity

supranational law can exert upon domestic jurisprudence.

that

The U.K. was, in

1951, the first country to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights (the
"Convention"),210 which included as one of its enforcement mechanisms the
establishment of the E.C.H.R. at Strasbourg.211 Subsequently, the U.K. accepted
the right of individual petition, which enabled indiv iduals to sue the U.K. in the
E.C.H.R. for violations of the Convention.212 At no time, however, did the U.K.
incorporate the Convention itself into domestic law.

As a result, individual

litigants could win binding judgments against the U.K. in Strasbourg but could
not invoke the Convention in domestic courts.

From that point, the U.K.

proceeded to compile the worst losing record of any nation before the E.C.H.R. a bitter irony for a country that had played a significant role in drafting the
Convention.213

Lord Browne-Wilkinson spoke for many in expressing a

combination of dismay and injured pride:
It is a most singular feature that the law of this country, which has
for so long prided itself on protecting individual freedom, has been
209

Kah n, supra note 97, at 1156.
See Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 93-94.
211
See EUROPEAN CONVENTION , supra note 124, § II.
212
See Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 94-95.
213
See id. at 95-96 (descri bi ng " some si xty judgments" agai nst th e U.K. i n a wi de vari ety of
contexts); The Ri ght Honourabl e Lord Browne-Wil ki nson, The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights, 1992
PUB. L. 397, 398; W ADE & F ORSYTH , supra note 37, at 183-85 & 183 n.11 (noti ng that the U.K. has
been found i n breach of " nearl y all th e Conventi on ri ghts," and that, by 1995, i t had l ost nearl y
half of its cases before th e E.C.H.R.); see also B ORK, supra note 94, at 33 ("It i s not cl ear why most of
th e [E.C.H.R.]'s deci si ons on cul tural matters appear to i nvolve th e United Ki ngdom."). But see
Bringing Rights Home, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2000, at 45, 45-46 (calli ng Britai n's record before th e
E.C.H.R. an "i nternati onal embarrassment," especially i n li ght of th e Briti sh role i n drafti ng th e
Conve nti on, but stati ng, contrary to Lord Browne-Wil ki nson, that the U.K. " does not have th e
worst record on compl iance").
210
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found to be in breach of the [Convention] on more occasions than
any other signatory. ...
It was those very freedoms enjoyed by us over the centuries which
were principal sources of the [Convention] itself. How can it be,
then, that our own system of law is unable to protect those
freedoms which in 1950 this country agreed to abide by in signing
the [Convention]?214
Some judges sought to salvage the situation by insisting – as Lord BrowneWilkinson did - that the principles found in the Convention already existed in
the common law:
It is now inconceivable that any court in this country would hold
that ... individual freedoms of a private person are any less
extensive than the basic human rights protected by the
[Convention]. Whenever [its] provisions ... have been raised before
the courts, the judges have asserted that the Convention confers no
greater rights than those protected by the common law.215
To the relief of many, Parliament enacted the Human Rights Act 1998,
which incorporated the Convention into domestic law and directed the courts to
give it effect, albeit within limits. 216 Yet adoption of the Convention appears to
have heightened, not relieved, the harmonizing pressures of supranational law
upon British constitutional law.

Traditionally, British courts have decided

challenges to governmental action under a highly deferential standard known as

214

Lord Browne-Wil ki nson, supra note 213, at 398, 404.
Id. at 405; see also, e.g., Laws, supra note 55, at 61 (argui ng that th e contents of th e Conventi on
"largely represent l egal norms or val ues whi ch are ei ther al ready i nherent i n our l aw, or ... may
be i ntegrated i nto it"). A promi nent deci si on that adopted thi s strategy was Derbyshi re County
Counci l v. Ti mes Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534 (H.L.), i n whi ch th e House of Lords affi rmed
a deci si on by th e Court of Appeal that l ocal auth oriti es coul d not bri ng defamati on acti ons:
wh ereas th e Court of Appeal had reli ed upon th e Conventi on's guarantee of freedom of
expressi on, Lord Keith emphasi zed that h e relied excl usi vely upon th e Engl i sh common law i n
reachi ng the same concl usi on. See id. at 550-51 (speech of Lord Kei th); see also, e.g., Lord Lester,
supra note 37, at 96-97 (noti ng that courts made use of th e Conventi on and E.C.H.R. case law "as
sources of pri nci pl es or standards of publ i c poli cy" " wh en common l aw or statutory law was
ambi guous, or wh ere the common l aw was undevel oped or uncertai n"); CRAIG, supra note 54, at
552 (descri bi ng the " growi ng l i st" of uses to wh i ch courts put th e Conventi on).
216
See, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 54, at 552-73; Lord Lester, supra note 37, at 100-10. Th e Act does not
empower th e courts to stri ke down i ncompati bl e parliamentary l egi slati on, i n li ght of concer ns
expressed by th e judi cial l eadershi p that such a power woul d be i nconsi stent with parliamentary
soverei gnty and th us unpalatabl e to many. See id. at 98; supra note 37 (di scussi ng judi cial
appli cati on of th e Human Ri ghts Act). For thi s reason and oth ers, it has been objected that th e
Act di d not trul y i ncorporate th e Conventi on i nto domesti c law. See Marshall , supra note 37, at
108-14.
215
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"Wednesbury unreasonableness,"217 which has been described by supporters and
critics alike as nothing more stringent than an "irrationality test."218 By contrast,
both the E.C.H.R. and the European Court of Justice (the "E.C.J.") apply
proportionality review: the E.C.J. does so when violations of E.U. law are alleged,
while the E.C.H.R. does so the context of Convention rights. As a result, when
governmental action is alleged to violate both domestic law and E.U. law or the
Convention – as is often the case - U.K. courts are required to apply both
Wednesbury and proportionality analyses to the same set of facts. A number of
British judges have chafed against this arrangement and sought to incorporate
proportionality review into domestic law. Some have argued that Wednesbury
review can and should be stretched into something resembling proportionality
review; others have simply equated proportionality with Wednesbury review.219

217

Wednesbury review, al so known as Wednesbury unreasonabl eness or the Wednesbury pri nci pl e,
derives its name from th e deci si on i n Associ ated Provi ncial Pi cture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223, i n whi ch Lord Greene M.R. observed that Briti sh courts wi ll overturn a
governme ntal deci si on onl y i f it i s " so absurd that no sensi bl e person coul d ever dream that it lay
wi thi n th e powers" of th e deci si onmaker. Id. at 229. In Lord Di pl ock's i nfl uential reformul ati on,
Wednesbury unreasonabl eness "appli es to a deci si on whi ch i s so outrageous i n i ts defiance of l ogi c
or of accepted moral standards that no sensi bl e person wh o had appli ed hi s mi nd to the questi on
... coul d have arrived at it." Bri nd v. Sec'y of State for th e Home Dep't, [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 765
(H.L.) (speech of Lord Lowry) (quoti ng Counci l of Ci vil Servi ce Uni ons v. Mi ni ster for the Civil
Serv., [1985] A.C. 374, 410 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Di pl ock)); see also supra note 46 (di scussi ng
Wednesbury review).
218
Bri nd, [1991] 1 A.C. at 757 (speech of Lord Ackner); see, e.g., R OBERTSON , supra note 46, at 23839; Si r Steph en Sedl ey, The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law Without a Constitution, 110 LAW Q.
R EV. 270, 278 (1994) (" Far from bei ng th e poi nt at whi ch publi c law woke up, the Wednesbury case
i s a snore i n i ts l ong sl eep[.]"); S HAPIRO, supra note 93, at 111-24 (argui ng that Engli sh courts do
not, i n practi ce, i nvali date executi ve acti on by th e nati onal governme nt). Lest it be suggested that
th e Wednesbury standard i s i nsuffi ci entl y deferential to governme ntal deci si onmakers, the House
of Lords has al so enunci ated what comme ntators have dubbed th e "Super Wednesbury" test: wh ere
i ntri cate questi ons of poli cy are i nvolved, th e courts are to i nvesti gate th e propri ety of a deci si on
" only if a pri ma faci e case were to be sh own for h ol di ng that th e [deci si onmaker] had acted i n bad
fai th, or for an i mproper moti ve, or that th e conseque nces of hi s gui dance were so absurd that h e
must have taken l eave of hi s senses." R OBERTSON , supra, at 260-61 (quoti ng Notti nghamshi re
County Council v. Sec'y of State for th e Env't, [1986] A.C. 240, 247 (speech of Lord Scarman)). But
see, e.g., W ADE & F ORSYTH , supra note 37, at 355-56, 364-66 (observi ng that, th ough the language of
Wednesbury i tself suggests that executi ve deci si onmaki ng " coul d al most never be found wanti ng,"
"th e courts i n deci di ng cases tend to l ower th e th resh ol d of unreasonabl eness to fi t thei r more
exacti ng i deas of admi ni strati ve good behavi or"); Si r Joh n Laws, The Limitations of Human Rights,
1998 PUB. L. 254, 262 (observi ng that Wednesbury review i s not " monol ithi c" and has been
sharpened i n cases i nvolvi ng h uman ri ghts); infra notes 219-222 and accompanyi ng text
(descri bi ng efforts to eli de Wednesbury and proporti onality revi ew i n cases i nvolvi ng h uman
ri gh ts).
219
See R. v. Chi ef Constabl e of Sussex ex parte Int'l Trader's Ferry Ltd., [1998] Q.B. 477, 495 (C.A.),
aff'd, [1999] 2 A.C. 418 (H.L.) (quoti ng Lord Hoffmann's observati on that it i s " not possi bl e to see
dayli ght" between the two forms of revi ew); W ADE & F ORSYTH , supra note 37, at 368-69. A thi rd
approach has been to argue that proporti onality i s di fferent from Wednesbury revi ew, but has i n
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The House of Lords and the E.C.H.R. have since foreclosed the latter approach;
both have indicated that proportionality review is more stringent than
Wednesbury review.220 Disagreement abounds, however, over both the extent of
the disparity and the pace at which it may be eliminated. 221 Lord Slynn, for
example, has made increasingly little effort to hide his own impatience:
There is a difference between [proportionality] and the approach of
the English courts [under] Wednesbury[.] But the difference in
practice is not as great as is sometimes supposed. [E]ven without
reference to the [Human Rights Act], the time has come to
recognise that this principle is part of English administrative law,
not only when judges are dealing with [E.U.] acts but also when
they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep
the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate
compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing.
Reference to the [Human Rights Act] however makes it necessary
that the court should ask whether what is done is compatible with
[C]onvention rights. That will often require that the question
should be asked whether the principle of proportionality has been
satisfied. 222

fact been practi ced by Engli sh judges. See Jowell & Lester, supra note 120, at 59-69 (reviewi ng
cases i n whi ch Engli sh judges h ave i n substance engaged i n proporti onality review, and argui ng
that "Wednesbury camouflage" sh oul d be abandoned for th e sake of the "legiti macy and i ntegrity
of th e judi cial process" ).
220
See Bri nd, [1991] 1 A.C. at 748 (speech of Lord Bri dge); id. at 750 (speech of Lord Roskill)
(refusi ng to excl ude th e " possi bl e future devel opment" of proporti onality revi ew as domesti c law
on a " case by case basi s" ); id. at 766 (speech of Lord Ackner) (" [T]here i s no auth ority for sayi ng
that proporti onality ... i s part of the Engl i sh common l aw and a great deal of auth ority th e oth er
way." (emphasi s i n ori gi nal)); Smith & Grady v. Uni ted Ki ngdom, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, 92-96
(h ol di ng that Wednesbury revi ew i s l ess stri ngent than proporti onality and fail s to consti tute an
" effective domesti c remedy" for breaches of th e Conventi on); see also Lord Lester, supra note 37, at
97 (di scussi ng Brind and th e E.C.H.R.'s response).
221
See, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 54, at 598-603 (argui ng that proporti onality i s likel y to be adopted as
a matter of domesti c law, i n part because "th e Wednesbury test i tself i s movi ng cl oser to
proporti onality"); Laws, supra note 218, at 261-62 (" The extent to whi ch the judges have already
modi fied the Wednesbury test ... has been more stri ki ng than i s someti mes appreciated."); Lord
Irvi ne, supra note 37, at 231 (noti ng " much argume nt" over th e status of proporti onali ty i n
domesti c law, and th e " unde niabl e" convergence of common l aw pri nci ples of judi cial revi ew
wi th "th eir conti nental cousi ns" ). Compare, e.g., Bri nd, [1991] 1 A.C. at 748-49, 751 (speech es of
Lords Bri dge and Templ eman) (argui ng that, i n h uman ri ghts cases, Wednesbury review merel y
requi res courts to ask wh eth er a " reasonabl e" offi cial, " on th e material before hi m, coul d
reasonably" concl ude that the i nterference with ri ghts was justi fiabl e) with id. at 764-67 (speech of
Lord Lowry) (quoti ng traditi onal, more restri ctive formul ati ons of Wednesbury revi ew, and
cri ti ci zi ng the use of proporti onality review as an arrogati on of judi cial power).
222
R. (Al conbury Devs. Ltd.) v. Env't Sec'y, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, 320-21 (2001) (H.L.) (speech of Lord
Sl ynn); see also R. v. Chi ef Constabl e of Sussex ex par te Int'l Traders Ferry Ltd., [1999] 2 A.C. 418,
439 (H.L.) (speech of Lord Slynn).
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The British experience, first with the Convention and now with
proportionality review, suggests several reasons to expect the harmonization of
domestic and supranational constitutional law - the effect of shaming in the
human rights context, the law of the instrument, and the appeal of the simplicity
that comes with adoption of a single standard or approach. First, there can be
little doubt that the embarrassment of repeated losses in Strasbourg encouraged
Parliament to enact the Human Rights Act.223 Had it not done so, judges might
well have continued to incorporate the Convention piecemeal into domestic law
themselves, under the guise of articulating the common law224 or even E.U.
law. 225 Moreover, the shaming effect was not simply a consequence of domestic
courts looking to other countries in an ad hoc manner and arriving at some
subjective impression as to the underprotectiveness of British law. Rather, the
U.K. belonged voluntarily to a predefined reference group of nations and faced a
supranational scorekeeper in the form of the E.C.H.R.: in other words, the U.K.
was a laggard by defined standards, relative to a peer group of its own choosing.
Comparative shaming may be especially effective with respect to jurisdictions
that pride themselves on a constitutional tradition of freedom, a category into
which the U.S. and U.K. both fall. It is equally plausible, though, that countries
with less of a constitutional tradition, or a troubled past, would for that very
reason be anxious to define constitutional rights aggressively and expansively;
Schauer suggests South Afr ica as a possible example. 226 In e ither case, when it

223

See W ADE & F ORSYTH , supra note 37, at 182-83 (noti ng th e "i nternati onal notori ety" attracted by
Briti sh vi olati ons of th e Conventi on, and the constant criti ci sm of th e U.K.'s fail ure to make th e
Conve nti on domesti call y enforceabl e); Bringing Rights Home, supra note 213, at 45 (noti ng that
i ncorporati on of th e Conventi on will hel p th e U.K. to "avoi d i nternati onal embarrassment").
224
See supra note 215 (di scussi ng Derbyshire County Council v. Times).
225
Unli ke the Conventi on, E.U. law has al ways been di rectly enforceabl e by U.K. courts. Th e
E.C.J., i n turn, i s requi red to ensure that E.U. i nstituti ons " respect fundame ntal ri ghts, as
guaranteed by th e ... Conventi on." TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION , Feb. 7, 1992, art. 6(2), O.J. (C
325) 5 (2002) [h erei nafter TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION ]; see id. art. 46(d) (conferri ng juri sdi cti on
upon th e E.C.J. over Arti cl e 6(2)); see also, e.g., Case 17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba,
2000 E.C.R. I-665, ¶¶ 8-9, at I-670-71 (E.C.J.); CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 350-54
(di scussi ng th e possi bility that the E.U. itsel f may accede to th e Conventi on); supra note 125
(di scussi ng Arti cle 52 of th e E.U. Charter of Fundamental Ri ghts). Th us, regardless of the Human
Ri ghts Act, U.K. courts coul d enforce th e Conventi on i n th e areas reach ed by E.U. law, on th e
grounds that th e Conventi on i s effectivel y a part of E.U. law. See Lord Browne-Wilki nson, supra
note 213, at 401 (descri bi ng E.U. law as a " backdoor" to i ncorporati on of the Conventi on).
226
See Schauer, supra note 25, at 259.
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comes to the protection of rights and freedoms, no country, or court, is likely to
want the booby prize.
Second, the law of the instrument predicts the domestic adoption of
supranational constitutional standards. As Paul Craig puts it, the repeated use of
proportionality review, as required by E.U. law and now by the Human Rights
Act, "will acclimatise our judiciary to the concept" and thereby encourage its
incorporation into domestic law as a "general standard of review."227 Even Lord
Irvine, who as Lord Chancellor was responsible for introducing the Human
Rights Act, expressed doubt that the courts would continue to "restrict their
review to a narrow Wednesbury approach" once they became "used to inquiring
more deeply in Convention cases."228 To know and apply a legal standard, it
seems, is to grow to like it. A third reason to expect constitutional harmonization
might be called the "law of just one instrument": why use two tools when one
will do? Many judges would undoubtedly agree with Lord Slynn that it is
"unnecessary" and "confusing" for a court to apply two standards of review to
the same claim raised under two parallel bodies of law. To that confusion must
be added the further indignity that will result if U.K. judges find themselves
forced by their own Wednesbury standard to deny rights claimed under U.K. law,
only to uphold those same rights under standards mandated by courts in France
and Luxembourg. To date, British courts have been reluctant to concede that
their own law offers less protection than European law.229
G. Reciprocal Influence and Doctrinal Recursion
Constitutional influences can be expected to percolate upward as well as
downward. Thus, while incorporation of the Convention into U.K. law
227

CRAIG, supra note 54, at 600.
Lord Irvi ne, supra note 37, at 235.
229
See, e.g., M. v. Home Offi ce, [1992] Q.B. 270, 306-07 (C.A.) (speech of Lord Donal dson) (calli ng
it "anomal ous" and " wrong i n pri nci pl e" that U.K. courts h ave th e power to i ssue i njuncti ons
agai nst the governme nt wh en E.U. law has been vi olated, but not wh en U.K. law has been
vi olated); Wool wi ch Equi tabl e Buil di ng Soc'y v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1993] A.C. 70, 177
(speech of Lord Goff) (" [A]t a ti me wh en Communi ty law i s becomi ng i ncreasi ngl y i mportant, it
woul d be strange if th e ri ght of th e citi zen to recover overpai d [taxes] were to be more restri cted
under domesti c law than it i s under Eur opean law."); Lord Irvi ne, supra note 37, at 230-32
(di scussi ng M. v. Home Office, Woolwich, and oth er cases).
228
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exemplifies supranational influence upon domestic constitutional law, the views
of British courts on the Convention can now, in turn, be expected to influence the
E.C.H.R.: as Lord Irvine humbly puts it, British judges "will bring to the
application of the Convention their great skills of analysis and interpretation"
and "our proud British traditions of liberty." 230 Perhaps this is merely to say that
courts may lead by example as well as by hierarchy, which is hardly a novel idea;
the very idea of persuasive authority presupposes as much.231 A different kind of
upward influence is evident when the U.S. Supreme Court "constitutionalizes"
state common law: for example, the Court has employed state common law to
fashion hearsay exceptions under the Confrontation Clause, to define property
rights for purposes of the Takings Clause, and to govern review of punitive
damage awards under the Due Process Clause.232 Alongside borrowing, the
Court also practices headcounting: whether the question is one of "evolving
standards of decency " or the content of "ordered liberty," the Supreme Court has
been known to formulate federal constitutional doctrine on the basis of a
purported state consensus - the result of which is to enforce the majority view
upon outlier states.233 These uses of state law to define federal constitutional
doctrine, when combined with the tendency of state courts to treat federal
constitutional doctrine as generic constitutional law, create a homogenizing
feedback loop.

The Supreme Court draws from state law, then imposes its

genericized version of state law back upon the states in the form of federal
constitutional law. But state courts then treat what the Supreme Court has done
as "generic constitutional law" – an ever-increasingly accurate description – and
incorporate it into state law. As fe deral and state courts look to each other for
guidance on a continual and cumulative basis, the constitutional doctrine that is
passed between them becomes increasingly generic.
230

See Lord Irvi ne, supra note 37, at 236.
See Gl enn, supra note 195, at 297 (descri bi ng th e " perspecti ve on law," preval ent outsi de th e
Uni ted States, that i s characterized by resi stance to " defi nitive statements of law" and openness to
" persuasi ve auth ori ty from abroad" ).
232
See Kaplan, supra note 21, passim.
233
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2479-81 (2003) (citi ng th e fact that Texas was
among a small mi nori ty of states to puni sh same-sex sodomy as evi dence of an " emergi ng
recogni ti on" of a protected li berty i nterest "i n matters pertai ni ng to sex"); Atki ns v. Vi rgi nia, 536
U.S. 304, 321-22 (2002) (Reh nqui st, C.J., di ssenti ng) (objecti ng that th ere does not exi st a " nati onal
conse nsus" among th e states agai nst the executi on of th e mentall y retarded).
231
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Whereas the Supreme Court is not required to constitutionalize state law
but does so as a matter of self-imposed interpretive strategy,234 the European
Court of Justice is expressly obligated to fashion generic constitutional law from
the laws of twenty-five nations. Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union
requires the E.U. and its institutions to "respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention [on] Human Rights ... and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law."235 In practice, Article 6(2) requires the E.C.J. to
construct generic rights doctrine both from "constitutional traditions common to
the Member States," and from the Convention, which is itself an amalgamation of
rights doctrine from an even larger number of European nations.236 If this
provision were not enough, the E.C.J. faces further pressure from national courts
to build an overarching body of European constitutional law. National courts
have proved reluctant to embrace the supremacy of E.U. law, which is not
explicitly stated in any treaty but instead stands as an

interpretive

accomplishment on the part of the E.C.J.237 German courts have been especially
insistent

upon

their

own

prerogatives:

in

particular,

the

Bundesverfassungsgericht has warned that if the E.C.J. fails to "generally
safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights," it will exercise its
inalienable jurisdiction to test E.U. law for consistency with Germany's own
Grundgesetz.238 That is, the E.C.J. risks open judicial rebellion if it fails to

234

See Kaplan, supra note 21, at 464-69, 525-29.
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 6(2). Arti cl e 46(d) of the same treaty confers juri sdi cti on
upon th e E.C.J. to enforce Arti cl e 6(2) agai nst E.U. i nsti tuti ons. See id. art. 46(d); Emesa Sugar
(Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. I-665, ¶ 9, at I-670-71 (E.C.J.).
236
Th e Council of Europe, whi ch predates th e E.U. and was responsi bl e for promul gati ng th e
Eur opean Conventi on on Human Ri ghts, has a membersh i p of 49 nati ons, 44 of whi ch have
si gned th e Conventi on.
See Counci l of Europe, About the Council of Europe, at
http://www.coe.i nt/T/e /Com/about_coe/ (last updated Jan. 2004). As of May 1, 2004, the E.U.
has 25 member states, all of whi ch happen to bel ong to the Counci l of Europe, th ough there i s no
formal requi rement that states must bel ong to th e Counci l before joi ni ng th e E.U. See Europa:
Gateway to th e
European Uni on,
The
Europe an
Union
at a
glance,
at
http://e uropa.eu.i nt/abc/i ndex_en.htm (last vi sited Apr. 23, 2004). Th e Council of Europe i s
i ndependent of the E.U. but can potentially be confused wi th th e very si milarl y named European
Counci l, whi ch i s an E.U. i nstituti on.
237
See CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 278-79.
238
See Re Wünsch e Handel gesell schaft ("Solange II" ), BverfGE 73, 339 (387) (F.R.G.), translated in
1987 (3) C.M.L.R. 225, 265; see also CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 289-98, 319-26 (di scussi ng
th e E.C.J.'s many ski rmi sh es with th e German courts).
235
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discern, then adopt as constitutional doctrine, the "essential content of
fundamental rights" throughout Europe.
The recursive doctrinal loop described earlier between federal and state
law in the U.S. can be expected in the E.U. as we ll. For example, Article 288 of
the EC Treaty renders the E.U. liable in damages for unlawful conduct by E.U.
actors and requires the E.C.J. to define the scope of this liab ility "in accordance
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States." 239 As
former Advocate-General Walter van Gerven has observed, it is unrealistic to
expect the E.C.J. to examine the sovereign liability doctrine of twenty-five nations
(and counting) and identify "general principles" that are truly common to all yet
provide some measure of actual guidance. Instead, the E.C.J. will inevitably use
the language of Article 288 as a pretext to articulate principles that are sufficiently
familiar in most countries to gain acceptance. 240 The result is, of course, generic
constitutional law. Member states, in turn, will be likely to adopt these generic
rules.241 Though the language of Article 288 refers only to E.U. actors, the E.C.J.
has held in the Francovich case that member states are liable in the same manner
as E.U. institutions for violations of E.U. law. 242

The immediate result of

Francovich is to replace each member state's liability rules with generic sovereign
liability rules abstracted from the laws of all the member states – at least to the
extent that the member state breaches E.U. law. Insofar as the same conduct also
breaches the member state's own law, however, national liability will still be
governed by national standards. If the British experience with Wednesbury and
proportionality review is any indication, national courts are unlikely to relish the

239

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 288, cl. 2, O.J. (C 325) 33
(2002) [h erei nafter EC TREATY] (" In th e case of non-contractual liability, th e Communi ty shall, i n
accordance wi th th e general pri nci ples common to th e laws of the Member States, make good any
damage caused by i ts i nstituti ons or by i ts servants i n th e performance of th eir duti es.").
240
See Walter van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common European Law in the Area of Tort Law: The EU
Contribution, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 135-36
(Duncan Fai rgrieve, Mads Tønnesson A nde nas & Joh n Bell eds., 2002).
241
See Walter van Gerven, Non-contractual Liability of Member States, Community Institutions and
Individuals for Breaches of Community Law with a View to a Common Law for Europe, 1 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 6, 36, 39-40 (1994) (argui ng that nati onal judges can and sh oul d not merel y
"harmoni ze" E.U. and nati onal liability rul es, but i nstead " merge them i nto a common l egal
system").
242
See Francovi ch & Bonifaci v. Italian Republ i c, Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357, ¶¶
31-35, at I-5413-14 (h ol di ng that member state liability i n damages for vi olati on of E.U. law i s
"i nh erent i n the system of th e Treaty").
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application of two sets of sovereign liability rules to the same act of
governmental misconduct. The fact that one set of rules is ostensibly based on
the other only makes their mutual existence seem that much more unnecessary
and confusing. As in the British example, both the "law of the instrument" and
the "law of just one instrument" suggest that national judges will abandon
uniquely national doctrine. And, as in the American example, the result is a
homogenizing feedback loop.

First, Article 288 obligates the E.C.J. to

homogenize the sovereign liability laws of the member states into a body of
generic doctrine.

Second, under Francovich, the E.C.J. imposes this generic

doctrine upon the member states in cases involving the violation of E.U. law.
Third, national judges incorporate the generic doctrine into domestic law.
Finally, to complete the loop, the E.C.J. refines its already generic doctrine in
light of newly homogenized national law, and produces doctrine that is even
more generic than before.
To generalize from the U.S. and E.U., some form of homogenizing
doctrinal recursion may be endemic to federal and supranational legal structures
that require state (national) courts to apply federal (supranational) law.

The

process begins when federal (supranational) courts fashion generic rules from
state (national) materials, then impose those rules upon state (national) courts as
a matter of federal (supranational) law. Once forced to apply a generic rule on
questions of federal (supranational) law, state (national) courts find it attractive
to adopt the generic rule for parallel questions of state (national) law as well.
Further use of state (national) law by federal (supranational) courts to fashion
federal (supranational) law both continues the expungement of impurities from
the generic doctrine and begins the process anew.
H. Generic Doctrine as a Remedy for Lateral Judicial Conflict
Generic constitutional doctrine may be both a boon and a necessity when
supranational structures collide. The coexistence of the E.C.J. and E.C.H.R. raises
the question of how coordination is to be achieved between two courts with

Published by Digital USD, 2004

65

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 23 [2004]

GENERIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
overlapping jurisdictions 243 but no formal hierarchical relationship. 244

65
The

emergence of generic European rights jurisprudence would ameliorate the risk of
conflict between the two courts, yet if such generic jurisprudence is to emerge,
both courts must coordinate upon its creation. As previously described, Article
6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty obligates the E.C.J. to enforce "fundamental rights,
as guaranteed by the European Convention [on] Human Rights," but does not
specify that the E.C.J. must accept the E.C.H.R.'s interpretations of the Convention.
The E.C.J. has in practice sought to avoid conflict with decisions of the
E.C.H.R.,245 but disagreements have inevitably arisen.246 Although the potential
for conflict could be eliminated if the E.U. were simply to accede to the
Convention, the E.C.J. has held that the E.U. currently lacks the legal power to do
so.247 For its part, the E.C.H.R. has not always made coexistence easy. In a trio of

243

See supra note 236 (descri bi ng th e overlappi ng me mbersh i ps of the Counci l of Europe and th e
Eur opean Uni on).
244
The probl ems of di suni formi ty that are created wh en courts share territorial juri sdi cti on but
lack formal hierarch y are not li mi ted to supranati onal courts. In France, for example, the Cour de
Cassati on sits atop th e regul ar judi ciary but lacks juri sdi cti on over questi ons of admi ni strative
law, on whi ch th e Conseil d'État i s supreme. Neith er court, i n turn, h as th e power to revi ew th e
constituti onality of legi slati on, whi ch i s the excl usi ve responsi bili ty of th e Conseil
Constituti onnel . These courts can neith er reverse nor hear appeal s from one anoth er, alth ough
th e Consei l Constituti onnel 's deci si ons do h ave res judi cata effect upon oth er courts confronted
wi th i denti cal questi ons. See B ROWN & B ELL, supra note 54, at 21 & n.20; Bell , supra note 99, at
1759; Breyer, supra note 123, at 1058-60. At one poi nt, the Consei l d'État and Cour de Cassati on
h el d opposite positi ons on th e effect to be gi ven E.U. law. Th e Consei l d'État took th e positi on
that it si mply coul d not consi der th e consi stency of French legi slati on with E.U. law because it
lacked th e power to revi ew legi slati on, wh ereas the Court de Cassati on h el d th e vi ew that it
coul d resolve confli cts between E.U. law and oth er legi slati on because E.U. law had been
i ncorporated i nto domesti c law. Compare Syndi cat Général de Fabri cants de Semoul es de France,
Conseil d'État, Mar. 1, 1968, Lebon 149, translated in 1970 (9) C.M.L.R. 395, 403-05 (submi ssi ons of
Commi ssai re Questiaux) with Admi ni strati on des Douanes v. Soci été Cafés Jacque s Vabre, Cass.
ch . mi xte, May 24, 1975, D. 1975, 497, translated in 1975 (2) C.M.L.R. 336, 363-64 (submi ssi ons of
Procure ur Gé néral Touffait). No doubt mi ndful of th e "absurd practi cal conseque nces for th e
ci ti zen" that had been created by the two i nconsi stent li nes of case law, Davi d Pollard, The Conseil
d'Etat is European - Official, 15 EURO. L. R EV. 267, 273 (1990), and spurred by deci si ons of th e
Conseil Constituti onnel i ndi cati ng an obl i gati on to appl y i nternati onal treati es, the Conseil d'État
eventuall y capitulated. See id. at 267-74 (di scussi ng Raoul Georges Ni col o, Conseil d'État, Oct. 20,
1989); CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 285-89.
245
See Lord Browne-Wil ki nson, supra note 213, at 401.
246
See CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 367 (citi ng cases).
247
See Opi ni on 2/94, Accessi on by th e Communi ty to th e ECHR, 1996 E.C.R. I-1759, ¶¶ 23-26, at I1787-89 ("No Treaty provi si on confers on th e Communi ty i nsti tuti ons any general power to enact
rul es on h uman ri ghts or to concl ude i nternati onal conventi ons i n thi s fiel d."); CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA,
supra note 122, at 351-54.
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decisions culminating in Vermeulen v. Belgium,248 the E.C.H.R. held that a
longstanding feature of Belgian judicial procedure violated the Convention right
to a fair trial by denying litigants the opportunity to respond to the opinion of
the procureur général's department, which renders legal opinions to the Belgian
courts and participates in their deliberations.249 Needless to say, the E.C.J. itself
utilizes a procedure extremely similar to the one at issue in Vermeulen.250
Confronted with Vermeulen, the E.C.J. satisfied itself, in an awkwardly reasoned
decision, that its own procedures did not violate the Convention.251 The very
awkwardness of its reasoning, however, is a touching testament to the E.C.J.'s
desire to remain at least nominally faithful to E.C.H.R. jur isprudence – whatever
embarrassment the E.C.H.R. may inflict upon it in the process. In all likelihood,
the E.C.J. has grasped that overlapping jurisdictions leave the two courts little
practical choice but to agree upon the content of constitutional rights doctrine –
even if , in practice, one of the two must do most of the agreeing.

248

Vermeul en v. Bel gi um, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 224. Th e two previ ous cases were Del court v.
Bel gi um, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1970), and Borgers v. Bel gi um, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
25 (1991).
249
See Vermeul en, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 234.
250
Compare Vermeul en, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 231-34 (descri bi ng the Bel gian Cour de Cassati on's
use of th e procureur général) with Case 17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, 2000 ECR
I-665, ¶¶ 11-15, at I-671-72 (descri bi ng th e E.C.J.'s use of i ts Advocates-General). Th e EC Treaty
itself mandates the parti ci pati on of Advocates-General i n E.C.J. proceedi ngs:
Th e Court of Justi ce shall be assi sted by ei gh t Advocates-General . ...
It shall be th e duty of th e Advocate-General , acti ng wi th compl ete i mpartiality
and i ndependence, to make, i n open court, reasoned submi ssi ons on cases whi ch,
i n accordance wi th th e Statute of th e Court of Justi ce, requi re hi s i nvolvement.
EC TREAT Y art. 222.
251
See Emesa Sugar, 2000 ECR I-665 passim; CRAIG & DE B ÚRCA, supra note 122, at 368 ("Not all
commentators are convi nced by thi s judgment, ... or by the asserti on of compati bility with th e
[Conventi on] wi th the rol e of th e Advocate-General i n ECJ pr oceedi ngs." ). The E.C.J. attempted
to di sti ngui sh its own procedure from th e Bel gian procedure i n a few ways. It asserted, for
example, that unl ike the Bel gian procureur général, th e Advocate-General neith er constituted nor
represented a separate department of government; rath er, hi s auth ority stemmed di rectl y from
th e court itsel f. See Emesa Sugar, 2000 ECR I-665, ¶¶ 12, 14, at I-671-72. It al so suggested that th e
Advocate-General's opi ni on di d not concl ude th e adversial heari ng porti on of th e proceedi ngs, as
i n th e Bel gian case, but i nstead formed a part of the court's deli berati ons. See id. ¶¶ 14-15, at I672. Th e E.C.J. coul d not, h owever, di sgui se the fact that its liti gants are denied opportuni ty to
respond to th e Advocate-General's submi ssi ons – th e very fact upon wh i ch th e E.C.H.R. had
rested its h ol di ng i n Vermeulen. See Vermeul en, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 234 (" [T]h e fact that i t was
i mpossi bl e for Mr Vermeul en to reply to [th e procure ur gé néral's submi ssi ons] before the end of
th e h eari ng i nfri nged hi s ri ght to adversarial proceedi ngs." ).
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I. Generic Constitutional Doctrine: A Systematic and Organic Occurrence
Diversity in constitutional doctrine is in no danger of disappearing. Nor
should we wish for its demise.

Courts must fashion and apply unique

constitutional rules as circumstances require. It is as unwise for judges to imitate
slavishly, as to be contrarian for the sake of contrariness, or to ignore the
experience of other jurisdictions entirely. In an ideal world, judges would earn
their keep by determining in every case whether borrowing is sensible or unwise.
In many cases, that task is likely to be impossible. It is difficult even to articulate
a coherent set of criteria that might govern the adoption or rejection of foreign
examples.252 The comparative study of public law is plagued, if not defined, by
fundamental disagreement over the extent to which legal thinking can or should
be transplanted from elsewhere. Indeed, scholars cannot even agree over what
the theoretical alternatives happen to be.253
It has been the contention of this essay, however, that generic
constitutional doctrine develops and thrives for reasons that presuppose little or
no conscious coordination or agreement on the part of courts or judges as to the
proper manner or extent of doctrinal borrowing. As human decisionmakers
faced with complexity and uncertainty of both normative and factual varieties,
judges can be expected to gravitate toward the path of least resistance, as defined
by considerations of ease and simplicity. In constitutional adjudication, the path
of least resistance – intellectually, if not also practically - tends to be that of
homogeneity, not heterogeneity, for several reasons.

First, people minimize

effort by making use of what is at hand; that is, they obey the law of the
252

Cf. Mi chael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atki ns and
Lawrence, 98 AM. J. I NT'L L. 69, 72 (2004) (argui ng that Ameri can courts sh oul d not use
i nternati onal material s to defi ne domesti c consti tuti onal ri gh ts absent a "full y arti culated theory"
that i dentifi es both the material s to be used and th e manner of thei r use " i n a way that can be
appli ed consi stentl y from case to case," but de cli ni ng to arti cul ate such a th eory).
253
See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON , MICHAEL W ALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 8-11 (2d ed. 1994); K ONRAD Z WEIGERT & H EIN K ÖTZ, AN
I NTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 11-12, 15-31 (Tony Wei r trans., 3d rev. ed. 1996) (stati ng,
i nter alia, that preparati on for th e "i nternati onal uni fi cati on of law" i s among th e functi ons and
ai ms of comparative law); Mark Tush net, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
Y ALE L.J. 1225 passim (1999) (descri bi ng " expressi vi st," "functi onali st," and " bri colage" approach es
to comparative consti tuti onal analysi s); Ch oudh ry, supra note 28, passim (contrasti ng
" uni versali st," " geneal ogi cal," and " dial ogi cal" uses and justi fi cati ons of comparative
constituti onal juri sprudence).
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instrument. Judges do so by copying what other judges have done. In legal
parlance, one might prefer to say, as David Strauss does, that the common law
style of constitutional adjudication values the existence of ready-made solutions
for their own sake.254 Alternatively, one might say that legal argument fails to
reward, and sometimes even penalizes, originality. The underlying idea remains
the same: courts will tend to adopt doctrines employed by other courts simply
because they are available for adoption. This tendency will only be encouraged
to the extent that other courts offer an appealing combination of experience,
intellectual firepower, and prestige.

Second, there is a natural inertia to

imitation: borrowing rewards further borrowing.

Shared constitutional

provisions and historical lineages not only reflect past influence, but also beget
continuing influence. It is difficult even for skeptics of comparative analysis to
dispute that courts may look abroad when asking "the same question about the
same legal text or concept as foreign courts or other institutions have previously
asked."255 Third, the prevalence of federal, supranational, and international law
engenders legal complexity and conflict by requiring courts to apply multiple
sets of rules to the same dispute. When jurisdictions overlap, generic doctrine
becomes inherently attractive to courts because it both promotes analytical
simplicity and reduces the risk of conflict among judicial and legal systems.
Federal and supranational structures, in particular, create strong incentives for
courts to consult one another in self-reinforcing and even recursive ways. In
such situations, doctrinal heterogeneity can only be maintained with effort - if it
can be maintained at all. Indeed, even in the absence of any global supercourt
capable of imposing common legal solutions, the same dynamic has developed at
the international level as well. As Jackson and Tushnet have observed, there
already exists an "upward-and-downward flow" between domestic and

254

See Strauss, supra note 175, at 891 (observi ng that th e " conventi onali st" aspect of " common l aw
constituti onal i nterpretati on" " emphasi zes the rol e of constituti onal provi si ons i n reduci ng
unproducti ve controversy by specifyi ng ready-made sol uti ons to probl ems that oth erwi se woul d
be too costly to resol ve").
255
Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 22 (statement of Mi chael D. Ramsey) (emphasi s
omi tted).
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international human rights law that amounts to a recursive doctrinal loop of the
kind discussed above.256
V. C ONCLUS IO N
It is one thing to suggest a new way of describing constitutional law; it is
another thing to have a reason for doing so.

What is the point of generic

constitutional law as an intellectual concept?

Does it have any practical

implications? Imagine the following scenario.

One day, instead of offering

classes in "Constitutional Law" and "Comparative Constitutional Law" – the
former implying the rigorous study of a defined body of law, the latter implying
comparison without a firm sense of purpose257 – law schools would instead offer
classes in "Constitutionalism" and "American Constitutional Law." Such a minor
adjustment in nomenclature would denote a significant shift in thinking about
the very nature of constitutional law. Much as first-year courses in contracts and
property cover general principles of law without purporting to explain the law of
every state, courses in "constitutionalism" would cover the doctrines, methods,
and justifications commonly employed by judges in reviewing governmental
action. As things stand, "comparative constitutional law" occupies an uncertain
place in the American law school curriculum; it is tolerated yet marginalized,258
256

Vi cki C. Jackson & Mark Tush net, Introduction to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at xiv-xv. Th ough th ey do not speak of doctri nal recursi on
per se, what Jackson and Tush net descri be i s preci sely thi s phenomenon at an i nternati onal l evel:
" some aspects of i nternati onal h uman ri gh ts law have devel oped i nitiall y by fl owi ng up from
domesti c l egal systems i nto th e i nternati onal arena and th en down to domesti c l egal systems,
someti mes even th ose systems that were sources for the i nternati onal h uman ri ghts norms i n th e
fi rst place." Id. at xiv.
257
Cf. W ATSON , supra note 26, at 1-9 (questi oni ng wh eth er "Comparati ve Law" consti tutes a
" meth od" or a "tech ni que," noti ng di sagreement over " what – if anythi ng – Comparati ve Law i s or
sh oul d be as an academi c activity," and opi ni ng that th e boundari es of th e di sci pli ne "have been
drawn too wi del y").
258
Al beit from th e not especiall y margi nali zed positi on of an endowed pr ofessorsh i p at Yal e Law
Sch ool , Joh n Langbei n offers th ese sad observati ons:
[L]aw sch ool catal og descri pti ons of comparati ve law courses conceal a
curri cul ar Potemki n Village. What you cannot know from a mere readi ng of th e
catal ogs i s that vi rtuall y nobody - onl y a handful of students - actuall y takes
th ese courses. Th e vast majority of Ameri can law students graduate i n compl ete
i gnorance of comparative law. Thereupon th ey joi n the Ameri can l egal
professi on, wh ere th ey can remai n i n bli ssful i gnorance that the rest of th e
ci vili zed worl d di sdai ns many of th e attri butes of a l egal system that Ameri cans
take for granted.
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and perhaps not without reason. If the notion of "comparative constitutional
law," with its emphasis upon the activ ity of comparison, can be set aside, the
study of how courts review governmental action might assume its place. Just as
first-year property courses do not gloss over the fact that states have different
ways of registering title to land or dividing property upon divorce, a law school
course in constitutionalism need not deny the fact of diversity in order to equip
students with a broad understanding of constitutional argument and reasoning –
of what sorts of governmental actions are likely to be invalidated by judges, and
how judges are likely to decide such questions.
As a practical matter, the incentive already exists for law schools to
redefine their understanding of constitutional law along the lines suggested here.
By way of analogy, self-consciously "national" law schools do not teach the
property law of just one state because they seek for reasons both self-interested
and intelle ctual to train lawyers who can and will take lucrative or at least
prestigious jobs in major cities nationwide. Sim ilarly, as global legal practice
becomes more common, self-consciously "global" law schools will aspire to train
lawyers who will take lucrative or at least prestigious jobs in major cities
worldwide, at which point generalist – or generic – training in constitutional law
may begin to demonstrate its appeal. Let us hope only that the global law school
of tomorrow does not forsake the study of national constitutional law the same
way that the national law school of today has forsaken the teaching of state
constitutional law.

Withi n th e i ntell ectual li fe of th e Ameri can legal academy, comparati ve law i s a
peri pheral fi el d. Questi ons of comparati ve and forei gn law sel dom fi gure i n th e
conversati on about law and law-related subjects that compri ses the common
i ntellectual life of an Ameri can law facul ty. Li ke a chil d i n Vi ctorian Engl and,
th e comparati vi st on an Ameri can l aw facul ty i s expected to be see n but not
h eard.
Joh n H. Langbei n, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
545, 546 (1995). Th e pli gh t of comparati ve public law, i n parti cular, may be even worse than that
of comparati ve law as a wh ole. See Joh n E. Fi nn & Donal d P. Kommers, A Comparative
Constitutional Law Canon?, 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 217, 226 (2000) (noti ng th e " relative
i nvi si bility" i n thi s country of the "i nternati onal communi ty of academi cs, judges and lawyers"
that wrestl es with "transnati onal" constituti onal probl ems); Donal d P. Kommers, Comparative
Constitutional Law: Its Increasing Relevance, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61 (deemi ng th e release of VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999) an "i mportant publ i shi ng event" because it
" represents a heal thy shift from th e overwh el mi ng emphasi s among comparati ve l egal sch olars
on pri vate law").
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But what of the normative questions posed by the idea of generic
constitutional law? This essay has argued that constitutional courts share similar
theoretical concerns, analytical methods, and substantive doctrine for reasons
that are not entirely within their control. The question is, how far should they
take these similarities?

Should American judges, in particular, succumb to

comparative constitutional analysis? To borrow, or not to borrow: that is the
question.
Resistance to the influence of foreign case law is nothing new. Following
the Revolution, a number of states barred outright citation of English judicial
decisions and even treatises.259 Such a position would probably be unthinkable
today: those who object most vocally to the Court's uses of foreign jurisprudence,
have

also

evinced an

interpretive

commitment

to originalism,

which

presupposes historical inquiry into the English legal backdrop against which the
Constitution was adopted.260 With the benefit of two centuries of separation,
English jurisprudence and legal values, at least, no longer seem especially
threatening; nor, indeed, do we regard them as foreign, insofar as they have been
adopted (or at least not disavowed) in this country. In reading the transcript of
recent congressional hearings on a resolution condemning the judicial use of
comparative legal materials,261 however, it is difficult not to be reminded of the
visceral fear of foreign influence that once led states to prohibit judges from
citing Blackstone's Commentaries. One might also wonder whether opposition to
comparative

constitutional analysis

does not

simply

mask

ideological

259

See GILMORE, supra note 19, at 22-23 (citi ng a New Jersey law enacted i n 1799 whi ch forbade
ci tati on of any Engl i sh case deci ded after Jul y 4, 1776, as well as "any [Engl i sh ] compi lati on,
commentary, di gest, l ecture, treati se, or other explanati on or exposi ti on of th e common l aw" );
Gl enn, supra note 231, at 277 (noti ng proh i biti ons i mposed i n the earl y 1800s by New Jersey,
Kentucky, and Pennsyl vania on the use of Engl i sh case law); R OSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 117 (1921) (same).
260
See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. at 3 (2004) (all owi ng that courts may consi der th e
" judgments, laws, or pronounce me nts of forei gn i nstituti ons" i nsofar as they "i nform an
understandi ng of the ori gi nal meani ng of th e laws of th e United States"); Hearing on H.R. Res. 568,
supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Representative Tom Feeney) (emphasi zi ng that th e " Reaffi rmi ng
Ameri can Independence Resol uti on" " doesn't prohi bi t any court from ever l ooki ng at forei gn
laws as l ong as th ose laws i nform an understandi ng of th e ori gi nal meani ng").
261
See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. Res. 568, supra note 5, at 1-4 (statement of Steve Chabot, Chai rman,
Subcommi ttee on th e Consti tuti on) (quoti ng the Declarati on of Independe nce, and objecti ng that
Ameri cans "are not subject to th e di ctates of one worl d governme nt"); id. at 49 (testi mony of
Jeremy Rabki n) (argui ng that th e European Uni on "i s really set on undermi ni ng A meri can
soverei gnty"); supra note 16 (di scussi ng th e " Reaffi rmi ng Ameri can Independe nce Resol uti on").
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disagreement with particular decisions that happen to include references to
foreign materials.

For example, though the Republican members of the

Subcommittee make repeated and unfavorable references to Lawrence v. Texas262
and Atkins v. Virginia,263 no one makes any mention of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg,264 which cites Canadian case law, invokes a
"norm among western democracies," and discusses the Dutch experience with
euthanasia in rejecting the existence of a constitutional right on the part of the
terminally ill to physician-assisted suicide. 265 Nor is Glucksberg the exception to
the rule: as Michael Ramsey observes, "in most historical examples the Court has
used international materials to deny a proposed right."266 Indeed, he argues that
"rigorous use" of international materials is inherently likely to favor rightsconstriction over rights-expansion.267
Ramsey is profoundly skeptical, however, that the Court has made, or will
make, "rigorous use" of international materials.

In his view, if international

materials are to enjoy "a meaningful place in constitutional adjudication," judges
must not use them simply to engage in "opportunistic advocacy." 268 To that end,
he offers the following suggestions:
First, there must be a neutral theory as to which international
materials are relevant and how they should be used. Second, we
must be willing to "take the bitter with the sweet" - that is, to use
international materials evenhandedly to constrict domestic rights as
well as to expand them. Third, we must get the facts right by
engaging in rigorous empirical inquiry about international
practices rather than making facile generalizations. And fourth, we
must avoid easy shortcuts to international practice that rely on
unrepresentative proxies such as United Nations agencies. 269

262

123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (stri ki ng down laws agai nst same-sex sodomy).
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (h ol di ng that executi on of th e mentally retarded constitutes " cruel and
unusual" puni sh ment prohi bited by th e Ei ghth Amendment).
264
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
265
Id. at 710 n.8; see id. at 734. Th e Glucksberg opi ni on cites th e Canadian Supreme Court's opi ni on
i n Rodri guez v. Bri ti sh Col umbi a (Attorney General ), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (1993), whi ch itself
canvasses th e laws of Austria, Spai n, Ital y, th e U.K., th e Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and
France. Glucksberg specifi call y quotes with approval th e Canadian court's concl usi on that "a
blanket prohi biti on on assi sted sui ci de . . . i s the norm among western democraci es." Gl ucksber g,
521 U.S. at 710 n.8 (quoti ng Rodri guez, [1993] 3 S.C.R. at 521).
266
Ramsey, supra note 252, at 72.
267
Id. at 81.
268
Id. at 80.
269
Id. at 69-70.
263
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Ramsey's guidelines raise a host of interrelated questions. First, would it be
desirable to implement them? In some cases, the answer is clearly yes. It is
difficult to argue that generalizations about foreign law should be facile, or that
the United Nations is in fact a representative proxy for legal practice around the
world.

Second, is it possible for judges to implement his suggestions? For

example, what if American lawyers and judges are not capable of anything but
"facile generalizations" about international practice? What if they prove to be as
amateurish at comparative legal analysis as they are at, say, history270 or
economics271? As difficult as these questions are, they are also mercifully simple
insofar as they might conceivably be answered in an empirical way; other
questions turn, however, upon the notion of "neutrality," which amounts to an
essentially contested concept in Gallie's sense of the term.272 Is it possible to
articulate a "neutral theory" of comparative analysis – or, indeed, of any
approach to constitutional adjudication? Indeed, what is a "neutral theory" in
constitutional adjudication? Does any ostensibly neutral theory face the same
suspicions and criticisms attracted by other ostensibly "neutral" methodologies
such as textualism, or originalism, or law and economics? Third, assuming that
judges are capable of following Ramsey's suggestions, is it plausible that they will
actually do so? Will e ither judges or the lawyers who appear before them
actually engage in "rigorous empirical inquiry" into foreign law?

If it is

somehow possible both to formulate and to apply a "neutral theory" of
comparative analysis, will judges do so faithfully? Finally, if implementation of
Ramsey's suggestions is unlikely or even impossib le, what is to be done instead?
What is our theory of the second-best? If neutrality in adjudication and skilled
270

See, e.g., JACK N. R AKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND I DEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 4-11 (1996) (observi ng that ori gi nali sm, as a strategy of consti tuti onal
i nterpretati on, i s at odds with th e professi onal hi storian's attenti on to ambi gui ty and nuance, and
cri ti ci zi ng the Supreme Court's use of " ori gi nali st evi dence" as "a mi x of 'law offi ce hi story' and
justifi catory rh etori c"); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. R EV.
119 passim (surveyi ng th e Court's l ong traditi on of twi sti ng h i story to i ts own purposes, and
assessi ng the resul ts as " very poor i ndeed," from a " professi onal poi nt of vi ew").
271
See, e.g., MARK K ELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL S TUDIES 114-65 (1987) (criti qui ng at l ength
both the nor mati ve and empi ri cal assumpti ons underl yi ng " Chi cago sch ool " law and economi cs).
272
See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC . ARISTOTELIAN S OC' Y 167, 169 (1956)
(" Th ere are concepts whi ch are essentially contested, concepts th e proper use of whi ch i nevitabl y
i nvolves endl ess di sputes about th ei r proper uses on th e part of th ei r users.").
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comparative analysis are beyond judicial reach, is the answer to abandon the
effort altogether, as Ramsey argues?273

Or does constitutional adjudication

already consist of "opportunistic advocacy," with or without a foreign flair? For
that matter, is there any kind of advocacy other than the opportunistic kind?
In arguing for adoption of a "neutral theory as to which international
materials are relevant and how they should be used," Ramsey sets an impossible
goal. He does so, moreover, in response to a concern that is no way unique to
comparative constitutional analysis. According to Ramsey, having a neutral
theory – namely, one "that can be applied consistently from case to case" "confirms that we are not merely pursuing our own moral preferences."274 As he
acknowledges,275 this is the same view that Herbert Wechsler took decades ago in
his celebrated article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law. 276

The

argument is that judges must decide constitutional cases on the basis of "neutral
principles" formulated without regard to the result in any particular case, if they
are to claim that what they do r ises above ordinary political decisionmaking.277
To be sure, one could keep worse intellectual company than Herbert Wechsler.
Unfortunately, Ramsey's rendition of Wechsler's argument is open to the same
objections as the original, and those are many.278 The principal objection goes
something like this. The Wechslerian argument envisions that we begin with the
"special values" embodied in the Constitution279 and extract from these values
"neutral principles" which are then used to decide cases. This process requires,
first, identification of the relevant values; second, the extraction of principles
from those values; and third, the application of principles to facts, which will by
273

See id. at 72.
Id.
275
See id. at 72 n.18 (citi ng Herbert Wech sl er, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
H ARV. L. R EV. 1 (1959)).
276
Herbert Wech sl er, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H ARV. L. R EV. 1 (1959).
277
See id. at 12, 15-16.
278
Criti ci sm of Wech sler's argume nt was qui ckl y forth comi ng even at th e ti me. See Arth ur S.
Mill er & Ronal d F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. R EV.
661 passim (1960). More broadl y, Wech sl er's argument pl aces hi m squarel y wi thi n the so-call ed
Legal Process sch ool of th ough t, whi ch has endured decades of criti ci sm from cri ti cal l egal
sch olars and oth ers with out di sappeari ng. See LAURA K ALMAN , THE S TRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 34-37, 82-93 (1996); William N. Eskri dge & Phili p P. Fri ckey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction to Th e Legal Process, in H ENRY M. H ART, JR. & ALBERT M. S ACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
B ASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at c-cxxxi v (William N. Eskri dge &
Phili p P. Fri ckey eds., 1994) (tentative ed. 1958).
279
Wech sler, supra note 276, at 19.
274
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definition be principled and therefore not result-oriented. At every step of this
process, however, substantive disagreement rears its ugly head – at the
identification of values, at the extraction of principles, and at the application of
principle to fact.

The result can be called neutral neither in theory nor in

application. When people disagree over what it means to be neutral, there can be
no such thing as neutrality.
Ramsey does identify what he calls a "neutral principle " implicit in the
Court's recent decisions – namely, that international materials can be used either
to defeat or (with greater difficulty) to support "abstract claims" as to the
"universality" or "inevitable consequences" of particular constitutional rules.280
This principle, he suggests, "would provide a defensible basis for the use of
international materials." 281 But does this principle exhaust the realm of neutral
possibilities? For the most part, Ramsey maintains, with Wechsler, that a neutral
principle is simply one that is formulated without regard to the result in any
particular case. If so, is there any use of international materials that could not be
considered "principled"? For example, may international comparisons be made
for the purpose of shaming judges to action? If, as a society, we aspire to enjoy
constitutional protections second to none, and to lead other societies by positive
example, is it not principled to pursue those goals by means of comparison?282
Perhaps it is a healthy pr ide that shames English judges into reading Convention
principles into the common law283; perhaps it would reflect a similar, widely
shared pride in our own Constitution if our judges were shamed into prohibiting
the execution of juveniles.284
At

some

points,

Ramsey

appears

to

equate

"neutrality"

with

"evenhandedness," as when he says international materials must be used
"evenhandedly to constrict domestic r ights as well as to expand them." 285 But
"neutrality," defined as this sort of Solomonic evenhandedness, is then simply a
280

Ramsey, supra note 252, at 75.
Id.
282
See R OBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., THE MOBILIZATION OF S HAME: A W ORLD V IEW OF H UMAN R IGHTS
193 (2001) (laudi ng gr oups such as Human Ri ghts Watch for th ei r deli berate use of sh ame, and
cli ngi ng to th e h ope that "l yi ng deep withi n the Ameri can soul i s the desi re to provi de l eadershi p
and moral i deal s").
283
See supra note 215 and accompanyi ng text (di scussi ng Derbyshire County Council v. Times).
284
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J., di ssenti ng).
285
Ramsey, supra note 252, at 70.
281
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preference that international materials not be used in a way that favors the
expansion of rights. Shaming may be principled, but it is not "neutral" if
neutrality is defined in this manner. By its very nature, shaming is a one-way
ratchet: we may be shamed into expanding constitutional protections, but it is
difficult to see how we could be shamed into contracting them. It sounds neutral
to say that we must either follow the lead of other countries faithfully, or not
follow their lead at all. But what is really neutral about opposing the idea that
constitutional comparisons should only be performed for the limited purpose of
shaming?

Does neutrality require that we fetishize consistency with other

countries for its own sake? Either we must adopt a substantive position in order
to give "neutrality" meaning – in which case we are no longer "neutral" - or
neutrality means nothing at all.
The use of foreign legal materials does raise a legitimate concern, but the
true nature of this concern emerges only if all pretense of neutrality is dropped
from constitutional argument.

As a means of interpreting the constitution,

comparative legal analysis may well be irreducibly non-neutral or prone to
opportunistic use – but so is any other ostensibly neutral approach to
constitutional adjudication that might be imagined. The real question is, does
comparative analysis pose any special risk of abuse not posed by other
approaches? Is foreign or international law a uniquely harmful or dangerous
source of persuasive authority in constitutional adjudication, as compared to
other sources? Is the siren song of foreign authority so allur ing that it renders
American judges incapable of judgment, such that its use should be prohibited?
Judges draw upon a variety of sources in deciding cases – not merely (or even
frequently) from the case law of the Canadian Supreme Court, but also from
treatises,286 and dictionaries, 287 and microeconomics,288 and studies of how
286

For exampl e, a Lexi sNexi s search of Supreme Court deci si ons for "Hart & Wech sler" – as i n
R ICHARD H. F ALLON , JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. S HAPIRO, H ART AND W ECHSLER' S THE
F EDERAL COURTS AND THE F EDERAL S YSTEM (5th ed. 2003) – turns up no l ess than 77 cases i n whi ch
thi s casebook and its precursor edi ti ons appear. See, e.g., Ari zona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31-32 & 31
n.6, 34 n.7 (1995) (Stevens, J., di ssenti ng); With row v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993) (majority
opi ni on of Souter, J.); id. at 719, 721 (Scalia, J., concurri ng i n part and di ssenti ng i n part).
Si milarly, a search for " Tri be, Ameri can Constituti onal Law" – as i n TRIBE, ci ted above i n note 34,
and earli er editi ons - yi el ds 62 resul ts.
287
See, e.g., Chi som v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., di ssenti ng) (usi ng Webster's
Second New Internati onal Di cti onary (1950) to defi ne the term " representati ves" as it appears i n §
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children play with dolls, 289 and public opinion polls, 290 and the kind of historical
research that actual historians deride as "law office history,"291 to name a few of
the more obvious culprits. By what right do judges allow any of these sources to
influence the interpretation of the Constitution and laws of the United States?
The indisputab le answer is the tautological one: it is acceptable for judges
to use that which is acceptable, whereas it is unacceptable for judges to use
anything that is unacceptable. To be more precise, the authority of judges to use
any source – domestic or foreign, legal or nonlegal – always rests upon the same
considerations: first, the legal community's internal standards of what constitutes
persuasive argument; and second, the accountability of judges to a wider
audience.
1.

The legal community's internal standards of persuasiveness. -- To some

extent, this check upon what constitutes persuasive constitutional argument is
circular: insofar as the Supreme Court has the final word on what constitutes a
winning constitutional argument, it is within the power of the Supreme Court to
remake the standards of acceptable argument.

Justice Breyer can make it

acceptable to cite international case law simply by doing so repeatedly, if only
because he has one-fifth292 of the final say over what constitutes a winning
constitutional argument in this country.

Nor is he in the minority on the

relevance of foreign case law. No prudent advocate can ignore the numbers –

2 of the Voti ng Ri gh ts Act); Ell en Aprill , The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIZ. S T. L.J. 275 passim (1998).
288
See, e.g., R ICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW passim (6th ed. 2002) (guaranteei ng
hi msel f at least one judi cial adh erent); GUIDO CALABRE SI , THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS passim (1970) (same).
289
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citi ng research by Kenneth and
Mami e Clark on the preference of black chil dren for white doll s); RICHARD K LUGER, S IMPLE
JUSTICE 315-36, 573-74, 705-07, 718-22 (1977) (di scussi ng Kenneth Clark's i nfl uence on th e Brown
liti gati on and deci si on); MICHAEL COLE & S HEILA R. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 398
(3d ed. 1996) (revi ewi ng sci entifi c debate over th e Clark studi es).
290
See, e.g., Atki ns v. Vi rgi nia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (argi ng that " polli ng data sh ows a
wi despread consensus among A meri cans, even th ose wh o support th e death penalty, that
executi ng th e mentally retarded i s wrong" ); id. at 325-37 & app. (Reh nqui st, C.J., di ssenti ng)
(produci ng th e raw polli ng data on thi s very questi on, and rai si ng a vari ety of meth odol ogi cal
obje cti ons to th e majority's use of th e data).
291
E.g., R AKOVE, supra note 270, at 11 (quoti ng yet anoth er hi storian, Leonard Levy); Kell y, supra
note 270, at 132.
292
It i s fi tti ng to say one-fifth , not one-ni nth , because deci si onmaki ng by th e Court requi res th e
agreement of onl y fi ve justi ces.
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namely, that there are nine justices, and that the number six is greater than the
number three. 293
On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent judges who disagree with
any particular approach from fighting back.

And they do.

There is no

enforceable code of conduct in constitutional argument – or, for that matter, in
intellectual argument – that excludes the use of any particular authority. There is
only what David Mamet calls "the Chicago way." Mamet is the author of the line
delivered by Sean Connery's character, crusty Irish cop Jim Malone, to Kevin
Costner's Eliot Ness, on how to deal with Al Capone, in the 1987 film version of
The Untouchables: "If he pulls a knife, you pull a gun. If he sends one of yours to
the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. That's the Chicago way."294
Thus, Justice Breyer cites the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, and Justice Thomas
publicly ridicules him for doing so.295 That, too, is the Chicago way. Both sides
of the debate would be foolish not to use all the authority and rhetorical
weaponry at their disposal, subject to their own calculations that the persuasive
benefits from doing so will outweigh the losses inflicted by the other side in
response.296 That is all the restraint that constitutional adjudication requires - or,

293

See Vi cki Jackson, Yes Please, I'd Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jul y-August 2004, at xx
(counti ng si x members of the current Court – Chi ef Justi ce Reh nqui st and Justi ces Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, Gi nsbur g and Breyer – wh o have i n recent years " referred, i n li mited ways, to forei gn
or i nternati onal legal sources" ); supra notes 1-10 and accompanyi ng text (descri bi ng th e current
di vi si on on th e Court). Whatever li ngeri ng doubts advocates may harbor as to th e practi cal val ue
of comparati ve argume nts, Justi ce Breyer has done h i s best to di spel them:
Neith er I nor my law cl erks can easil y fi nd rel evant comparative material on our
own. The lawyers must do the basi c work, fi ndi ng, analyzi ng, and referri ng us
to, that material. I know th ere i s a chi cken and egg probl em. Th e lawyers will do
so onl y if th ey believe the courts are recepti ve. By now, h owever, i t sh oul d be
cl ear that the chi cken has broken out of th e egg. Th e demand i s th ere.
Breyer, supra note 4.
294
THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Studi os 1987). The Court itself has been known to ch ampi on
th e Chi cago way on occasi on. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
(i nvali dati ng hate speech ordi nance on Fi rst Amendme nt grounds) ("St. Paul has no such
auth ori ty to li cense one si de of a debate to fi ght freestyl e, whil e requi ri ng th e oth er to foll ow
Marqui s of Q ueensbury R ul es.").
295
See supra note 10 (descri bi ng exchanges between Justi ces Scalia and Th omas, on th e one hand,
and Justi ce Breyer, on th e oth er, i n th e death penalty context).
296
Judge Posner's account of h ow judges use auth ority comports wi th the account of
constituti onal argume nt offered h ere, th ough h e i s more i ncli ned to cri ti ci ze than to accept what
h e sees. In hi s words, th e citi ng of forei gn case law
i s one more form of judi ci al fi g-leafi ng, of whi ch we have enough al ready. ... Indepth research for a judi cial opi ni on i s usuall y conducted after rather than before
th e judges h ave voted, al beit tentati vely, on th e outcome. Citi ng forei gn deci si ons
i s probably best understood as an effort, wh ether or not consci ous, to furth er
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indeed, permits, given that there is no appeal from the Supreme Court. A judge
who is willing to resort to international materials enjoys no unfair advantage
over colleagues disinclined to do the same. The use of such materials does not
render him immune from criticism, or have a chilling effect on his critics, or
shock the opposition into silence. If anything, the opposite is true.
Any victory won by opponents of comparative constitutional argument
may, however, be Pyrrhic. Insofar as their goal is simply to prevent judges from
cloaking arguments in the prestige and authority of other courts or
jurisdictions, 297 anti-comparativists may well succeed. Criticism may dissuade
judges from citing foreign jurisdictions openly. But no amount of criticism is
likely to prevent judges from plagiarizing covertly. There is no effective way to
distinguish in substance between the decision of a judge who has arrived
independently at what he believes to be a reasonable and appropriate approach,
and that of a judge who has silently considered the approaches adopted by other
jurisdictions and sele cted what he believes to be the most reasonable and
appropriate of them.

Nor have the critics of comparativism mounted any

convincing argument that judges must fashion constitutional doctrine that is
wholly original and unique to this country. It is one thing to object to imitation
for the sake of imitation; it is another thing to object to adoption of an
intrinsically sensible approach simply because it has already been adopted
elsewhere.

The result may ultimately be to invite subterfuge on the part of

comparison-minded judges.298
2. Judicial accountability to a wider audience. – It is an open secret that judges
are accountable for the quality and nature of their arguments not just to one

mystify th e adjudi cati ve process and di sgui se th e politi cal deci si ons that are th e
core, th ough not th e enti rety, of th e Supreme Court's output.
Posner, supra note 28, at xx.
297
See id. at xx (criti ci zi ng th e use of forei gn case l aw as "auth ori ty" or " precedent," but not as a
source of " persuasive reasoni ng" ).
298
Th e ri sk that judges wi ll resort to covert borrowi ng i n th e face of resi stance to expli cit
comparati ve analysi s i s more than h ypotheti cal. Edward McWhi nney relates th e exampl e of
Canadian Supreme Court Justi ce Ivan Rand, a Harvard Law Sch ool graduate wh o di scovered
that oth er members of the court were resi stant to th e noti on of emul ati ng Ameri can approach es
to consti tuti onal questi ons. Rand ul ti mately succeeded i n adopti ng a number of th ose
approaches for th e court – i n part by faili ng to acknowl edge th ei r Ameri can ori gi ns. See Edward
McWhi nney, Judicial Review in a Federal and Plural Society: The Supreme Court of Canada, in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL S YSTEMS, supra note 94, at 69-70.
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another, but also to the rest of us. The idea of judicial independence is something
of a sacred cow, even though the judiciary in this country is not independent of
political forces and has never been - not since the Jeffersonians sought to rescind
the appointment of a federal magistrate named Marbury. By contrast, the very
notions of judicial accountability and responsibility are regarded with distrust;
they conjure up unhappy images of judges criticized or pressured into resigning,
or even threatened with impeachment for unpopular decisions. 299 But to dwell
upon judicial independence without thinking about judicial accountability is to
harp upon the separation of powers without regard to the fact that the
Constitution also establishes checks and balances. As argued above,300 the power
of the president to nominate federal judges, and the Senate's powers of advice
and consent, are mechanisms that ensure the composition of the bench reflects
the dominant forces of American political life. It has been nearly fifty years since
Robert Dahl observed that the members of the Supreme Court are replaced with
such regularity "that the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long
out of line with the po licy v iews dominant among the lawmaking majorities of
the United States." 301 He - and the political scientists who have followed in his
footsteps302 - still await a strong empirical rebuttal.303 And they shall continue to

299

A di squi eti ng exampl e i s that of Cli nton di stri ct court appoi ntee Harol d Baer, wh o was
th reatened by Republi can congressi onal l eaders wi th i mpeach ment over an evi dentiary ruli ng i n
a drug case, United States v. Bayl ess, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), whi ch Judge Baer
subseque ntl y recanted, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Th e Cli nton White House contri buted to
th e furor by i nsi nuati ng that it woul d request Judge Baer's resi gnati on if he di d not reverse
hi msel f. See Jon O. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156 passim (1997); Joan
Bi skupi c, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism', W ASH . POST., Sept. 14, 1997, at A1; Ann
Devroy & Joh n M. Gosh ko, President Answers GOP, Other Critics on Judiciary, W ASH . POST., Apr. 3,
1996, at A3. Anoth er promi nent exampl e i s that of th e attempt made by House Republ i cans to
i mpeach Justi ce William O. Douglas, ostensi bl y for th e offense of publi shi ng excerpts from hi s
book i n a magazi ne that featured sexuall y expli ci t material. Geral d Ford, th en House Mi nori ty
Leader, l ed th e effort and declared at the ti me that "an i mpeachabl e offense i s anythi ng a majority
of the House of Representati ves consi ders [i t] to be at a given moment i n hi story." JEFFREY A.
S EGAL & H AROLD J. S PAETH, THE S UPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 128 n.11 (1993).
300
See supra note 100 and accompanyi ng text.
301
Dahl, supra note 34, at 285.
302
See Geral d N. Rosenberg, The Road Taken: Robert A. Dahl's Deci si on-Maki ng i n a Democracy:
Th e Supreme Court as a Nati onal Poli cy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 613 passim (2001) (di scussi ng th e
i ntellectual l egacy of Dahl's arti cle); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MODERN
COURT 68-70 (1989) (same); supra note 100 (di scussi ng th e work of Dahl, Rosenberg, and Barrow
et al.).
303
Thi s i s not to suggest that Dahl's li ne of argument has escaped criti cal empi ri cal eval uati on.
See Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM . POL. S CI . R EV. 50
passim (1976). Casper takes Dahl to task for usi ng th e i nvali dati on of federal l egi slati on as hi s sol e
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wait, for the last five decades have been kind, on the whole, to Dahl's argument.
Who, today, is prepared to argue that the ideological balance of the bench does
not reflect an ongoing struggle between political actors who have sought to tip it
one way or the other?
It is the premise of so much constitutional theory that we cannot accept
judicial review unless we believe in the independence of judicial decisionmaking
from political influence. 304 That premise is questionable. As reasons to accept
judicial review go, judicial independence may be overrated, while judicial
accountability may be underrated.305 In this post-Bush v. Gore,306 post-Roe v.
Wade-then-Planned Parenthood v. Casey,307 post-Bowers-then-Lawrence308 age, in
which presidential candidates openly campaign on the composition of the
Supreme Court, and circuit and even district court nominees face defeat on
ideological grounds,309 it cannot be assumed that people think judges are even
capable of political neutrality. Yet no widescale repudiation of judicial review
appears to be forthcoming. It did not take the National Guard to enforce any of
these decisions 310 - not even the one that decided a presidential ele ction against a
majority of actual voters. No one has proposed a new Court-packing plan.311
Why so? The indisputable answer is, again, the tautological one: the Court has
measure of th e extent to whi ch th e Court has foll owed (or resi sted) th e prevaili ng lawmaki ng
majori ty, to th e excl usi on of cases i nvolvi ng statutory constructi on or the constituti onality of state
laws. See id. at 56-60. Neverth eless, Casper deems much of th e extended evi dence i nconcl usi ve
and concl udes that, " [i ]n some areas, th e pattern Dahl suggests does seem apposi te: unpopul ar
deci si ons be come part of the country's politi cal agenda, and changes i n pol iti cal regi mes affected
recrui tment to th e Court." Id. at 59.
304
See, e.g., Loui s Mi chael Sei dman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. R EV. 1571, 157173 (1988) (observi ng that " several generati ons of poli ti cal theori sts and academi c lawyers" have
struggl ed to reconcil e " democrati c premi ses" with th e noti on that "an i ndependent judi ciary,
unco-opted by th e politi cal ai ms of th e ruli ng majori ty and wi lli ng to defend i ndi vi dual s' ri ghts
agai nst governme nt abuse, seems cr ucial to li beral democracy" - th en attempti ng the same task).
305
Cf. Frances Kah n Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
R EV. 625, 629-31 (1996) (argui ng that "if th e publi c i s to conti nue to grant auth ori ty to th e courts, it
will be on th e basi s of deci si onal i ndependence accompani ed by accountability" ).
306
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
307
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenth ood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
308
Bowers v. Hardwi ck, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
309
See Davi d S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner's Dilemma,
26 CARD OZO L. R EV. ___ (forth comi ng 2004).
310
See K LUGER, supra note 289, at 753-54 (noti ng Ei senh ower's rel uctance to depl oy troops to Littl e
Rock i n th e wake of Brown v. Board).
311
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE F EDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
H ISTORICAL ANALYSIS 124, 155 (2000) (di scussi ng Frankli n Roosevelt's i nfamous proposal to
i ncrease the membershi p of th e Court i n order to overcome i ts resi stance to th e New Deal).
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not in recent decades sufficiently antagonized enough people, for long enough,
to provoke such extreme reactions. That it has not done so, however, may have
something to do with the fact that political actors have paid careful attention to
the views of those they appoint, such that the views represented on the bench
reflect the political forces of the day (and those of the recent past312). Perhaps the
time has come to celebrate, not criticize, the scrutiny given to judicial nominees.
A newfound popular appreciation of the extent to which political forces
determine both the composition of the bench and the direction of constitutional
adjudication may actually imbue judges with some measure of the democratic
legitimacy that they so often claim to lack. 313 The fact that the judiciary is subject
to political control - even if only indirectly and with some lag - is a respectable
reason to tolerate the judicial invalidation of statutes.
The fact of accountability means that, when constitutional questions arise,
we have good reason to prefer that they be decided by a federal judge in Saint
Louis than by a multinational pane l of judges in Strasbourg. Though we may not
like to dwell upon the power that we enjoy over our independent judges, it is
simply the case that the judge in Saint Louis is more accountable to us for the
exercise of her power than any number of judges in Strasbourg. Through our
representatives, we determine her appointment, her replacement, and even, in
the extreme, her impeachment. The marriage of power to accountability is again
a respectable reason, free of xenophobia or nativism, to submit to a judge in Saint
Louis, but not to a judge in Strasbourg. For our judge in Saint Louis merely to
cite a judge in Strasbourg, however, does not diminish her responsibility to us for
what she does. In citing foreign case law, she relinquishes to Strasbourg neither
the power to interpret the Constitution nor responsibility for the decision
reached. International legal materials do not apply themselves to domestic legal
disputes; neither, for that matter, do dictionaries, or the Federalist Papers, or

312

See Ri chard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM . POL. SCI. R EV. 795, 805-06
(1975) (confi rmi ng Dahl's hypoth esi s that, "duri ng peri ods of el ectoral and parti san reali gnme nt,"
th ere exi sts a "lag peri od" owi ng to th e li fe tenure of th e justi ces duri ng whi ch ti me th e Court i s
more li kely than usual to be " out of li ne" wi th th e lawmaki ng majori ty).
313
Judge Posner has made a si milar clai m, and he has done so wi th out i nvoki ng th e empi ri cal
research on the extent and regulari ty of judi cial turnover and replacement. See Posner, supra note
28, at xx (observi ng that di rect and i ndi rect popular control s over the sel ecti on of state and
federal judges i mbues th em with "a certai n democrati c l egiti macy" lacki ng i n forei gn judges).
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microeconomic concepts. A judge is responsible for her own choice and use of
persuasive authorities; the burden and responsibility of judgment remain
inalienably her own.
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